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INTRODUCTION
The standard of proof (“SOP”) for criminal convictions in the United
States—and in many other jurisdictions1—is proof beyond a reasonable
doubt (the “BARD” standard). The Supreme Court held that this standard
was a constitutional requirement in 1970 in In re Winship.2 The standard,
which is customarily thought to require the fact finder to be at least 90%

1. See infra notes 29–34.
2. 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). Winship was not a unanimous opinion, but all
of the Justices agreed on the substantive conclusion. Justices Burger and Stewart
dissented on the ground that “[t]he original concept of the juvenile court system
was to provide a benevolent and less formal means than criminal courts could
provide for dealing with the special and often sensitive problems of youthful
offenders.” Id. at 376 (Burger, J., dissenting). They avoid requiring the BARD
standard, then, by distinguishing convictions in juvenile courts from “criminal”
convictions. Justice Black also dissented, but his reasons were grounded in concerns
about judicial restraint. Id. at 385–86 (Black, J., dissenting). Substantively, he
agreed that “a strong, persuasive argument can be made for a standard of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal cases—and the majority has made that
argument well.” Id. at 385.
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certain of the defendant’s guilt to convict,3 is now part of American legal
folklore. But neither the BARD standard’s proper interpretation nor its
theoretical justification are settled and clear.4 This Article aims to address
both of these deficits.
To address these deficits, it will be helpful to have a clear sense of
what an SOP does. Understood most generally, an SOP provides an agent
with a practical standard for determining that an action is sufficiently
likely to be objectively justified for her to permissibly and blamelessly
perform it.5 This concept applies not only to judicial actions, such as
convicting a criminal defendant, but to any action that an agent might perform,
and that might, depending on facts that are not known to her, be objectively
justifiable. That is, it applies not only to convictions but also to acts such as
self-defense. It also implies both that an agent can act permissibly and
blamelessly even if she does what is objectively unjustifiable, and that she can
act impermissibly and in a way that warrants blame even if she does what is
objectively justifiable. The focus in this Article, however, will be determining
when criminal convictions are impermissible because the likelihood of
punishing an innocent person is too high.
To be clear, punishing an innocent person wrongs that person.
Nonetheless, if the state’s fact finder has found him guilty using the morally
correct SOP, then the state acts permissibly and blamelessly. It acts
permissibly and blamelessly, despite the unfortunate result, because its
agents took all the care that they were required to take.6 Thus, the challenge
for a theory of the SOP for a criminal conviction is to determine: (1) how
stringent the SOP must be before a fact finder meeting the standard acts

3. See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Dangerousness and Expertise Redux, 56
EMORY L.J. 275, 306 (2006).
4. One dispute that this Article does not pursue further concerns the standard
for mixed questions of law and fact. See United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506,
522–23 (1995) (finding that courts must use the BARD standard to answer mixed
questions of law and fact); but see Youngjae Lee, Reasonable Doubt and Moral
Elements, 105 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY (forthcoming 2015) (where the law
involves making vague moral judgments, such as that a person’s actions were
“cruel,” the state should not have to meet the BARD standard).
5. See T.M. SCANLON, MORAL DIMENSIONS: PERMISSIBILITY, MEANING,
BLAME 49–52 (2008) (treating permissibility as an action guiding term).
Permissibility and blame can come apart; it can be permissible to do the right thing
for the wrong reason and thereby merit blame. But such worries are outside the
scope of this Article.
6. If the state discovers later that the person was actually innocent, the state
should recognize that it owes compensation for the wrong done. But this
compensation is analogous to a kind of strict liability debt for faultless
wrongdoing, and one should not interpret the state’s owing compensation as
implying that the state was at fault for the wrong done.
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permissibly, even if she mistakenly convicts the innocent, and (2) whether
the BARD standard satisfies that level.
Given that the BARD standard is well-settled law, it may seem
unnecessary to investigate it. But it takes just a little digging in history to
show that it is not so obvious how to set the right SOP for a criminal
conviction. Many people associate the BARD standard with Blackstone’s
ratio, according to which “it is better that ten guilty persons escape, than
that one innocent suffer.”7 But the ten-to-one ratio is just one of a range of
positions that has been taken by notable thinkers and politicians. On a
much more cautious note, Moses Maimonides wrote: “[I]t is better and more
satisfactory to acquit a thousand guilty persons than to put a single innocent
man to death.”8 Voltaire, who saw the options as more evenly balanced,
declared “that it is better to risk saving a guilty man than to condemn an
innocent.”9 And Otto von Bismark is reported to have said that “it is better
that ten innocent men suffer than that one guilty man escape.”10 These
remarks suggest an SOP range going from essentially 100% certainty to
something closer to a 10% possibility.11 Assuming, contrary to some case
law,12 that some sort of quantitative measure should guide jury
considerations, one must determine which measure is best.

7. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, ARTICLEARIES *358. This and the next three
citations can all be found in Alexander Volojh, N Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REV.
173, 178, 193, 195 (1997)
8. 2 MOSES MAIMONIDES, THE COMMANDMENTS 270 (Charles B. Chavel
trans., Soncino Press Ltd. 1967) (1166).
9. 1 VOLTAIRE, ZADIG OU LA DESTINÉE 28 (Librairie Marcel Didier 1962)
(1747).
10. John W. Wade, Uniform Comparative Fault Act, 14 FORUM 379, 385
(1979).
11. The connection between the ratio and the SOP is only suggestive. See,
e.g., Michael L. DeKay, The Difference Between Blackstone-Like Error Ratios
and Probabilistic Standards of Proof, 21 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 95, 95 (1996)
(demonstrating that the SOP has implications for the ratio of false convictions to
false acquittals only if one also knows how accurately juries can distinguish the
guilty from the innocent and the proportion of defendants at trial who are guilty);
see also Ronald J. Allen & Larry Laudan, Deadly Dilemmas, 41 TEX. TECH. L.
REV. 65, 72, 76 (2008) (showing that it might be impossible to get the Blackstone
ratio in a situation with a seemingly low error rate of 5%; there might not be
enough guilty to acquit).
12. See, e.g., McCullough v. State, 657 P.2d 1157, 1159 (Nev. 1983) (“The
concept of reasonable doubt is inherently qualitative. Any attempt to quantify it
may impermissibly lower the prosecution’s burden of proof, and is likely to
confuse rather than clarify.”). But see Louis Kaplow, Burden of Proof, 121 YALE
L.J. 738, 773 n.62 (2012) (pointing out that consistency requires a tribunal to pick
a probability below which it acquits and above which it convicts). For further
discussion of whether the SOP can be quantified, see infra Part III.B.2.
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Two types of theorists have risen to this challenge. One group, whom
this Article refers to as “maximalists,” invoke a range of nonconsequentialist arguments to argue in favor of using the BARD standard.
The maximalists interpret the BARD standard in an extreme way so that,
contrary to current practice, the standard is as protective of the innocent as
possible without ruling out all convictions.13 This Article argues, however,
that the maximalist arguments are either conclusory or morally unsound.14
Other theorists, who take a fundamentally consequentialist approach,
constitute the second group.15 Many recent sophisticated consequentialist
arguments hold that the criminal law should, at least in certain kinds of
cases, either use or consider using an SOP that is lower than the very high
level of confidence customarily associated with the BARD standard.16 The
consequentialists who take this position argue that only a lower standard
would properly protect all the interests involved, including the interest
almost all share in being protected from the criminal acts of those who, if
falsely acquitted, would likely commit a greater number of violent crimes
than if convicted and incapacitated.17 Strikingly, these consequentialist
arguments also lead, in at least some cases, to an SOP so low—well below
13. See, e.g., 3 ANTONY DUFF ET AL., THE TRIAL ON TRIAL: TOWARDS A
NORMATIVE THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL TRIAL 89 (2007); ALEX STEIN,
FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW 172–83 (2005); Rinat Kitai, Protecting the
Guilty, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 1163, 1164 (2003); Laurence H. Tribe, Trial By
Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329
(1971). Note, Kitai seems to have changed her name to Kitai-Sangero, but, for
consistency, this Article will reference the name under which she published the
2003 paper.
14. See infra Part II.
15. See, e.g., Daniel Epps, The Consequences of Error in Criminal Justice,
128 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (2015); Kaplow, supra note 12; Larry Laudan, The Rules
of Trial, Political Morality, and the Costs of Error: Or, is Proof Beyond a
Reasonable Doubt Doing More Harm than Good?, in 1 OXFORD STUDIES IN
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 195 (Leslie Green & Brian Leiter eds., 2011); Erik Lillquist,
Recasting Reasonable Doubt: Decision Theory and the Virtues of Variability, 36
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 85 (2002).
16. This connection between consequentialism, or utilitarianism, and a lower
SOP for criminal law seems to have been first noticed by Saul Smilansky, and he
saw this as a reason not to be a utilitarian. See Saul Smilansky, Utilitarianism and
the ‘Punishment’ of the Innocent: The General Problem, 50 ANALYSIS 256
(1990). Laudan and Epps, however, embrace the prospect of using a lower SOP.
Laudan, supra note 15, at 207; Epps, supra note 15, at 1151. Kaplow does not
endorse the conclusion that the BARD standard is too high, but he is generally
skeptical of the reasons given in support of fixed standards that pay no attention
to the welfare implications of using a particular standard in a particular context.
17. This is Laudan’s primary point. See Laudan, supra note 15; see also
Kaplow, supra note 12, at 762 n.42, 803–04 n.112; Epps, supra note 15, at 1069
n.12.
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50%—that it becomes clear that consequentialism cannot really provide an
SOP for punishment. Though consequentialism can accord some significance
to the distinction between guilt and innocence, that significance is sometimes
drowned out by a concern with incapacitation and deterrence. In such cases,
consequentialism uses punishment as nothing more than a fig leaf for these
other goals. Therefore, consequentialism can only accidentally, and thus
unreliably, ground an SOP for punishment.18
The inability of consequentialism to provide an SOP for punishment,
combined with the failure of the maximalist arguments, sets the challenge
that this Article addresses: articulate a non-consequentialist account of the
right SOP for criminal convictions that captures the moral significance of
punishment as an act that presupposes guilt, and provide a practical measure
of the SOP that fits this account.
This Article argues that courts should retain the BARD standard, more
or less as it is customarily understood, as the proper SOP for most criminal
cases. It does not argue that courts should require that the fact finder be at
least 90% certain of the defendant’s guilt to convict.19 That is too rigid and
precise. The argument’s conclusion is more accommodating: Courts
should retain the requirement that the SOP for a criminal conviction is a
high, though not maximally high, standard.
This Article also argues that the justification for the BARD standard,
as a high but not maximally high standard, is found neither in general
deontological principles nor in consequentialist balances.20 That is to say,
its justification is not to be found in principles governing right action quite
generally—such as the distinction between doing and allowing—that are
independent of maximizing good consequences, nor is it to be found in the
principle that the right action maximizes good consequences. It is to be
found in the retributive justification for punishment itself. This is not the
first retributive defense of the BARD standard; Jeffrey Reiman offered

18. Consequentialists might argue that they simply work with a different
understanding of punishment. See infra Part III.D.
19. This Article argues that exceptions may exist when penalties are either
disproportionate or very small. See infra Part IV.D; cf. Lillquist, supra note 15, at
85 (arguing for a much broader variability in the SOP for criminal trials).
20. This is an example of a broader point, namely that only the right sort of
reasons can justify a given action or reaction. Stephen Darwall calls this point
“Strawson’s Point.” STEPHEN DARWALL, THE SECOND-PERSON STANDPOINT:
MORALITY, RESPECT, AND ACCOUNTABILITY 15 (2006). It can also be understood
in terms of what Joseph Raz calls exclusionary reasons, which exclude reasons
“by kind and not by weight.” JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON
LAW AND MORALITY 22 (1979).
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such a defense in 1990.21 But his argument mistakenly assumed, among
other things, that the duty to punish had to be owed to particular people. This
Article corrects his mistakes and thereby succeeds where his argument
fails.22
In a nutshell, the positive argument proceeds as follows: In a retributive
framework, the justification for punishment includes the thought that people
who have committed serious wrongs—crimes in the context of state
punishment—deserve punishment and that others have a right not to be
punished. A retributivist may recognize that desert is not the only reason to
punish; the good that punishment accomplishes by deterring and
incapacitating potential criminals provides, on any reasonable account of
retributivism, an important and sometimes necessary reason to punish.23 But
on a retributivist view, these instrumental reasons to punish are relevant to
punishment only once it has been determined that the person to be punished
deserves punishment. Desert functions like a switch in the normative
equivalent of a transistor; until the transistor is switched on, the potentially
greater normative force of the instrumental reasons cannot justify
punishment.24 The transistor metaphor may be novel, but the idea that desert
functions as both a necessary condition for punishing and a positive reason
to punish, lies at the very heart of retributivism.25 Moreover—and this is the
novel positive contribution of this Article—this transistor-like function is
true not only for the act of punishing, but also for setting the SOP for
determining whether someone deserves punishment.
If the state must establish that the defendant deserves punishment
before citing instrumental reasons to justify punishment, then the only
value of punishment that can be taken into account in establishing the SOP
is the value of doing justice by giving someone the punishment he deserves.
21. See Jeffrey Reiman & Ernest van den Haag, On the Common Saying that
It is Better that Ten Guilty Persons Escape than that One Innocent Suffer: Pro
and Con, 7 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 226, 230–34 (1990).
22. The differences between Reiman’s retributive accounts and those this
Article proposes are explained in more depth later in the article. See infra Part
IV.B.
23. See, e.g., Michael T. Cahill, Punishment Pluralism, in RETRIBUTIVISM:
ESSAYS ON THEORY AND POLICY 25, 29–30 (Mark D. White ed., 2011); Douglas
Husak, Holistic Retributivism, 88 CAL. L. REV. 991, 995 (2000); MICHAEL
MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 154
(1997).
24. Whether they can justify preventive detention is another matter. See Alec
Walen, A Unified Theory of Detention, with Application to Preventive Detention
for Suspected Terrorists, 70 MD. L. REV. 871 (2011) (discussing the moral
preconditions for preventive detention).
25. See Alec Walen, Retributive Justice, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (June
18, 2014), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/justice-retributive/.
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The right SOP for punishment should therefore reflect the balance of the
abstract positive value of punishing the guilty, and thereby accomplishing
justice, against the concrete harm of mistakenly punishing and blamelessly
wronging the innocent. This balance tips heavily, but not absolutely, in
favor of protecting the innocent. The result is an SOP in the ballpark of the
BARD standard as customarily understood.
Part I of this Article offers legal, historical, and sociological background
on the use of the BARD standard. Part II examines and rejects a range of
non-retributive, deontological, and generally maximalist accounts of the
BARD standard. Part III examines consequentialist accounts of the SOP for
criminal trials, showing that these accounts quite plausibly imply that the
state should use a lower standard than the BARD standard, in some cases
calling for a standard so low that it becomes clear that the connection to
punishment is a mere fig leaf. Finally, Part IV, drawing a lesson from the
faults of consequentialism, defends the retributive account of the BARD
standard.
I. BACKGROUND ON THE BARD STANDARD—GROUNDWORK
To set the stage for the normative argument, one must understand the
legal and social context in which this argument operates. This Part begins
with a discussion of the BARD standard’s legal background, both in the
United States and elsewhere, and describes the dominant judicial
interpretation of the BARD standard as well as the inadequate rationale
judges have given for using this standard. This Part then discusses the
standard’s history, arguing that it did not always serve the function that
courts now believe the standard serves. The BARD standard was not
always meant to convey a substantive standard of proof, implying that a
conviction can be acceptable only if the probability that the defendant is
innocent falls below a certain threshold.26 Rather, the problem that it was
originally introduced to address was that jurors were too reluctant to
convict because they were overly worried that if they convicted the
innocent they could face eternal damnation themselves. Accordingly, the
BARD standard was introduced to encourage the faint of heart to convict
by telling them not to worry if they had no reasonable doubts about the
defendant’s guilt.27 When the problem shifted and courts sought to
protect innocent defendants, courts made an effort to read the BARD
standard as a substantive SOP that would require a high degree of
proof.28 But the courts never clarified what was at stake in setting the
26. See infra Part I.B.
27. Id.
28. See infra Part I.A–B.
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proper SOP for a criminal conviction, and that has led to the current
confused state of BARD jurisprudence. Finally, this Part argues that the
way the standard is used in practice is quite inconsistent with the dominant
judicial rhetoric. Because one can resolve this tension between rhetoric
and practice in any number of ways, it is crucial to appeal to a plausible
normative framework to guide any attempted resolution of this tension.
A. The Legal Background of the BARD Standard
As Charles McCormick, the canonical writer on evidence, explained,
“demand for a higher degree of persuasion in criminal cases was recurrently
expressed from ancient times, but its crystallization into the formula
‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ seems to have occurred as late as 1798.”29
Despite this demand’s relatively late “crystallization” into the BARD
standard, it is now currently widespread. The English-speaking world fully
embraces the BARD standard,30 and is joined by a growing swath of
Western Europe, including Germany, Sweden, and most recently, Italy.31 In
29. CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 321,
at 681–82 (1954) (footnote omitted) (cited by Justice Brennan in In re Winship,
397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970)).
30. See Thomas V. Mulrine, Reasonable Doubt: How in the World is It
Defined?, 12 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 195 (1997) (Australia, Canada, and the
United Kingdom); Warren Young, Neil Cameron & Yvette Tinsley, Juries in
Criminal Trials, Part Two, (N.Z. Law Comm’n, Preliminary Paper No. 37, 1999)
(New Zealand); Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 § 105A(2)(a)(i) (S. Afr.)
(South Africa). The English Crown Court Bench Book directs judges to instruct
the jury: “The prosecution proves its case if the jury . . . are sure that the defendant
is guilty.” But it follows that with a note: “Being sure is the same as entertaining
no reasonable doubt.” JUDICIAL STUDIES BD., CROWN COURT BENCH BOOK:
DIRECTING THE JURY 16 (2010), available at http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wpcontent/uploads/JCO/Documents/Training/benchbook_criminal_2010.pdf [http://per
ma.cc/D8E2-ALVE].
31. See Richard S. Frase & Thomas Weigend, German Criminal Justice as a
Guide to American Law Reform: Similar Problems, Better Solutions?, 18 B.C.
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 317, 343–44 (1995); Fråga om utvisning på grund av brott.
Tillika spörsmål om beviskravoch bevisvärdering i brottmål [NJA] [Supreme
Court] 1980-12-23 § 725 (Swed.) (“utom rimligt tvivel” means “beyond
reasonable doubt”); see also CHRISTOPHER WONG, OVERVIEW OF SWEDISH
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 3 n.18 (2012), available at http://works.bepress.com
/christoffer_wong/15 [http://perma.cc/5AKM-3FJJ]; Federico Picinali, Is “Proof
Beyond a Reasonable Doubt” a Self-Evident Concept? Considering the U.S. and
the Italian Legal Cultures Towards the Understanding of the Standard of
Persuasion in Criminal Cases, 9 GLOBAL JURIST, art. 5 (2009) (noting that Italy
adopted the BARD standard in 2006). The French use a standard that seems
outwardly different. French fact finders must be “inwardly convinced”—they
must feel a conviction intime—of the defendant’s guilt. CODE PÉNAL [C. PÉN] art.
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addition, much of the rest of the democratic world, including Israel,32
India,33 and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,34 has also
adopted the BARD standard. Something about the standard rings true in
most liberal democracies.
The BARD standard seems to reflect a basic commitment to justice, and
as such, judges naturally express the standard in an idealistic, maximalist
manner. One can see this maximalist expression in Justice Brennan’s
opinion in In re Winship.35 Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan wrote:
“[T]he reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable, for it impresses on the
trier of fact the necessity of reaching a subjective state of certitude of the
facts in issue.”36 He reinforced that maximalist interpretation at the end of
his argument by writing that: “It is also important in our free society that
every individual going about his ordinary affairs have confidence that his
government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without
convincing a proper fact finder of his guilt with utmost certainty.”37
In truth, Brennan was exaggerating. The BARD standard does not
require a state of certainty. If the Court wanted to require certainty, Winship
should have required courts to base convictions on proof beyond any
rational doubt, no matter how unlikely to reflect reality. Further, if ensuring
that guilt is established with the utmost certainty were really important,
Winship should have introduced numerous changes to the structure of trials.
For example, the Court could have required trial courts to exclude
inculpatory testimony from accomplices who have struck plea bargains.38
But the Court did not require these types of changes. Indeed, in Addington
v. Texas,39 the Court indicated its awareness that some scholars had argued
353 (Fr.). Thomas Weigend, in personal conversation, has assured me that this is
functionally the same as the German standard. See also Kevin M. Clermont &
Emily Sherwin, A Comparative View of Standards of Proof, 50 AM. J. COMP. L.
243, 246 (2002) (“In actual practice, . . . the civil-law and common-law standards
for criminal cases are likely equivalent.”). Others, however, argue that the
standard is not the same as the BARD standard. See, e.g., Michele Taruffo,
Rethinking the Standards of Proof, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 659, 667 (2003) (asserting
that “intime conviction . . . stresses the value of the subjective ‘intimate’
persuasion of the single judge, relying mainly upon her individual and even
emotional beliefs. It does not mean by itself, however, that such beliefs must be
based upon a particularly high standard of proof . . . .”).
32. CA 9796/03 Haviv Shem-Tov v. Israel [2005] (Isr.).
33. Mancini v. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions, [1942] A.C. 1 (H.L.) 1–13 (appeal
taken from Eng.).
34. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 66(3), July 1, 2002.
35. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363–64 (1970).
36. Id. at 364 (internal quotation marks omitted).
37. Id.
38. See Laudan, supra note 15, at 216.
39. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
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that the BARD standard was not the highest possible SOP.40 The Court’s
considered position, then, is not that the BARD standard is the highest
standard the law could use; it is rather that the BARD standard is high, but
not so high as to make it too difficult to achieve the practical task of
convicting and punishing criminals.
Recognizing that the BARD standard is not actually maximally high
raises the question: How far short of a maximally high standard should the
SOP for criminal convictions be? Before addressing that question,
however, it will be helpful to have a fuller picture of the Court’s reasoning
in support of adopting an SOP that aims to be as high as practically
possible, without making it unduly difficult to obtain a conviction. As
already noted, one reason that Justice Brennan gave is that it is important
that individuals “have confidence that [their] government cannot adjudge
[them] guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a proper fact finder of
[their] guilt with utmost certainty.”41 Brennan’s five other reasons appealed
to: (1) the BARD standard’s historical pedigree;42 (2) the constitutional
argument that the BARD standard is implicit in the presumption of
innocence43 and due process of law;44 (3) the idea that a lower standard would
put the defendant “at a severe disadvantage . . . amounting to a lack of
fundamental fairness;”45 (4) the moral importance of a defendant’s “good
name and freedom;”46 and (5) the concern that “the moral force of the
criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in
doubt whether innocent men are being condemned.”47 Additionally,
Justice Harlan, in his concurrence, appealed to what seems to have been
the most commonly given reason for adopting the BARD standard: “that
it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.”48
None of these reasons is adequate if one hopes to justify a standard
that in any way reflects the maximalist rhetoric that Justice Brennan
used.49 Taking Justice Harlan’s reason first: His consequentialist argument
40. Id. at 423 n.2 (“[R]easonable doubt represented a less strict standard than
previous common-law rules.” (citing Antony Morano, A Reexamination of the
Development of the Reasonable Doubt Rule, 55 B.U. L. REV. 507 (1975))).
41. In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.
42. Id. at 361–63.
43. Id. at 363.
44. Id. at 364.
45. Id. at 363 (quoting In re Samuel W., 247 N.E.2d 253, 259 (N.Y. 1969)).
46. Id. at 364.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 372 (Harlan, J., concurring).
49. There are other reasons, which will not be discussed here, why one should
not take Brennan’s maximalist rhetoric seriously. Among these is that the Court’s
focus on proving all the elements of each crime beyond a reasonable doubt allows
and incentivizes states to avoid the BARD standard by making what would have
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was based on an incomplete exercise in balancing costs and benefits.50 A
more complete balance, taking into account all of the relevant facts and the
empirical data, quite plausibly would call for a lower SOP.51 As for Justice
Brennan’s arguments: The importance of the people’s confidence that a court
will not falsely adjudge them guilty is just another consequentialist
consideration, as is the moral importance of a defendant’s “good name and
freedom.”52 Courts must balance these considerations against the good
consequences that might result from lowering the SOP and making it easier
for the state to convict and punish the guilty.53 The moral force of the law
turns on the sociological claim that courts would dilute this moral force by
using a lower standard. Ultimately the relevance of diluting the moral force of
the law is also consequentialist. Further, the manner in which the standard is
actually used54 belies the claim that the standard must approach anything
resembling its maximalist representation. The fairness argument, which
asserts that the defendant is at a disadvantage, is too crude, as the argument
does not address cases in which the defendant has better resources than the
prosecution.55 Further, the historical argument is dubious.56 The constitutional

been elements into defenses. See Paterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977)
(holding that New York could put the burden on the defendant to show that he
suffered extreme emotional disturbance, despite the fact that he would be guilty
of murder only if he did not suffer it); see also Barbara Underwood, The Thumb
on the Scales of Justice: Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases, 86 YALE L.J.
1299 (1977).
50. He clearly cast that as a consequentialist point, spelling it out in terms of
“the social disutility of convicting an innocent man” and “the disutility of
acquitting someone who is guilty.” 397 U.S. at 372 (Harlan, J., concurring).
51. See infra Part III.
52. See 397 U.S. at 363–64.
53. One might be tempted to object that some of these concerns, such as the
moral importance of a defendant’s good name, have intrinsic value and thus are
not consequentialist concerns. But that betrays an overly narrow conception of
consequentialism. Consequentialism can and must allow that certain things have
intrinsic value. The argument is consequentialist if what one should do is
governed by maximizing that value. See infra Part III.A.
54. See infra notes 99–106 and accompanying text.
55. See Kaplow, supra note 12, at 850 n.204 (noting that in white collar
contexts “the government is often significantly outspent by private parties”).
Kaplow adds that the real worry is not that the defendant will always be at a
disadvantage, but that the government has the ability to focus its vast resources,
which the government may be tempted to do in cases involving political
opponents. See id. Whether the SOP should generally be high to protect against
this possibility in a small number of cases is dubious. More narrowly tailored
alternatives should at least be considered if that is the primary reason for the
BARD standard.
56. See infra Part I.B.
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appeal to the presumption of innocence is consistent with a very low SOP,57
and the appeal to due process of law is question begging if the other arguments
do not work. Thus, a better normative argument is required if the use of a
high—but not maximally high—SOP in criminal cases is to be justified.
B. The Lessons of History and Epistemological Nonsense
Surprisingly, given the prevalence of the BARD standard in
democratic systems and its rhetorical connection with seeking to raise the
SOP as high as practically possible, the BARD standard’s roots illustrate
a very different concern. Rather than seeking to raise the SOP in criminal
cases as high as possible, this Section will argue that courts originally
sought to encourage jurors to convict more often. Appreciating how the
BARD instruction changed into the BARD standard can help explain why
the legal doctrine connected to the BARD standard is in disarray—so
much so that many courts believe that the best option is to not even attempt
to explain the standard58—and can help inform efforts to fix the doctrine.
James Whitman convincingly argues that the original reason for
formulating the BARD instruction was to address the concern that jurors
in the eighteenth century had with judging.59 Jurors in that earlier, more
Christian age were reluctant to convict anyone because they believed that
“any sinful misstep committed by a judge [or juror] in the course of
judging built him a mansion in Hell.”60 Undoubtedly, this fear was
particularly acute because, as Daniel Epps explains, “[i]n eighteenthcentury England and earlier, numerous crimes, including many we would

57. See infra Part III.C.
58. The Fourth and Seventh Circuits do not allow courts to give the jury any
explanation of reasonable doubt. See, e.g., United States v. Blackburn, 992 F.2d
666, 668 (7th Cir. 1993) (“We have reiterated time and again our admonition that
district courts should not attempt to define reasonable doubt.”); United States v.
Adkins, 937 F.2d 947, 950 (4th Cir. 1991) (“This circuit has repeatedly warned
against giving the jury definitions of reasonable doubt, because definitions tend
to impermissibly lessen the burden of proof.”). Meanwhile, the D.C. Circuit
advises against defining it. See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 997 F.2d 1551, 1558
(D.C. Cir. 1993). One can only defend the decision not to instruct jurors on the
BARD standard if jurors can make adequate sense of the standard on their own,
which is a dubious proposition. See infra Part I.C.
59. JAMES Q. WHITMAN, THE ORIGINS OF REASONABLE DOUBT: THEOLOGICAL
ROOTS OF THE CRIMINAL TRIAL (2008). He opposes his view to, among others, that
of Barbara Shapiro. See BARBARA J. SHAPIRO, “BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT”
AND “PROBABLE CAUSE”: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN
LAW OF EVIDENCE (1991). Forerunners of Whitman’s position include Morano,
supra note 40.
60. WHITMAN, supra note 59, at 3 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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consider minor today[,] . . . were punishable exclusively by death.”61
Jurors, therefore, “experienced ‘a general dread lest the charge of innocent
blood should lie at their doors.’”62 The judiciary respected this fear enough
that one could commonly find jury instructions in the late eighteenth
century—when courts first began using the BARD instruction—
encouraging jurors to acquit the defendant if they experienced any doubt:
“[I]f any doubt at all hangs upon your minds, if you feel the least suspicions
. . . acquit him.”63 Obviously, such jury instructions made obtaining
convictions more difficult than if jurors had been encouraged to pursue
justice boldly, with little concern for themselves. Thus, some courts, to
counter this tendency of jurors to choose the “safer way,”64 introduced the
BARD instruction to help reassure timid jurors that they could vote to
convict as long as they could assure themselves that none of their doubts
were “reasonable.”65
To be clear, encouraging jurors to be more willing to convict should
not be confused with setting a lower SOP for a conviction. The original
point of the BARD instruction seems not to have concerned the substantive
SOP for conviction, but instead was literal encouragement.66 The
instruction was designed to combat the irrational timidity of jurors based
on the mere abstract possibility of error.67 The motivation behind the
instruction was to address the concerns of people like William Paley and
Jeremy Taylor.68 Paley, a prominent moral philosopher in England in the
1780s, complained of the harm done by timid juries who refused to convict
even when the evidence “furnishes that degree of credibility, . . . which
experience has shown that they may decide and act upon with sufficient
safety,” and who “reject such proof, from an insinuation of uncertainty that
belongs in all human affairs, and from a general dread lest the charge of
innocent blood should lie at their doors.”69 And Taylor, whom Whitman
describes as “the leading English moral theologian of the late seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries,” compared the actions of a timid juror with:
[A] Woman handling of a Frog or a Chicken, which all their
friends tell them can do them no hurt, and they are convinced in
61. Epps, supra note 15, at 1081.
62. WHITMAN, supra note 59, at 4 (quoting WILLIAM PALEY, THE PRINCIPLES
OF MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 391–92 (1785)).
63. Id. at 196 (citation omitted).
64. Id. at 4. To be clear, the safer way was meant to be safer for their souls.
65. Id. at 206.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 197.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 192 (quoting PALEY, supra note 62, at 391–92).
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reason that they cannot, they believe it and know it, and yet when
they take the little creature into their hands they shreek [sic], and
sometimes hold fast and find their fears confuted, and sometimes
they let go and find their reason useless.70
The BARD instruction, understood in that context, is merely meant to
encourage jurors not to indulge irrational fears. It is not meant to provide
substantive guidance for determining what kind of doubt would be
“reasonable.”
If the previous claim is correct, it raises the question: Where did the
substantive standard come from? The answer is that it would have been
grounded in weighing what was at stake. Courts surely did not mean for
the BARD instruction to imply that jurors had no legitimate concern that
their souls were at stake. Nor did the courts intend for the instruction to
inform jurors of the importance of punishing criminals. The reasonable
juror would know to take both concerns into account when determining
the confidence level necessary to vote to convict. The courts introduced
the BARD instruction only to remind jurors who might fear for their souls
not to dismiss the importance of bringing criminals to justice. It was meant
to give them the courage to put their souls on the line, when doing so could
be done with “sufficient safety,” given that the alternative would be to give
“public encouragement to villainy, by confessing the impossibility of
bringing villains to justice.”71
In contrast with the late eighteenth century, jurors today likely do not
worry that judging another endangers their immortal souls. Further, studies
have shown that jurors often interpret the BARD standard in practice to
mean something akin to preponderance of the evidence.72 This implies that
they are quite ready, arguably too ready, to convict defendants, especially
those who seem different and frightening.73 Accordingly, the dominant
concern, when instructing juries, has shifted and is now aimed at preventing
them from being too ready to convict, rather than too reluctant to convict.
70. Id. at 205 (quoting JEREMY TAYLOR, DUCTOR DUBITANTIUM, OR THE
RULE OF CONSCIENCE IN ALL HER GENERAL MEASURES 160 (1676)).
71. Id. at 192 (quoting PALEY, supra note 62, at 391–92).
72. See infra Part I.C.
73. See, e.g., Douglas O. Linder, Juror Empathy and Race, 63 TENN. L. REV.
887, 901 (1996) (noting that “dissimilarity [between juror and defendant] causes
‘a shift towards harshness’” (internal quotation omitted)); Shamena Anwar et al.,
The Role of Age in Jury Selection and Trial Outcomes, 57 J.L. & ECON. 1001,
1004 (2014) (noting that “when the average age of the jury pool is older than 50
(which happens in about half of the trials), defendants are convicted 79 percent of
the time. In contrast, when the average age of the jury pool is younger than 50,
conviction rates are only 68 percent. These differences are statistically
significant”).
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Although no logical contradiction exists in repurposing the BARD
instruction into a standard that aims to make convictions more difficult,
rather than easier, to obtain, doing so presupposes that the BARD standard
can be given a substantive meaning that the instruction did not originally
have. Unfortunately, rather than directly tackling the question of what the
substantive standard should be, so that the standard is high but not too
high, courts have naively and vainly struggled to draw substance out of the
very idea of a reasonable doubt.74 Unsurprisingly, the effort has been a
failure. The idea of a reasonable doubt is itself far from clear, and efforts
to explain it invoke either vague platitudes or misleading epistemic
nonsense.
To see this, consider the following examples of explanations of a
“reasonable doubt”:

“doubt based upon reason and common sense . . . that a reasonable
person has after carefully weighing all the evidence;”75

“doubt that is something more than a guess or a surmise. It is not
a conjecture . . . . [It is] a real doubt, an honest doubt;”76

“doubt which is not a vague, speculative, or imaginary doubt;”77

“doubt for which a reason can be assigned.”78
Or consider these formulations of the right kind of proof:



It is “proof that precludes every reasonable hypothesis except guilt
. . . . [and] is inconsistent with any other reasonable conclusion;”79
“If . . . you think there is a real possibility that he is not guilty, you
must give him the benefit of the doubt and find him not guilty.”80

74. The evidence that this is what courts are doing can be found in the
instructions discussed in the text immediately following this note.
75. 1 LEONARD B. SAND ET AL., MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS,
instr. 4-2, at 4–9 (2015).
76. State v. Billie, 2 A.3d 1034, 1044 n.14 (Conn. App. Ct. 2010) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
77. People v. Munoz, 240 P.3d 311, 315 (Colo. App. 2009).
78. Ex parte Brown, 74 So.3d 1039, 1053 (Ala. 2011) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
79. Billie, 2 A.3d at 1044 n.14 (internal quotation marks omitted).
80. FED. JUDICIAL CTR., PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 28 (1987),
available at http://federalevidence.com/pdf/JuryInst/FJC_Crim_1987.pdf [http://per
ma.cc/4DEX-32L7]. The following proposal in the academic literature echoes those
explanations: “A fact is proven beyond a reasonable doubt when there is a plausible
explanation of the evidence and events in dispute that includes this fact and no
plausible explanation that does not include this fact.” Michael S. Pardo, SecondOrder Proof Rules, 61 FLA. L. REV. 1083, 1105 (2009); see also LARRY LAUDAN,
TRUTH, ERROR, AND CRIMINAL LAW: AN ESSAY IN LEGAL EPISTEMOLOGY 82
(2006) [hereinafter TRUTH, ERROR, AND CRIMINAL LAW]. To be fair, one reason
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These instructions fail for a range of reasons. Some are hopelessly
vague. For example, telling jurors that a reasonable doubt is “real doubt,
an honest doubt”81 tells them nothing they did not already know. Some
suggest a standard that is too low; one that makes it too easy to convict.
For example, instructing that doubt should not be “speculative”82 implies
that doubt must be very well founded, perhaps to the point of making
innocence more likely than guilt. Some suggest a standard that is too high.
For example, identifying reasonable doubt with a “doubt for which a reason
can be assigned”83 rules out doubts the basis of which is hard to pin down
but which may reflect an intuitive sense that something in the prosecutor’s
case was unsound. Of course, it is to be preferred if the basis for a doubt can
be articulated and held up to scrutiny, but many sound beliefs reflect
judgments that rest on reasons that are hard to articulate. If doubts could not
count as reasonable unless reasons for them could be articulated, and
presumably defended, then many objectively reasonable doubts would be
excluded.
Although all of these failings are problematic, this Article will focus
on the ungrounded assumption that the notion of a “reasonable doubt” has
an inherent meaning as an epistemic label, one that calls for a particular
high level of proof irrespective of what is at stake in finding a defendant
guilty or not. That is to say, the doctrine has been misled by the thought
that the very terms “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” imply that proof of
guilt must reach some level of evidence-based confidence in guilt just shy
of absolute certainty. To the contrary, what counts as a “reasonable doubt”
has to be understood by reference to a practical determination of what is
at stake, as a moral matter, in making the judgment that a defendant is or
is not guilty.
To see that the BARD standard cannot be simply associated with an
SOP just shy of certainty, one need only consider how trials work in the
real world. The evidence is almost always more or less credible and more
or less compelling. If a jury could find a defendant guilty only when the
evidence is completely compelling, convictions would become so rare that
the criminal justice system would grind to a halt. Consider first the
Laudan supports such a test is that he is rightly skeptical that jurors have any
reasonable basis for assessing the probability of a defendant’s guilt, given the
evidence. Id. at 77–78; see also infra Part III.B.1.
81. See Billie, 2 A.3d at 1044 n.14. Obviously, the intention of this instruction
is to contrast a real and honest doubt with a contrived doubt. But jurors do not
need to contrive a doubt to engage in jury nullification. Otherwise, if they are not
trying to nullify a verdict, their doubt is presumably “real,” and this instruction is
of no use to them.
82. See Munoz, 240 P.3d at 315.
83. See Billie, 2 A.3d at 1044 n.14.
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reliability of witnesses. All else equal, it is better if witnesses know the
person they are testifying about than if he is a stranger to them; better if
they are of good character than bad; better if they have no known motive
to lie than if they might gain from false testimony; better if there are more
of them and their stories provide independent confirmation one to the
other. Similar things can be said for the physical evidence, given that
exculpatory evidence might have been suppressed or overlooked, and that
inculpatory evidence might have been mishandled or tampered with. In the
best cases, the evidence makes innocence incredible. It would presuppose
the sort of vast conspiracy to frame the defendant that no sane person
would believe a realistic possibility. Guilt is, in those cases, a practical
certainty. But the evidence is rarely that strong.84 Rather, it is normally the
case that one could imagine how the witnesses might be lying or mistaken,
and how the physical evidence might be incomplete, mishandled, or
otherwise misleading. If convictions were ruled out in such cases,
convictions would become rare indeed.
One might try to embrace this conclusion and argue that morality
requires that there should be many fewer convictions—that position will be
examined in Part II. But the argument here is not a moral one, it concerns
the concept of a “reasonable” doubt. As shown by its use in practice, the
concept does not require a level of confidence just shy of certainty. Rather,
what it requires depends on the context. To see that context matters, consider
this thought experiment: Imagine that the judge told the jurors that their fate
is tied to the defendant’s; if the defendant’s innocence is later proven, the
court will have the jurors executed.85 And imagine that the judge otherwise
kept the same instruction on the BARD standard. Even if jurors would still
sometimes find the courage to convict, they would certainly find that they
have a “reasonable” doubt much more frequently than they do now.86 The
point is not that jurors who faced such a threat would act irrationally, finding
reasons to doubt when none exist. The point is that when the costs of errors
rise for jurors, the very nature of a “reasonable” doubt would change. The
84. In cases where the evidence is strong enough so that guilt is a practical
certainty, only an irrational defendant, or one who oddly relished going to trial,
would contest his guilt at trial rather than seek a plea bargain.
85. This rule would obviously reintroduce the kind of fear that Whitman
argues was prevalent amongst jurors when the BARD standard was first devised.
86. Of course, judges cannot really threaten jurors with execution if it later
turns out that a person they voted to convict is innocent. But a judge could instruct
jurors to consider the thought experiment and vote to convict in accordance with
that standard. And it is worth noting that there was a period in English law when
jurors were in fact punished for incorrect verdicts. See THOMAS A. GREEN,
VERDICT ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL
TRIAL JURY 1200-1800, at 200–64 (1985) (discussing the brief history of fining
and imprisoning jurors).
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nature of a reasonable doubt is context dependent. It is not some acontextual level of certainty; it depends on what is at stake.
In summary, the first step in providing a sound theoretical foundation
for the BARD standard is to accept that one cannot define the quantum of
doubt that qualifies as “reasonable” free of context. The quantum of doubt
that properly requires an acquittal depends on what is properly held to be
at stake in setting the SOP for a criminal conviction in our secular world,
where a juror’s eternal soul is no longer assumed to be part of what is at
stake.87 Three different sets of views about what is at stake are considered
below: general deontological theories in Part II, consequentialism in Part III,
and retributivism in Part IV. But before shifting to the normative arguments,
it will be helpful to add one more area of background information: a review
of how juries actually use the BARD standard.
C. The BARD Standard in Contemporary Practice
Two dominant understandings of the BARD standard currently operate
in the United States: one that is fairly high and endorsed by most judges,
commentators, and even the general public88—the “customary”
understanding—and one that is used by lay jurors and arguably by judges89
87. Given the balance between a juror’s strong interest in protecting his soul,
and a weaker, but not insignificant, interest in doing justice and keeping society
safe from criminals, it seems that the substantive SOP in use at the time the BARD
standard was adopted would have been a high, but not maximally high, one. My
position on the modern, substantive BARD standard is that it should be similar.
Whether some distinction can nonetheless be defended is immaterial to the current
law. An originalist might think otherwise, but the context is too different to
reasonably think originalism relevant.
88. See, e.g., RICHARD O. LEMPERT ET AL., A MODERN APPROACH TO
EVIDENCE 1378 n.19 (5th ed. 2014) (observing that the general population equates
the BARD standard with 85% to 90% certainty). But see Lillquist, supra note 15,
at 112 (discussing a range of surveys in which the SOP associated with the BARD
standard ranged from 51% to 92% certainty); GEORGE H. GALLUP, JR., THE
GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 1993, at 231–32 (1994) (finding that 56% of
respondents disagreed with the proposition that it’s “better for society to let some
guilty people go free than to risk convicting an innocent person,” while only 17%
strongly agreed with it).
89. While judges generally endorse the customary understanding, see infra
notes 90–91 and accompanying text, there is reason to think they too do not use it
in practice. One study found that juries voted to acquit but judges would have
voted to convict in 16.9% of cases, while juries voted to convict and judges would
have acquitted in only 2.2% of cases. See HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL,
THE AMERICAN JURY 59 (1966). In other words, when judges and juries differ,
judges are more likely to convict than juries. It could be that judges follow the
customary understanding of the BARD more than jurors but tend to see the
evidence in a light favorable to the prosecution more than jurors. But another
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in practice—the “practice” understanding. They do not match. From the
point of view of the customary understanding, the standard used in practice
is shockingly low.
Judges, who instruct on the BARD standard, provide a useful source
for the customary understanding of the standard. In one study of federal
judges throughout the United States, nearly three quarters of the 171 who
responded to the poll picked a probability that was 90% or higher; and in
a second study, this one of Illinois state judges, the mean probability was
89%, with 63% of the judges picking a level of 90% or higher.90 Some
judges picked much lower numbers. Nevertheless, only 7% of federal
judges picked a value of 76% or lower, compared with 72% who picked a
value of 90% or higher.91 It thus seems fair to say that the customary
understanding of the BARD standard, shared by a clear supermajority of
judges, is that it requires at least a 90% confidence in the defendant’s guilt.
The general population, from which juries are drawn, may claim to
hold to the customary view of the BARD standard,92 but even if they talk
the talk, they do not seem to walk the walk.93 In one study, Robert
MacCoun and Norbert Kerr constructed a trial transcript that was as
equivocal as possible.94 The authors gave the transcript to mock juries
composed of four students.95 Half of the juries received a reasonable doubt
instruction, and the other half received a preponderance of the evidence
instruction.96 Only 36% of the latter juries found the defendant guilty,
implying that the case was weak.97 On that basis, one would hope that none
of the juries given a reasonable doubt instruction would find the mock
defendant guilty. Instead, 21% of those juries found the defendant guilty.98
likely explanation is that judges are unaware of the gap between the customary
understanding of the BARD standard that they espouse and their practice.
90. These and other studies are reported in Lawrence M. Solan, Refocusing
the Burden of Proof in Criminal Cases, 78 TEX. L. REV. 105, 126 (1999); see also
C.M.A. McCauliff, Burdens of Proof: Degrees of Belief, Quanta of Evidence, or
Constitutional Guarantees?, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1293, 1325 tbl.2, 1332 tbl.8
(1982) (showing results of a survey of federal judges in which their mean estimate
for the BARD SOP was 90.28%).
91. Solan, supra note 90, at 126 (Solan gave raw numbers, which have been
converted into percentages here).
92. See supra note 88.
93. For a broader survey of the empirical data, see Lillquist, supra note 15,
at 111–17.
94. Solan, supra note 90, at 123–24 (citing Robert J. MacCoun & Norbert L.
Kerr, Asymmetric Influence in Mock Jury Deliberation: Jurors’ Bias for Leniency,
54 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 21 (1988)).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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This shows that a substantial number of jurors interpreted the BARD
instruction to allow conviction on weak evidence, evidence that would not
even satisfy the preponderance of the evidence standard for more than half
of the juries that considered it.
Irwin Horowitz and Laird Kirkpatrick conducted what may be an even
more telling study.99 They compared five different versions of the BARD
standard: four instructions with interpretations and one instruction without
interpretation.100 The authors gave these instructions to six-person mock
juries composed of jury-eligible adults, rather than students.101 The authors
also gave the juries audiotapes of a mock trial, one of which was designed
to have equivocal evidence, and the other of which was designed to have
strong evidence of guilt.102 Only one of the instructions, the “firmly
convinced” instruction drafted by the Federal Judicial Center, prevented
juries from convicting on the equivocal evidence.103 Of the juries who got
the other instructions—including the instruction with no interpretation—
either three-eighths or one half of the juries who got a particular instruction
voted to convict on equivocal evidence.104 This result implies, with high
statistical significance, that these other four instructions protected
defendants about as much, or as little, as a preponderance of the evidence
standard. This conclusion is further supported by the fact that the mean of
the jurors’ own sense of how confident they believed they had to be to vote
to convict, using all instructions except for the “firmly convinced”
instruction, ranged from 49.75% to 61.62% in the weak cases, even after
discussing the case.105 This bears highlighting: the mean was only 55% for
the instruction that left the BARD standard undefined.106 Therefore, this
study shows that, with the exception of Federal Judicial Center’s “firmly
convinced” instruction, juries took the BARD standard to be not very

99. See Irwin A. Horowitz & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, A Concept in Search of a
Definition: The Effects of Reasonable Doubt Instructions on Certainty of Guilt
Standards and Jury Verdicts, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 655 (1996).
100. Id. at 659–61.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 661.
103. Id. at 660.
104. Id. at 662–63.
105. Id. at 664 tbl.2. There was also an interesting “case effect;” the stronger
case caused the jurors to raise their sense of level of confidence needed to convict,
but not by much. Id. The range for those instructions, post discussion, was 57.50%
to 69.75%. Id.
106. But see Chantal Mees Koch & Dennis J. Devine, Effects of Reasonable
Doubt Definition and Inclusion of a Lesser Charge on Jury Verdicts, 23 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 653 (1999) (finding that the firmly convinced instruction did not
always lead to fewer convictions than no definition of reasonable doubt).
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stringent; they took it to mean something more like a preponderance of the
evidence standard than the customary understanding of the BARD standard.
This gap between the customary understanding and the practice
understanding is cause for concern.107 The gap seems likely to undermine
respect for the law, as juries disregard in practice what the law espouses.
Moreover, as Epps argues, there are costs associated with most people
believing that the criminal justice system uses a high SOP, although it uses
a lower SOP in practice.108 For example, the social value of an acquittal is
undermined if people believe that those defendants who are acquitted
might very likely be guilty.109 Insofar as one thinks that it is problematic
for innocent defendants to face an SOP that is, in practice, so much lower
than the customary understanding, these costs that Epps highlights make
matters even worse.110 Finally, the existence of this gap reinforces the
importance of determining which standard is the right one. One cannot
hope to determine which standard is better unless one resolves whether the
customary understanding is missing something of practical importance, or
whether the practice understanding is corrupted in some way—perhaps by
juries not caring enough about the fate of the defendant—and in need of
being reformed by better instructions. Only a better understanding of what
is properly at stake can resolve these issues and bridge the gap between
the two understandings.
II. THE FAILURE OF MAXIMALIST ARGUMENTS
This Part explores non-retributive deontological arguments that aim to
support the customary understanding—indeed, a maximalist version of the
customary understanding—of the BARD standard.111 These arguments
107. Another problem that results from the BARD instructions being so
unclear is that it undermines uniformity in the law. Different juries will use
different standards just by the luck of the draw. Some will be dominated by people
who interpret the BARD standard as quite high, others will be dominated by
people who interpret the BARD standard as quite low. See TRUTH, ERROR, AND
CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 80, at 31. One can at least hope that better instructions
would limit this effect.
108. Epps, supra note 15, at 1114.
109. See id.
110. Epps thinks it also hurts the guilty. See infra Part III.C.
111. The category of “maximalists” is drawn from Laudan, who uses the more
disparaging term: “garantistas.” Laudan, supra note 15, at 211. The heart of
Laudan’s criticism of garantistas is that their position requires not merely a change
in the SOP, but rather pervasive legal reform. Id. at 215–16. He presents the law’s
likely rejection of such reform as a kind of reductio ad absurdum of their views.
Id. Although the maximalists would be committed to pervasive reforms,
understanding why their arguments fail is more instructive than being satisfied
with a reductio.
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seek to avoid taking a balancing, consequentialist approach to what is at
stake in convicting a defendant. Rather, they focus primarily on what they
take to be strong reasons not to convict the innocent, and let the importance
of convicting the guilty do only secondary work in pushing the SOP down
from absolute certainty to the high level they think is required to respect
the strong reasons not to convict the guilty.
The four thinkers—here dubbed “maximalists”—whose work is
highlighted in this Part are Alex Stein, Laurence Tribe, Rinat Kitai, and
Antony Duff.112 All of these authors take the position that what is at stake
in punishment calls for using an SOP of practical certainty.113 Although
none of their arguments succeed, it is important to examine them carefully.
In the end, this Article concludes that maximalists are right to think that
the SOP for criminal law has a deontological justification.114 Indeed, this
Article argues that the distinction between doing and allowing does place
a thumb on the scale in favor of innocent defendants. It is just a fairly light
thumb, not heavy enough to yield the customary understanding of the BARD
standard. The problem with maximalists is not their appeal to deontology; it
is that their non-retributive deontological justifications do not work to justify
anything like their understanding, or even a more moderate customary
understanding, of the BARD standard.115
This Part proceeds by examining the five arguments that the maximalists
offer in support of their position: (1) that accidental false convictions are
permissible, but intentional ones are not, and that anything less than the
maximalist position would involve the moral equivalent of intentional false
convictions; (2) that “singling out the accused as a risk-absorbing unit . . .
would violate both equality and fairness;”116 (3) that the social contract
112. See STEIN, supra note 13; Tribe, supra note 13; Kitai, supra note 13;
DUFF ET AL., supra note 13.
113. See STEIN, supra note 13, at 72–83; Tribe, supra note 13, at 1374; DUFF
ET AL., supra note 13, at 89; Kitai, supra note 13, at 1164.
114. Accordingly, Epps errs when he says:
[O]nce we’ve determined that a particular type of action is acceptable—
as we have with respect to punishment of people determined to be
guilty—and the only question is what level of certainty is required before
we act, deontology shouldn’t continue to place a thumb on the scale.
Epps, supra note 15, at 1135; see also ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND
UTOPIA 97 (1974) (“That system is most effective which minimizes the expected
value of unearned harm to me, either through my being unjustly punished or
through my being a victim of a crime.”).
115. This Article argues that the distinction between doing and allowing does
place a thumb on the scale in favor of innocent defendants. It is just a fairly light
thumb, not heavy enough to yield the customary understanding of the BARD
standard. See infra Part III.
116. STEIN, supra note 13, at 175.
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requires the maximalist position; (4) that it is substantially easier to justify
allowing people to suffer injustice—by not suppressing crime as much as
possible—than to justify causing them to suffer injustice—by wrongly
convicting them; and (5) that the special moral significance of condemnation
requires that the fact finder know that the defendant is guilty of the crime
charged to him.
A. Accidental Versus Deliberate False Convictions
Stein says that “[a]ny perceptible doubt—that is, any doubt
substantiated by the evidence, thus qualifying as ‘reasonable’—must work
in favour of the accused.”117 He adds that this position “is best understood
as mirroring the moral distinction between accidentally and deliberately
erroneous convictions.”118 Likewise Tribe expresses the view that “the
[criminal justice] system dramatically—if imprecisely—insists upon as
close an approximation to certainty as seems humanly attainable in the
circumstances.”119 He defends this by claiming:
That some mistaken verdicts are inevitably returned even by jurors
who regard themselves as “certain” is of course true but is
irrelevant; such unavoidable errors are in no sense intended, and
the fact that they must occur if trials are to be conducted at all need
not undermine the effort, through the symbols of trial procedure,
to express society’s fundamental commitment to the protection of
the defendant’s rights as a person, as an end in himself. On the
other hand, formulating an “acceptable” risk of error to which the
trier is willing deliberately to subject the defendant would
interfere seriously with this expressive role of the demand for
certitude . . . .120
117. Id. at 173.
118. Id. at 174.
119. Tribe, supra note 13, at 1374. He later wrote: “any ‘doubt founded on
reason,’ of ‘whatever magnitude, must be resolved in favor of the accused.’”
Laurence H. Tribe, A Further Critique of Mathematical Proof, 84 HARV. L. REV.
1810, 1819 (1971) (footnote omitted).
120. Tribe, supra note 13, at 1374 (footnote omitted). Lest one think that Tribe
was focused only on the positive goal of treating people as ends in themselves, he
also deployed, in the prior paragraph, the other side of the Kantian categorical
imperative, the prohibition on using people merely as a means. Id. He wrote that:
[I]nsistence on the greatest certainty that seems reasonably attainable can
serve . . . to affirm the dignity of the accused and to display respect for
his rights as a person—in this instance, by declining to put those rights
in deliberate jeopardy and by refusing to sacrifice him to the interests of
others.
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This argument rests on two premises, one that this Article accepts as
true, the other that this Article argues is false. The premise accepted as true
is that deliberately convicting the innocent to pursue some greater good is
impermissible. The premise argued against is that adopting an SOP that is
lower than practical certainty is morally equivalent to deliberately
convicting the innocent to pursue some greater good.121
The true premise rests on a general deontological principle that is
sometimes described as the Doctrine of Double Effect (“DDE”),122 and
sometimes as the Means Principle (“MP”).123 These principles hold that it is
very hard to justify harming someone without his consent124 if one does it
intentionally or if one uses him as a causal means of achieving some other
good. That is, these principles hold that it is impermissible to harm someone
intentionally or as a casual means of bringing about some good, even if the
good significantly outweighs the harm caused to the person, unless one has
that person’s consent. That is because the person’s claim not to be treated or
used in this manner is very strong. There is reason to think that these
deontological principles are not quite right, but they are familiar and this
Article will proceed on the assumption that they are close enough to the truth
for present purposes.125
Id.
121. One might object that Tribe did not say that formulating “an ‘acceptable’
risk of error” is morally equivalent to deliberately convicting the innocent. He
said that this would “interfere seriously with” the expressive function of the law’s
“commitment to the protection of the defendant’s rights as a person, as an end in
himself.” Id. This could be consistent with the view the policy would merely
communicate the mistaken impression that people are not being treated as ends in
themselves. However logically possible, that is a substantively implausible reading
of Tribe.
122. See, e.g., Jeff McMahan, Intention, Permissibility, Terrorism, and War,
23 PHIL. PERSP. 345, 345 (2009); MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A
MORAL ARGUMENT WITH HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 151–53 (3d ed. 2000).
123. See, e.g., Alec Walen, Transcending the Means Principle, 33 LAW &
PHIL. 427, 428 (2014); VICTOR TADROS, THE ENDS OF HARM: THE MORAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 113 (2011).
124. Some supporters of the DDE think consent cannot cure intentional harming.
See, e.g., Joseph Boyle, Who is Entitled to Double Effect?, 16 J. MED. & PHIL. 475
(1991).
125. The moral truth that people seek to capture with the DDE or the MP is
better captured by another principle, which may be called the “restricting claims
principle” (“RCP”). See Walen, supra note 123, at 429; Alec Walen, The Restricting
Claims Principle Revisited: Transcending the Means Principle Based on the AgentPatient Divide, LAW & PHIL. (forthcoming). For a related view, see Gerhard
Øverland, Moral Obstacles: An Alternative to the Doctrine of Double Effect, 124
ETHICS 481 (2014). Given that the DDE and MP are much more familiar than the
RCP, and given that the RCP, the DDE, and the MP have mostly the same
implications in practice, this Part will discuss only the DDE and MP.
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The problem with the false premise can be explained in three ways.
First, it conflates aiming to impose an unjust harm with aiming to do
something that foreseeably imposes a risk of an unjust harm. But the two
aims are completely different.126 Framing an innocent is intentionally
using someone as a means. By contrast, using an SOP of less than 100%
does not require that a jury actually unjustly harm anyone. Rather, this
type of SOP is a policy adopted for the sake of the good, where unjust
harms, should they occur, are merely a foreseen side effect of adopting the
policy.127
Second, any system of punishment, even one that aims to make “as few
mistakes as possible” while still convicting the guilty, puts innocents at risk
to convict the guilty. Having a system of punishment, however, is not
necessary—it is a choice. Society could eliminate convictions altogether,
and thereby put no innocents at risk of false convictions. Of course, losing
the ability to convict, punish, and thereby incapacitate and deter criminals
would presumably encourage other harms to innocents.128 But if the moral
imperative not to put the innocent knowingly at risk of a false conviction
were sufficiently strong, then that is a consequence that should be accepted.
Moreover, choosing to do away with the punishment altogether would
presumably make little difference if the SOP for conviction were high
enough to satisfy the maximalists. An SOP near certainty would make
obtaining criminal convictions very difficult, greatly undermining the
capacity of the criminal justice system to punish the guilty, incapacitate
criminals, and deter criminal activity. If one were willing to go that far to
avoid knowingly putting the innocent at risk, it is hard to see the reason not
to abolish punishment entirely. Some might be willing to accept this
abolitionist conclusion, but it seems that Tribe and Stein would not accept
it. If that is right, then they have to abandon the premise that choosing to set
up a system of criminal law that knowingly puts the innocent at risk of a
false conviction—by using an SOP lower than practical certainty—is
morally equivalent to intentionally convicting the innocent.

126. But see Claire Finkelstein, Is Risk a Harm?, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 963, 978
(2003) (arguing that imposing risk of harm on another is imposing a kind of harm
on another).
127. See Alan Wertheimer, Punishing the Innocent—Unintentionally, 20
INQUIRY 45, 62 (1977) (“[W]hen the State adopts a set of judicial policies with a
certain probability of punishment mistakes, it is not intending to harm anyone.”).
128. This effect would be mitigated if those deemed dangerous were
preventively detained. This raises a host of other problems, however, such as the
practical problem of determining who is dangerous. Equally if not more
important, they include the moral problem of justifying the preventive detention
of rational, accountable agents. See Walen, supra note 24.
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Third, the claim that knowingly risking harm to innocents counts the
same as intentionally harming innocents, and that it is acceptable only if
the risk is de minimis, proves too much. Consider the SOP for an arrest—
probable cause. Whatever that probability is, it is surely much lower than
practical certainty. And relying on that relatively low SOP imposes the risk
of arrest, and all the difficulties that ensue, on innocent people. Yet Tribe
and Stein presumably do not think that relying on probable cause as the SOP
for arrest amounts to intentionally arresting the innocent whenever an
innocent person is arrested. If they did, they would be forced into the
awkward position of either insisting that police use the same maximalist
SOP for arresting suspects, which would effectively ban almost all arrests,
or of trying to distinguish arrests from convictions. They could try to grab
the second horn of that dilemma by noting that arrests are generally less
harmful than convictions. But in truth, that response misses the point. Of
course there is a moral difference between, on the one hand, relying on
probable cause and unintentionally arresting some innocent people, and on
the other hand, intentionally arresting innocent people. That same difference
must exist, however, when using an SOP lower than practical certainty when
it comes to convicting the innocent.
In summary, tolerating some probability of convicting the innocent is
wholly unlike aiming to convict the innocent. If some innocent persons are
convicted when the jury aims to convict the guilty, the jury has simply made
a mistake. That fact does not depend on the SOP having any particularly
high value, much less being as close to 100% as possible. Failure to see
this amounts to a failure to understand the moral role of an SOP.129
B. Equality and Fairness
The heart of Stein’s argument for a maximalist position is his thought
that “singling out of the accused as a risk-absorbing unit . . . would violate
both equality and fairness.”130 He offers two arguments to support his
maximalist interpretation of equality and fairness,131 which will be
addressed in turn.

129. See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text (discussing what an SOP
does).
130. STEIN, supra note 13, at 175. Stein takes these notions from Dworkin. Id.
(citing RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 72, 79–88 (1985)). But, as
Stein is aware, Dworkin does not use these notions to arrive at a maximalist
position. See STEIN, supra note 13, at 175 n.13. Laudan unfairly lumps Dworkin
with Stein in the maximalist camp. See Laudan, supra note 15, at 198, 209–11.
131. STEIN, supra note 13, at 175.
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1. The “Equal Best” Standard and Weighty Evidence
Stein interprets equality and fairness to imply that “[t]he legal system may
justifiably convict a person only if it did its best in protecting that person from
the risk of erroneous conviction and if it does not provide better protection
to other individuals.”132 Stein calls this the “equal best” standard.133 He
recognizes that a state might cite various costs of doing more to protect
defendants from false convictions to defend the claim that the state is
doing its best, even though the state imposes a clear risk of an erroneous
conviction on defendants.134 Stein thinks, however, that evidence law
provides us with a framework for explaining why that account of an “equal
best” standard is a mere “empty shell.”135 In his view, evidence is
sufficient only if it “generates [a] probability of guilt that comes close to
certainty and survives maximal individualized testing.”136 This Section
will argue, however, that he simply assumes that the probability of guilt
must come close to certainty.137
The key idea for Stein is that case-specific evidence, which allows for
individualized testing, must play a significant role in a trial. Although this
idea is correct, Stein mistakenly thinks that the need for individualized
evidence is inversely connected with some independent notion of
probability, so that the two together must meet some very high SOP.138 He
is right to assert that case-specific evidence must always be considered,
but that indicates nothing about the correct SOP.
To understand this mistaken contention, consider the “Prisoners in the
Yard Paradox,” the case that Stein uses to argue that a very high
probability of guilt that nonetheless does not take facts relative to the
individual into account is insufficient for conviction.139 In Stein’s version
of the paradox, one is to imagine:

132. Id. (emphasis in the original).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 175–76.
135. Id. at 175.
136. Id. at 177.
137. The demand for “maximal” individual testing is also dubious, but it is
unnecessary to pursue that point to argue that Stein simply assumes what he needs
to argue.
138. Id. at 176 (“Probability and its evidential weight [the extent to which the
evidence is individualized] ought to work together. . . . As the probability becomes
more removed from . . . factual certainty, . . . its weight goes down.”).
139. Id. at 78–79. The paradox was originally formulated by Charles R.
Nesson, Reasonable Doubt and Permissive Inferences: The Value of Complexity,
92 HARV. L. REV. 1187, 1192–93 (1979).

2015]

PROOF BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT

383

[A] corrections facility accommodating 1,000 inmates. There, 999
inmates conduct a riot during which they kill a number of
corrections officers. The remaining inmate stood against the wall
and did not participate in the riot. However, this inmate is
unidentifiable, and so every inmate accused of participating in the
riot will claim to be him. Subsequently, each of the one thousand
inmates is accused of murdering the officers. The probability of
the accusation in each case thus equals 0.999. . . . [P]robability
that equals 0.999 is extremely high, and so it should satisfy the
criminal proof standard. However, the fact-finders’ inability to
distinguish between the inmates and the affirmative knowledge
that one of these inmates is innocent block the possibility of
convicting any of the inmates.140
For Stein, the key to avoiding this paradox is recognizing that the
probability of guilt in that case is “naked,” lacking “case-specific
evidence” that would allow one to distinguish one inmate from another.141
And surely he is right: proceeding directly to convict all 1000 inmates on
the basis of this naked, generic evidence would be wrong. One reason is
that the prosecution and the defense should look reasonably hard for casespecific evidence first. Was there a witness who saw one person stand off
to the side? Did he see anything that could help distinguish that one from
others? Perhaps he was tall, or short, or fat, or thin, or walked with a limp.
They should also interrogate all of the prisoners. Did anyone say anything
that might imply that one particular person was not involved in the riot?
And then there are psychological profiles and inquiries into motives.
Perhaps one prisoner has developed a reputation for shrinking back from
conflicts. And so on. Obviously, the state cannot rest with the naked
evidence; the prosecution must try to individualize it, and the defendant
must have a fair opportunity to do so as well, in the hopes of finding
individualized evidence that lowers the odds in his case below the relevant
SOP.
Suppose that the case-specific evidence casts particular doubt on five
prisoners. Assuming that they all seem to be equally likely to be the one
who did not participate, then the jury should have at most 80% confidence
that each of these five participated in the riot. This is arguably sufficiently
low confidence as to require the jury to acquit all five of these inmates,
even though at least four are guilty. Furthermore, the jury should feel
sufficiently confident that the other 995 prisoners did participate in the riot
to convict them, even though the case-specific evidence is to some degree
140. STEIN, supra note 13, at 78–79 (footnote omitted).
141. Id. at 79.
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unreliable, meaning that the innocent prisoner may well be among the 995
convicted.142
Assuming this is the right way to handle the “Prisoners in the Yard
Paradox,” we can now turn back to Stein’s assertion that the solution also
depends on adopting the maximalist position. The requirement that the
state allow and even demand individualized testing shows only that the
state should require prosecutors to introduce individualized evidence, and
should not deny defendants the chance to argue that evidence, which first
appeared highly incriminating, is not incriminating unless and until
reasonable efforts have been made to individualize it. Having the right to
individualized evidence, even when the naked evidence is nearly certain,
does not show that the SOP for individualized evidence is “nearly certain.”
Indeed, the point of the Paradox was to show that approaching certainty
does not help reach the SOP needed to convict if the evidence remains
naked. If the evidence has been individualized, however, it remains to be
determined what the SOP for conviction must be. Any claim that the
relevant SOP must be close to certainty simply asserts what is to be shown.
2. The Argument from Fairness
Stein’s other argument for a maximalist interpretation of the “equal
best” notion of evidence is based on the idea that imposing the risk of a
false conviction on a particular individual is like imposing a tax on him
for the general good accomplished by the criminal justice system. But the
“equal” part of the equal best formulation implies that the state should
impose the tax on everyone. If those who are 90% likely to be guilty must
pay the tax, then those who are 10% likely to be guilty should also pay the
tax. This reasoning, however, leads to a reductio, which is avoided only
142. What if the search for individualized evidence turns up nothing that
distinguishes one prisoner from the rest? It is still intuitively difficult to accept
that all 1000 should be punished, especially if the punishment is severe. Two
questions then arise: First, what is the basis for that intuition? Second, what should
be done, all things considered? My speculative answer to the first question is that
what bothers us is knowing that we are punishing one person too many. As long
as we can take it as a fact that there was one person standing off to the side, and
that this person was not implicated by complicity or conspiracy in the acts of the
others, then we know that punishing all would amount to punishing an innocent
person. We intuitively react differently to high probabilities and certainties. See
Rachael Briggs, Normative Theories of Rational Choice: Expected Utility, STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. § 3.2 (Aug. 8, 2014), http://plato.stanford.edu
/archives/fall2014/entries/rationality-normative-utility/ (discussing the Allais
Paradox). My answer to the second question is that if we have given everyone an
adequate chance to show that he is innocent, then we can and should convict them
all.
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by ensuring that the risk is not imposed at all. That is, to reach a selfconsistent position that respects the “equal best” condition, the state may
punish only if the fact finders, after carefully considering all of the
evidence, are really sure that the defendants are guilty.
Stein’s reductio works as follows. How could the state impose a fair
tax on those who are 90% likely to have committed a crime and on those
who are 10% likely? “[T]hrough a lottery mechanism that distributes the
appropriate number of conviction tickets (nine tickets for ten defendants
with a 0.9 probability of guilt, and only one such ticket for ten defendants
with a 0.1 probability of guilt).”143 Though possible, this type of lottery
does not fit the “best” part of the “equal best” idea. According to Stein,
“[c]onvicting a person on a 0.1 probability of guilt is assuredly not the best
protection that the state can provide [against convicting the innocent].”144
The reductio, then, comes in the form of a dilemma: either society loses
the “equal” part by imposing the tax only on some, or the “best” part by
imposing it on those who are almost certainly not guilty. And again,
according to Stein, the dilemma is avoided only by ensuring that the state
punishes only those whose guilt has been established to practical certainty.
Although creative, this argument suffers a decisive objection. Stein
himself seems to be willing to allow juries to convict people when the
probability of their guilt “comes close to certainty.”145 He does not say
what that means in probabilistic terms; he shares Tribe’s reluctance to
assign a number to the acceptable probability.146 But choosing a number
helps clarify the moral stakes. Accordingly, in the spirit of charitable
transparency, then, let us set the SOP at 99%. In that case, one could use
the same argument against Stein’s position. The lottery would simply have
to be more fine-grained: those who are only 1% likely to be guilty would
pull from a pile in which only one card in a hundred is the conviction card;
those who are 90% likely to be guilty would pull from a pile in which nine
out of ten cards is the conviction card, and so on. Yet surely convicting a
person who is 99% likely to be innocent is not the best option available.
Thus, Stein’s position implies that society would have to give up criminal
convictions even when juries are 99% confident, after taking all relevant
143. STEIN, supra note 13, at 176.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 177.
146. Id. at 172 (“The conventional doctrine . . . vigorously resists the explicit
introduction of numbers into” the SOP.); Tribe, supra note 13, at 1375 & n.146
(writing that the “fuzziness” of the BARD standard reflects, in part, that it would
be too costly to “spell[] . . . out explicitly and with calculated precision” the fact
that “we cannot realistically insist on acquittal whenever guilt is less than
absolutely certain . . . .”). For discussion of whether the SOP can appropriately be
quantified, see infra Part III.B.2.
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case-specific information into account. This argument, then, does not
support using a very high SOP, one that is near certainty; it is an argument
for abolishing criminal convictions altogether.
One might suggest that the right conclusion to adopt is the abolitionist
one.147 But a less radical response to Stein’s failed argument is to
acknowledge that it simply adds to the case for rejecting the idea of
running a lottery with conviction tickets. The lottery is introduced to give
us a model for fairly distributing the risk of being convicted of a crime.
But life’s lottery already gives people the suspect card or not. Of those
who get the suspect card, only those who are eventually tried, and for
whom the probability of guilt exceeds the relevant SOP, should be
convicted. It is an unfortunate reality in our society that the poor and
minorities have an unfair chance of getting the suspect card.148 Life’s
lottery is not fair; as a society, we should seek to make it fairer. Those are
the changes that are called for to meet the equal best standard.
In summary, fairness and equality do not require a maximalist
interpretation of the BARD standard.
C. The Social Contract
Kitai shows her maximalist bona fides by stating that the government’s
evidence must “negate[] unequivocally any rational, plausible explanation
for the defendant’s innocence.”149 In support of this, she offers a social
contract argument: “Conviction of a defendant despite reasonable doubt as
to his guilt implies a violation of the state’s commitment toward the
individual.”150 Kitai believes that this claim can be grounded “on the concept
that the state, which replaced ‘the state of nature,’ derives its power from the
consent of the people.”151 To justify the consent of each individual,
according to Kitai, the state must make each individual who obeys the law,
thus upholding his end of the contract, better off than he would be without
the state.152 Kitai believes that, “[i]f the state can punish a person unjustly
for a crime he did not commit, he is better off without the state.”153 The state

147. See supra Part II.A (explaining the second reason that Tribe’s and Stein’s
arguments fail).
148. See, e.g., Paul D. Butler, Poor People Lose: Gideon and the Critique of
Rights, 122 YALE L.J. 2176 (2013).
149. Kitai, supra note 13, at 1164.
150. Id. at 1172.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1175.
153. Id.
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therefore has a duty to avoid punishment unless it has proven a defendant’s
guilt “with the greatest certainty possible.”154
The obvious flaw in this argument is that, ex ante, an individual is better
off with the state, not without it, as long as it promotes utilitarian policies.
As Larry Laudan explains:
The idea that a person would necessarily be better off in a state of
nature than in a state that imposes a non-negligible risk of false
conviction wholly ignores the question as to whether, under [a rule
that allowed the guilty to be more easily convicted], the risk of
victimization has been vastly diminished in comparison with the
state of nature.155
One thing Kitai could say in response is that, from the point of view
of a person who is being falsely punished, that is, from the ex post point
of view, living in a state that imposes a substantial risk of a false conviction
on him might be worse than what he could have expected living in the state
of nature. At least if the punishment is serious, the certain experience of a
serious punishment is worse than even reasonably high odds of being
victimized by others in the state of nature. But, of course, that argument
cuts both ways. Living in a stateless society could have a worse outcome,
ex post, if one is the victim of a violent crime. How can we decide which
objection is stronger? One natural way to do so is by giving weight to each
objection by weighing the degree of lost welfare and the odds of being a
victim. But then we are back to the utilitarian position that we should
choose the policy that would minimize the risk of victimization.156 That
policy would almost certainly not be in accord with Kitai’s maximalist
position.157
Other scholars have offered different social contract arguments in
favor of the BARD standard—as customarily understood, not as the
maximalists understand it. This Section concludes by briefly considering
154. Id.
155. Laudan, supra note 15, at 213 n.32.
156. To be clear, ex ante thinking does not automatically reduce to utilitarian
thinking. Johann Frick convincingly argues that an ex ante social contract theorist
can defend positions that are more like utilitarianism than many ex post social
contract theorists, but that are still, in important ways, unlike utilitarianism. See
Johann Frick, Contractualism and Social Risk – How to Count the Numbers
Without Aggregating, PHIL. & PUB. AFF. (forthcoming) (on file with author).
Whether Frick’s ex ante contractualism would allow an SOP that would be
indistinguishable from the consequentialist one is a difficult question to answer,
and is therefore beyond the scope of this Article.
157. See infra Part III (providing more on what utilitarian, or, more properly,
consequentialist considerations would suggest for the SOP for criminal convictions).
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three of these arguments—one by Jeffrey Reiman, one by Youngjae Lee,
and one that appeals to a distinction, offered by Ronald Dworkin, between
“moral harms” and “bare harms”158—as well as one other intuitively
appealing argument.
Reiman’s argument turns on the idea that the state should provide a
“secure zone,” which he likens to being secure in one’s home.159 The
thought is that the state itself makes one insecure by using an SOP that is
too low. The problem with this argument is obvious in light of what was
just said about Kitai’s argument. If one wants to be secure in one’s home,
then one would want security from all forms of wrongdoing. One would
want to be protected not only from the state itself but also from others. A
lower SOP than BARD might well provide more protection overall. If so,
then this argument does not support using the BARD standard.160
One might think that this response misses the worry that the state is a
greater threat to an individual than other individuals, and that we would
want, therefore, to constrain the state. But this concern about the potential
for state abuse of power calls for restrictions of a far different sort than a
high SOP. It calls for things like civilian control of the military, an
independent judiciary, civil juries that can engage in jury nullification, and
the possibility of sanctions for prosecutorial misconduct. A raised SOP
could also put a thumb on the scale making it harder for the state to oppress
people. But it is a crude tool to use for that purpose.161 Moreover, it is a
tool that could get in the way of the state doing a good job incapacitating
criminals and deterring potential criminals. If we assume that the state is
trying to serve, rather than oppress, the people, then we would want the
SOP for a criminal conviction, from the point of view of security, to
balance the harms caused by wrongful punishments against the harms
caused by failure to punish and incapacitate. In other words, we would want
to adopt a consequentialist position on the SOP, which might well be below
the BARD standard as customarily understood.162
Lee’s contractualist argument appeals to the thought that the government
has a monopoly on punishment, displacing private punishment. But, says Lee,
“before the state can exercise acts of violence and attach stigma to individuals,
we demand that the state be able to justify the acts it is about to take by
correctly identifying wrongdoers. The proof beyond a reasonable doubt
158. See DWORKIN, supra note 130, at 80.
159. Reiman & van den Haag, supra note 21, at 237–40.
160. Other authors have provided related criticisms. See id. at 247–48; Epps,
supra note 15, at 1140.
161. For more on using a heightened SOP to make it harder for the state to use
the criminal law to oppress people, see infra note 223.
162. See infra Part III (arguing that consequentialism could plausibly call for
using an SOP below the BARD standard on its customary understanding).
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requirement is generated from this demand.”163 Unfortunately, Lee makes this
assertion essentially without argument.164 He therefore makes no attempt to
convince those who doubt that the state’s legitimacy depends on using the
BARD standard as customarily understood.165
Another argument that a social contract theorist might want to make is
to appeal to the distinction Dworkin made between “bare harm” and the
“moral harm” of injustice.166 The thought is that the state commits an
injustice when it wrongfully convicts and punishes, and that avoiding such
moral harms is more important than avoiding the bare harm of being a crime
victim. The problem with this argument is that harms that criminals inflict
are clearly “wrongs,” not bare harms. They are not wrongs committed by
the state, but they are wrongs that are allowed by the state insofar as it
chooses policies that allow more of such wrongs to take place than
alternative policies would probably allow, judging probability with the best
available social science. Therefore, if there is a sound moral argument in
play here, it works by appeal to the distinction between doing and allowing,
not to the distinction between bare harms and moral harms.
The distinction between doing and allowing will be taken up in the next
Section. For present purposes, it is worth adding one more thought about the
distinction between bare and moral harms. If the state is using a justified
SOP, it is acting blamelessly. By contrast, a criminal is not. In a
straightforward sense, then, it is false convictions that are “bare” harms; it
is only criminal victimizations that count as “moral” harms. Thus, if the
distinction between moral and bare harms carries any weight, it should make
the harm of victimization count for more and thus push for a lower SOP.
There is still one more reason that the idea of a social contract might
seem to provide a tempting framework for making sense of the BARD
standard: There is an undeniable sense in which people care more about
state abuse authority than private wrongdoing. It is not simply that the state
has more power to do wrong. Even holding wrongs constant, people get
more upset, for example, when the police wrongfully kill someone than
when a normal criminal does.167 It is hard to be sure why that is. But this
163. Youngjae Lee, Deontology, Political Morality, and the State, 8 OHIO ST.
J. CRIM. L. 385, 399 (2011).
164. The closest he comes to giving an argument is to gesture at the pressure
the state faces to reduce crime, implying that the BARD standard is protection
against doing so to an excessive degree.
165. See Epps, supra note 15, at 54–55 (providing similar criticisms).
166. See DWORKIN, supra note 130, at 80.
167. This is borne out by the fact that the police killings of African Americans
in the United States are much less frequent than non-police killings of African
Americans, but police killings have recently provoked huge demonstrations. See
Oliver Laughland, Jon Swain & Jamiles Lartey, U.S. Police Killings Headed for
1,100 this Year, with Black Americans Twice as Likely to Die, GUARDIAN (July 1,
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seems a plausible explanation: We are more upset when the state does
wrong because we expect (as a normative matter, not necessarily a
predictive one) that the state will act properly. Its job, its reason to exist,
is to serve the people. If the state instead preys on the people, it is an
outrage. It is the breach of a trust that adds an extra dimension to the base
wrong. If that is the right explanation, however, then it again tells us
nothing about what the right SOP for a criminal conviction should be. For
whatever the right SOP is, if the state uses it, it acts blamelessly. There
would be no reason to be upset that it has misbehaved or breached the trust
rested in it.
In summary, it seems that the only thread of argument in the various
social contract arguments that might still hold moral weight rests on the
distinction that grounds the next deontological argument—the distinction
between causing and allowing harm. If that distinction makes it much
harder for the state to justify causing harms than allowing others to cause
harms, then a social contract theorist would have a response to the
consequentialist challenge. The next Section will argue, however, that the
distinction does not carry that kind of moral weight.
D. The Distinction Between Causing and Allowing Harm
Many believe that the state must take special care not to inflict the
horrible damages of conviction and punishment on the innocent because
doing something wrongful and harmful is much more difficult to justify than
allowing an equivalent wrongful harm to occur.168 This belief would justify
a strong skewing of the SOP in favor of the state not wronging innocent
people, even if use of a high SOP would result in more guilty people going
free and then harming other innocents. The appeal of this thought, however,
reflects two conflations. Once they are teased apart, it becomes clear that
this thought cannot justify the BARD standard as customarily understood.
The first conflation is of two parallel but different distinctions: the
agent-centered distinction between doing something harmful and allowing
2015), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jul/01/us-police-killings-thisyear-black-americans (finding that 547 people were killed by the police in the first
half of 2015, 28.3% (155) of whom were black); Crime in the United States 2001,
FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2011/crime-in-the-u.s.
-2011/tables/expanded-homicide-data-table-1 [http://perma.cc/3WHV-ZTSG] (last
visited Nov. 3, 2015) (Table 1) (according to which 6329 blacks were killed in
2011). Assuming that the first half of 2015 can be compared to 2011, then nonpolice killings of black Americans are roughly 20 times more common—6329
compared to 310—than police killings of black Americans.
168. See, e.g., Adam Omar Hosein, Doing, Allowing, and the State, 33 LAW &
PHIL. 235, 239–40 (2014) (arguing that one way to justify the “Blackstone ratio”
is by appealing to the difference between doing and allowing).
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something harmful to happen, and the patient-centered distinction—patients
are people affected by the choices of agents—between being caused harm and
being allowed to suffer harm.169 A basic commitment of liberal morality is
that natural agents—real persons—have strong negative claims as agents—
agent-claims—not to have to sacrifice themselves for the sake of others, even
if the others are in dire need, unless they have a special relationship with them,
for example, parent to child, promisor to promisee, or tortfeasor to victim.170
The reason for this strong negative agent-claim is that natural agents have
their own lives to lead; morality may not impose heavy burdens on them
that would effectively treat them as servants for the welfare of others. But
this agent-centered distinction is not what is at issue in determining
whether the state can justifiably expose defendants to a non-negligible risk
of a false conviction to prevent others from suffering harm from criminals
who are mistakenly acquitted. What is at issue is the patient-focused
question of whether the state can be prohibited from making that tradeoff
even if it chooses to make it.
To see this, start with the assumption that the state exists to serve,
insofar as justice permits, the interests of its citizens.171 This means that it
cannot benefit from negative agent-claims as a real person does. But even
if we assume that the state can channel the negative agent-claims of its
citizens, that would give it only a claim not to be forced to do things that
they do not want it to do, things that would effectively indirectly turn them
into servants of the common good. In that spirit, the state could channel
their claims not to have to spend huge resources to achieve some common
good. But that is not the kind of thing at issue when the state decides,
169. This contrast is often framed in terms of acting versus omitting—the
agent-focused distinction—and doing versus allowing—the patient-focused
distinction. The problem with this way of framing the contrast is that the contrast
between doing and allowing is also naturally interpreted as an agent-focused
distinction.
170. See Alec Walen & David Wasserman, Agents, Impartiality, and the
Priority of Claims over Duties; Diagnosing Why Thomson Still Gets the Trolley
Problem Wrong by Appeal to the ‘Mechanics of Claims’, 9 J. MORAL PHIL. 545,
554–56 (2012) (arguing that “claims” is the best generic to cover both pro tanto
liberty rights and pro tanto claim rights, and arguing that negative agent claims
are strong, while positive ones carry no weight). This position on negative agentclaims is consistent with saying that agents have a duty to make small sacrifices
for the sake of others, as well as to pay taxes for the general welfare.
171. Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule make a similar but weaker point
when they argue that “governments always and necessarily face a choice between
or among possible policies for regulating third parties.” Cass R. Sunstein &
Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? Acts, Omissions, and
Life–Life Tradeoffs, 58 STAN. L. REV. 703, 721 (2005). As Hosein points out, they
neglect the fact that governments not only choose policies, but act against a status
quo background in particular cases. Hosein, supra note 168, at 247.
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within its legitimate authority, to pursue criminal justice. In that case, no
negative agent-claims come into play. Thus any appeal to the distinction
between doing and allowing meant to skew the SOP away from
maximizing the general welfare would have to turn on the strength of
negative patient-claims not to be harmed, as compared to positive patientclaims to be saved from harm.172
This difference in patient-claims, unlike the agent-focused difference,
is not a deontologically weighty one. Although negative patient-claims,
which are claims not to be harmed, are somewhat stronger than positive
patient-claims, which are claims to be aided,173 three reasons exist for
thinking that the difference is slight.
First, the legal doctrines of necessity and lesser evil justify taking
actions that harm some, who have negative claims, if doing so is necessary
to avoid allowing a greater harm to befall others, who have positive
claims.174 Widely shared intuitions support these doctrines on the moral
permissibility of performing actions like diverting a threat from a larger
number of people onto a smaller number.175
Second, another distinction is easily confused with the distinction
between positive and negative patient-claims, making it seem like this
second distinction carries more weight than it does. This second conflation
confuses the distinction between negative and positive patient-claims with
the distinction that the DDE and MP capture. This latter distinction
differentiates between patient-claims not to be harmed as a side effect of an
agent acting for the greater good and patient-claims not to be harmed as a
172. Although this Part comes to the same conclusion, with regard to the
normative significance of the distinction between doing and allowing, as Sunstein
and Vermeule, see Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 171, it does not rely on those
authors’ arguments because they consistently conflate the agent-focused and the
patient-focused distinctions. For example, when explaining why “a defense of the
reasonable doubt standard on act/omission grounds [is] unlikely,” id. at 727, they
focus on an acquittal being an “action” just like a conviction. But while it is true
that a judge or jury acts and is responsible for the decision, the important question
is from the patient-side. See also Epps, supra note 15, at 1138 (suggesting that
libertarians—who emphasize strong negative agent-claims—would respond to his
argument differently than those who think the government has strong obligations,
thereby showing that he is wrongly focused on the agent-focused distinction).
173. See Alec Walen, Doing, Allowing, and Disabling: Some Principles
Governing Deontological Restrictions, 80 PHIL. STUD. 183, 190–93 (1995)
(arguing that negative claims are at least somewhat stronger than positive claims,
all else equal).
174. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 cmt. 2 (1962) (explaining the “Choice
of Evils” justification).
175. See, e.g., Fiery Cushman, Liane Young & Marc Hauser, The Role of
Conscious Reasoning and Intuition in Moral Judgment: Testing Three Principles
of Harm, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1082 (2006).
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means by which an agent can achieve the greater good. There is good reason
to think that the DDE and MP track a sound moral principle.176 Moreover,
it is often true that claims not to be used as a means, taking the MP
formulation, are also negative claims not to be harmed. For example,
framing an innocent person to try to deter others from committing crimes
involves both treating him as a means and doing something harmful to
him. But the two types of claims can come apart. For example, allowing
someone to die by withholding medical treatment so that his organs can
then be used to save lives disregards both a claim not to be used as a means
of achieving a greater good and a claim for aid. If one pulls the distinctions
apart, it seems that what is really contributing weight is the MP or DDE,
not the distinction between positive and negative claims.177
Third, a theoretical case can be made to explain why negative patientclaims should not be much stronger than positive patient-claims, all else
being equal.178 When these two types of claims conflict, and when no one
is using any of the claimants as a means to help the others, then both sets
of claims impose something like a negative externality on others. Consider
the case of an agent facing the choice either to allow a trolley to continue
down a hill where it will kill five people, or to divert it onto another track
where it will kill one person. And then consider the difference the
claimants’ claims seek to make against a baseline in which they are not
present with their claims.179 The five would have the agent kill the one to
save them; the one would have the agent allow the five to die rather than
kill him. Each side has claims the normative force of which is to “push”
the agent to act in such a way as to make the others worse off than they
would be if the agent did what she obviously should do if the other set of
claimants were not present. If the one on the side-track were not present,
then the agent obviously should turn the trolley away from the five. If the
176. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
177. Hosein notes that both sorts of principles are morally relevant. Hosein,
supra note 168, at 238 n.6. But he does not wrestle with lesser evil cases, which
undermine the importance of the distinction between positive and negative
patient-claims. He does introduce a case in which the distinction between positive
and negative claims seems to be doing important work: one must drive over
someone to get to a position to rescue others. Id. at 237. But it is not so clear that
one may not do that, and insofar as there is reason to think that one may not, the
notion of using him as a means can be extended to cover using what he has a prior
claim to—the space in which he sits—as a means. See Walen, supra note 123, at
456–57.
178. What follows is a very brief summary of the core argument for the RCP.
For further discussion of that argument, see Walen, supra note 123.
179. The baseline of not being present is a good heuristic, but ultimately not
morally accurate. The right baseline refers to the agent’s baseline freedom to act,
which is given by her rights over property. See Walen, supra note 125.
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one’s claim had to be respected as a right not to be killed, then the five
would be worse off because the agent could not permissibly rescue them
from the trolley. Likewise, if the five were not present, then the agent
obviously should not turn the trolley onto the one. If their claims had to be
respected as rights to be saved, then the one would be worse off because
the agent would be required to turn the trolley onto him.
By contrast, consider the case of an agent facing the choice either to
use someone as a means of saving the five—say by pushing him in front
of the trolley—or to allow the five to die. The one in this case has a claim that
pushes to make others no worse off than if he were not present. Whether the
agent respects his claim not to be used or he is simply not available, she cannot
save the five. This shows that claims not to be used do not push to make others
worse off in the way that both negative and positive claims, held by those who
would not be so used, do. That can explain why claims not to be used are
stronger, all else being equal, than claims that do push to make others worse
off. And the fact that both negative and positive patient-claims, when no party
would be used as a means of helping another, do push to make others worse
off at least suggests that they are competing more or less on a par. This does
not mean that negative claims should get no priority over positive ones, all else
being equal. But the dominance should be much less than that given to claims
that do not push to impose anything like a negative externality.
Hosein did offer an argument that negative claims should be much
stronger than competing positive claims. His argument boils down to this:
“[A]s an agent I must take special responsibility for what I do to other people
as opposed to what merely befalls them or what other people inflict on
them.”180 The problem with this argument, however, is that it is essentially the
flip side of the principle that agents have strong negative claims not to have to
do things to help others unless they have done something to them. That,
however, is a point about agent-claims, not patient-claims. One cannot make
inferences from one to the other.
In summary, the negative claim of innocent defendants not to be harmed
as a side-effect of the state adopting a relatively low SOP in criminal cases181
should be treated as only slightly stronger than the competing positive claims
of the potential victims of crime not to be allowed to suffer harms at the hands
of criminals who would be incapacitated if convictions were easier to obtain.
The slight priority of negative over positive patient-claims will not suffice to
significantly increase the SOP over the level a consequentialist balance of the
harms recommends. If the consequentialist balance does not come close to the
BARD standard, then the extra concern the state should have not to cause harm
will not justify the increase to the BARD standard.
180. Hosein, supra note 168, at 238.
181. See supra Part II.A.
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E. The Expressive Significance of Condemnation
Antony Duff—who believes that “conviction is appropriate only if the
fact finder knows that the defendant is guilty”182—articulates a position
that many share. According to this position, the expressive significance of
condemnation is what justifies using a high SOP in criminal cases:183
To be convicted of a crime is not just to suffer some loss; it is to be
condemned for committing a wrong. This gives us reason to make
it quite hard to convict defendants, by defining proof “according to
law” as proof beyond reasonable doubt. Civil liability, involving no
more than liability to pay the costs of harm that has occurred, might
be justly allocated to the defendant if it is proved only on the
balance of probabilities that she was responsible for the harm, given
that the costs must fall on one of the parties; but proof that the
defendant is “probably” guilty is not enough to justify his formal
condemnation and punishment by the state.184
I too was initially drawn to this position. In my first published views
on the topic, I wrote: “[T]he expressive content of punishment, the
dimension of censure, the claim that the sanction is deserved, these all
require a high level of confidence that the punishment is deserved. That
high level of confidence is captured by the BARD standard.”185 I now see
three compelling reasons why this expressivist defense of the BARD
standard misses the mark.
First, it is unclear why condemnation should require a much higher
SOP than, say, finding liability for a tort. Duff’s claim that the harm of
punishment is worse than the harm of a tort penalty is at best a valid
generalization;186 some tort penalties are devastating, and some criminal
penalties fairly light. One might reply that the law has to reflect such
182. DUFF ET AL., supra note 13, at 89 (emphasis added). Duff further explains
that “[f]or it to be true that the fact finder knows this, she must be entitled, on the
basis of the evidence presented in court, to assert her judgment that he is guilty
without qualification or hesitation.” Id.
183. Other authors support this view. Tribe, supra note 13, at 1374; Kitai,
supra note 13, at 1181.
184. DUFF ET AL., supra note 13, at 89–90.
185. Mattias Kumm & Alec D. Walen, Human Dignity and Proportionality:
Deontic Pluralism in Balancing, in PROPORTIONALITY AND THE RULE OF LAW:
RIGHTS, JUSTIFICATION, REASONING 82 (Grant Huscroft et al. eds., 2014).
186. DUFF ET AL., supra note 13, at 89–90. Duff addresses the question of why
condemnation requires a much higher SOP than finding liability for a tort,
explaining that civil liability involves “no more than liability to pay the costs of
harm that has occurred,” whereas criminal liability involves “formal
condemnation and punishment by the state.” Id.
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generalizations. But that position does not explain where to draw the
relevant lines. It is not obvious why society could not have a range of SOPs
for both torts and criminal cases that would reflect the severity of penalty
and that would sometimes overlap.187 Further, if the issue is reduced to
harms, then it is not obvious why a utilitarian or consequentialist
framework is not then the relevant one, and as we will see in the next Part,
this framework might call for an SOP quite a bit lower than “knowing”
that the defendant is guilty.
Second, the thought that “punishment is in part the intentional
infliction of suffering, justified in a retributive framework by the idea that
the defendant deserves it” may seem to imply that, to justify punishment,
“the fact finder must positively believe that the person deserves such
punishment.”188 But there are two problems with this argument. First, even
if we accept that the fact finder must believe that the person deserves the
punishment before voting to convict, it is not clear why that requires a very
high level of confidence. Compare, again, the civil case. To award
damages to the plaintiff, the fact finder must believe, with a confidence
level set by the relevant SOP, that the defendant is liable for having
committed a tort, and that the plaintiff deserves to get compensation from
the defendant. Yet in the United States, the relevant SOP in tort liability is
a mere preponderance standard—that the defendant is more likely than not
to be liable.189 Second, it is not clear why the fact finder must “positively
believe” that the defendant is guilty, rather than believe that the SOP has
been met.190 Any attempt to limit the SOP by the nature of “belief” requires
a substantive justification; otherwise it simply falls into a trap that H.L.A.
Hart identified, that of invoking a “definitional stop.”191
187. See infra Part III.C. In the end, Duff is correct that the SOP for criminal
trials should be high and for civil trials the SOP should be mere preponderance of
the evidence. But mere consideration of harms does not lead to that result.
188. Kumm & Walen, supra note 185, at 14.
189. In other countries, the SOP is higher. In Germany, for example, dispute
persists over what the standard should be, but one standard deemed sufficient
reads: “[S]uch a high degree of probability as would quiet, without eliminating,
the doubts of a person of reasonable and clear perception of the circumstances of
life.” PETER L. MURRAY & ROLF STÜRNER, GERMAN CIVIL JUSTICE 310 (2004)
(quotations marks omitted) (citation omitted); see also Taruffo, supra note 31, at
667–68 (“[P]revailing opinion seems now to be that [preponderance of the
evidence] is too low to fit with the idea of establishing the truth of the facts that
is at the basis of § 286”—the section of the code of civil procedure dealing with
the evaluation of evidence by the court).
190. See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text (discussing what an SOP
does).
191. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 5 (1968).
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Admittedly, there are some—Lara Buchak,192 for example—who
think that beliefs operate differently from what is sometimes known as a
partial belief or credence—an SOP is effectively a required minimal
credence193—and that only a belief can suffice for a criminal conviction.
Buchak argues that credences are appropriate for what she calls “personal
action: action when the only or primary relevant stakes are for the
agent.”194 She argues, in contrast, that belief operates in the interpersonal
realm of reactive attitudes such as resentment and indignation, as well in
interpersonal activities such as blaming and punishing.195 She rests her
argument primarily on cases such as those discussed by Stein,196 cases in
which it is plain that naked statistical evidence, which suffices for a
credence, does not suffice for a finding of guilt or even tort liability.197
One of her examples nicely illustrates her objection to relying on naked
statistical evidence for a conviction: A phone was stolen by one of two
people; one is a man, one a woman. Statistical evidence indicates that 90%
of phone thieves are men; nonetheless, it would be unacceptable to base
conviction simply on that fact. But Buchak’s response to cases like this is
different from Stein’s. Rather than assert that the evidence has to be nearly
certain and based on individualized testing, she thinks that cases like this
show that beliefs are required to convict. Beliefs, as Buchak conceives
them, do not come in degrees; one merely believes or one does not believe
that some proposition or other is true.198 This is not to be confused with
having a high credence. One might believe that someone committed a
crime if a witness says she saw him do it, or if he looks guilty when asked
about the crime, even if the odds of his guilt are lower than they would be
if naked statistical evidence were used, and even if that naked statistical
evidence were inadequate for a conviction.199 Her point is that one must
believe it before one convicts; one must not simply think it is likely to be
true beyond some certain threshold.
Buchak’s argument has a clear intuitive appeal. It feels better to say
that one would vote to convict someone only if one believes he is guilty.
Then one does not have to own up to the fact that one is imposing the risk
192. Lara Buchak, Belief, Credence, and Norms, 169 PHIL. STUD. 295 (2014).
193. Having a belief that some proposition (p) is true is inconsistent with p
being false, but having the credence that it is 90% likely that p is true is consistent
with p being false.
194. Id. at 298.
195. Id.
196. See supra Part II.B.
197. Buchak, supra note 192, at 292.
198. Id. at 268 (“When an agent believes p, she in some sense rules out worlds
in which not-p holds.”).
199. Id.
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of false conviction on him. But this is, in fact, just a kind of moral
obscurantism; it is a way of ducking responsibility for acting on an
adequate SOP. Moreover, it is not well supported by Buchak’s discussion
of naked statistical evidence. The problem with naked statistical evidence
is not that it lacks some unstated marker of interpersonal reliability that
would make it fit for “belief.” The problem with it is that it needs to be
supplemented, as Stein rightly points out, by individualized testing of the
evidence. Witness testimony is particularly significant because—expert
witnesses notwithstanding—it is always about the individual event in
question. Still, at the end of the day, introduction of individualized testing
is not sufficient for a conviction. When judging whether another is guilty
or liable, one needs to assess one’s credences. How reliable were the
witnesses? How reliable is the evidence overall? Only if one’s credence
crosses the relevant SOP should one act.
A third reason to reject the expressivist defense of the BARD standard
is that its appeal illicitly trades on the nature of the communicative act of
condemnation. The idea that there is a connection between communication
and the BARD standard can be explained as follows: When one is
expressing condemnation, one is addressing oneself to the other. This may
seem to require that one be highly confident that one is indeed justified
before expressing and acting on one’s condemnation. But this connection is
illusory. Again, all one needs to justify oneself to the other is the ability to
say that one has met the relevant SOP.
It might seem that this response to the communicative thought is too
quick. That is, it might seem that the relationship between those who would
condemn and those whom they would condemn must have implications for
what the SOP for condemnation should be. It might seem that one has no
business condemning another if one is not very confident, and for good
reason, that the other deserves the condemnation.
But these appearances are indeed illusory because they make it seem as
though the SOP can be determined by thinking simply about a bilateral
relationship. It is crucial to keep in mind, however, that the correct SOP
cannot be determined simply by thinking about the relationship an agent has
to the person she is contemplating condemning. An agent—whether a
natural agent, or an artificial one, be it a corporation or a state—is never
simply in a binary relationship with another.200 An agent is always
200. This fact is the central structural feature of the “Mechanics of Claims.”
Walen & Wasserman, supra note 170, at 551–53. The mechanics of claims allows
a kind of aggregation that is generally frowned on in contractualist theories of
morality. See, e.g., T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 30–32
(1998) (arguing that the right policy is one which generates the weakest individual
complaint). But contractualist theories such as Scanlon’s oversimplify the moral
landscape, looking too quickly to an individual’s ability to complain, without
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responding to a complex set of complementary and conflicting patientclaims. Focusing on the state as a potential punisher: some will want it to
condemn and punish criminals; others will want it not to wrongly condemn
and punish them. The state, as the agent confronting those competing
claims, has to appropriately weigh all of them. Without some reason to
disregard their claims,201 there is no reason to turn a blind eye to those who
want the state to protect them from the guilty. And if the interests of those
who desire the state’s protection are on par with the interest the innocent
have in not being punished—modulo the difference between positive and
negative claims discussed in the previous Section—it is far from clear that
the right SOP would be the BARD standard as customarily understood.202
The idea that an agent is always responding to a complex set of
complementary and conflicting patient-claims bears further explication. For
in some sense, one is in a binary relationship whenever rights are at stake.
People have a pro tanto right not to be falsely condemned, and agents,
including the state, have a duty to their citizens not to falsely condemn them.
So why should it not be the case that one should pay attention to that
relationship, to the exclusion of all others, when thinking about the right
SOP for condemnation? The answer is that this feature of rights applies to
all rights people have against each other, and it never allows one to simply
ignore the larger context in which that binary relationship is situated.
To see the point more clearly, consider the case of an agent who is
considering whether to kill another in defense of others. If she kills a culpable
aggressor who would otherwise, in the immediate future, kill an innocent
person, it is non-problematic;203 the aggressor, through his culpable action,
has forfeited his right not to be killed as long as no lesser means will suffice
to stop his aggression.204 If, however, the person is not aggressing, but is
setting out a normative structure for weighing competing claims. The mechanics
of claims sets out such a normative structure. More specifically, contractualists
like Scanlon are wary of the topic of aggregation because the topic can seem to
swamp the claims of the individual. Less drastic measures, however, such as
distinguishing different kinds of claims that might serve the same interest,
recognizing that some types of claims can sometimes operate as lexically stronger
than others, or using screening functions—the thesis of this Article—can serve
the same end and can sensibly allow aggregation when not otherwise banned.
201. See infra Part IV (aiming to provide this “reason to disregard their
claims,” as expressivism by itself does not provide it).
202. See infra Part III.
203. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) (1962) (“[T]he use of force upon or
toward another person is justifiable when the actor believes that such force is
immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of
unlawful force by such other person on the present occasion.”).
204. See Christopher Heath Wellman, The Rights Forfeiture Theory of
Punishment, 122 ETHICS 371, 374 (2012) (emphasizing that “self-defense is
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acting in self-defense, then killing him for the sake of the other, who is
aggressing against him, is impermissible. The epistemic problem is that the
agent may not know which of these conditions applies. What she does know
is that two parties are present in one of these relationships. If she kills the
person she thought was a culpable aggressor, but who was acting in selfdefense, she will have wronged him. But she will have acted without
culpability if her belief that she was doing the right thing is sufficiently
justified.205 For the belief to be sufficiently justified, the evidence and level
of confidence must meet the relevant SOP. But that SOP cannot reflect
simply the fact that she might be killing an innocent; rather, the SOP has
to reflect as well that she might be saving an innocent. The same is true
for the choice to condemn, which occurs no more in a simple binary
relationship than the choice of whether to kill in defense of another. The
choice to condemn occurs in a larger moral context, where others also have
an interest in such actions, and one has to take their claims into account.
Without some reason to screen out the interests of those who have an
interest in courts convicting and imprisoning the guilty, there is no reason
to think that the SOP can be set by reference only to the communicative
message of condemnation.
In summary of this Part, the five non-retributive deontological
arguments for the BARD standard have all failed. Before turning to examine
this Article’s new retributive-deontological argument, however, it will be
useful to examine what consequentialism itself implies about the correct
SOP for criminal trials. Consequentialism straightforwardly rests its account
of the SOP for a criminal conviction on its account of what is at stake in
convicting or not convicting both the innocent and the guilty. In that regard,
it starts off on the right foot. But it fails in its own way to give a plausible
account of the SOP for conviction and punishment, and its failure helps
point the way to the right solution.
III. CONSEQUENTIALIST REJECTION OF THE BARD STANDARD
This Part examines what consequentialism might imply for the SOP
for a criminal conviction.206 It starts with some preliminary remarks about
commonly understood in terms of rights forfeiture”); JOSHUA DRESSLER,
UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 235 (6th ed. 2012) (listing forfeiture as
involved in two of four non-utilitarian explanations for self-defense law).
205. The law uses a “reasonable person in the actor’s situation” standard, but
jurisdictions differ in terms of how much they allow that to vary according to
subjective features the actor brings to her “situation.” See DRESSLER, supra note
204, at 239.
206. This discussion will not be completely consequentialist because the Article
leaves mostly implicit that whatever SOP consequentialism might prescribe would
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consequentialism, distinguishing it from utilitarianism and distinguishing its
pursuit of “the good” from the pursuit of accuracy as possible guiding norms
for an SOP. It then describes the primary consequentialist considerations
affecting the SOP in criminal trials and argues that they might call for a
surprisingly low SOP in criminal cases. Next, it examines the implications of
separating out different SOPs for different kinds of criminal cases. This
possibility, implicit in the discussion up to this point, shows that the
consequentialist recommendation in some cases is very low. Finally, this Part
explores the implications of recommending, even if only in a few cases, a very
low SOP, arguing that consequentialism cannot properly make sense of the
idea that punishment presupposes guilt.
It is worth emphasizing, before proceeding, that the discussion that
follows treats the SOP at trial as though it has significant implications for
how the guilty and the innocent fare in the criminal justice system. Given
that approximately 95% of convictions result from guilty pleas,207 one
might wonder whether the SOP for trials is a sideshow. And one might
think that the main reason to think not is the old trope that pleas occur in
the shadow of expected trial outcomes.208 There are, however, problems
with this trope. When it comes to minor felonies and misdemeanors, there
is reason to worry that the practice of plea bargains, in combination with
the practice of pre-trial detention, leads many innocents to plead guilty
regardless of what would have happened at trial.209 On the other hand,
have to be modified slightly to accommodate the slight preference for negative
claims over positive claims discussed in Part II.D. One might argue that this need
not even be taken as a departure from consequentialism. That is, one might argue
that a consequentialist could say that it is slightly worse for the state to cause
harms than to allow them. But this sort of extension of consequentialism is
incoherent. Consequentialism, as understood here, directs agents to maximize the
good from an agent-neutral point of view. From an agent-neutral point of view,
the state’s allowing criminals to act is not merely an allowing; it is also a doing
on the part of criminals. But even if the consequentialist picture would have to be
modified, it would only be slightly, and it would not affect the larger picture
developed in this Part.
207. See Epps, supra note 15, at 1114 & n.236; see also Oren Gazal-Ayal &
Avishalom Tor, The Innocence Effect, 62 DUKE L.J. 339, 341 (2012).
208. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117
HARV. L. REV. 2463 (2004).
209. See id. As Bibas writes:
Most criminal cases . . . involve misdemeanors or minor felonies, such
as petty theft, that usually carry short sentences. Though many
defendants make bail for these offenses, some do not have enough
money or are detained without bail. One empirical study found that
roughly four times as many defendants charged with misdemeanors or
lesser felonies are imprisoned before trial as are after conviction. The
pretrial detention can approach or even exceed the punishment that a
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studies of post-plea interviews and exoneration statistics of major felonies
indicate that the innocent rarely plead guilty to such crimes. As Oren
Gazal-Ayal and Avishalom Tor write:
[O]nly 37 of the 466 exonerated defendants, or 7.9 percent, were
convicted following a guilty plea. The remaining 92.1 percent were
convicted by an erroneous jury decision at trial. This 7.9 percent
rate stands in sharp contrast to the common rate of guilty pleas in
comparable felony cases during the same period, which was
approximately 90 percent.210
The implication of these statistics is that the SOP for trial is actually
more important in felony cases than the high rate of plea bargains might lead
one to believe. The reason is that, “innocents disproportionately refuse the
plea and go to trial.”211 Indeed, there is an extra reason why the SOP at trial
is relevant. As Gazal-Ayal and Tor point out, one of the reasons that the
innocent do sometimes plead guilty is that “they believe that their conviction
at trial is extremely likely.”212 Lowering the SOP would raise the number of
cases in which convictions, both false and accurate, are extremely likely to
occur. Lowering the SOP would, therefore, not only lead to more false
convictions at trial, but also to more false convictions based on a plea
bargain. Thus, if one is concerned with protecting the innocent from false
convictions, there is all the more reason to focus on the SOP at trial.
Conversely, there is still reason to focus on the SOP at trial if one is
concerned with punishing the guilty. Although it is true that the vast
majority of convictions result from plea bargains, there is still good reason
to believe that the guilty are more likely to take their chances at trial if the
odds of conviction are low and more likely to plead if the odds of conviction
are high. Thus, this Article proceeds on the assumption that the SOP for
trial is relevant to the fates of both the innocent and the guilty, at least for
major felonies.213
court would impose after trial. So even an acquittal at trial can be a
hollow victory, as there is no way to restore the days already spent in
jail. . . . Thus, pretrial detention places a high premium on quick plea
bargains in small cases, even if the defendant would probably win
acquittal at an eventual trial. In other words, the shadow of pretrial
detention looms much larger over these small cases than does the shadow
of trial.
Id. at 2491–93.
210. Gazal-Ayal & Tor, supra note 207, at 352.
211. Id. at 394.
212. Id. at 387.
213. It is presumably also relevant to minor felonies and misdemeanors, even
if the use of pretrial detention clouds its relevance somewhat.
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A. Preliminary Remarks on Consequentialism
As a preliminary matter, this Section seeks to clarify why this Article
focuses on consequentialism, as opposed to utilitarianism, and how a
concern with consequentialism is different from a concern with accuracy.
Starting with the first issue, both consequentialism and utilitarianism agree
that right actions or right rules—normally, the law, including the law
governing the SOP, is a matter of rules, not acts judged in isolation214—
are those that maximize, from an impartial point of view, the moral value
brought about or preserved. The two views differ, however, in terms of
their definition of what exactly is “the good.” Utilitarians are concerned
with happiness, whether understood in terms of the balance of pleasure
over pain, preference satisfaction (whether informed or uninformed), or
welfare.215 Consequentialists accept other moral reasons as also shaping
the good that is to be maximized.216 Utilitarians are thus a subset of
consequentialists.
Of particular relevance to this discussion, consequentialism can, but
utilitarianism cannot, make sense of the thought that punishing the
innocent is particularly bad. As Bentham pointed out, a utilitarian thinks
that “all punishment is mischief: all punishment in itself is evil. Upon the
principle of utility, if it ought at all to be admitted, it ought only to be
admitted in as far as it promises to exclude some greater evil.”217 But a
consequentialist can make a distinction. A consequentialist can accept the
retributive thought that the guilty deserve punishment, and she can
therefore assert that punishing the guilty is intrinsically good, while
punishing the innocent is intrinsically bad. Many consequentialists may
not want to go that far; they may want to say only that punishing the guilty,
within some proportionality limits, is not bad, or not as bad as punishing
the innocent.218 But even that position is one that a utilitarian cannot take.
214. This rule can be bent. See infra Part III.C.
215. See Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Consequentialism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA
PHIL., http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/consequentialism (last
updated Sept. 27, 2011).
216. Id. (“When such pluralist versions of consequentialism are not welfarist,
some philosophers would not call them utilitarian.”).
217. Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and
Legislation, in 1 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 83 (John Bowring ed., 1962).
218. See SHELLY KAGAN, NORMATIVE ETHICS 57 (1998). Kagan contrasts
what he calls the retributive view that the culpable suffering is good with the idea
of a “culpability discount rate” according to which the culpable doing well is
worse than if the innocent do well. Kagan is mistaken in labeling the former view
“the retributive view” because, as a consequentialist, he misses something
important about retributivism. He rejects the retributive commitment to the view
that the good consequences that flow from punishing the innocent cannot count
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Because most discussions of the BARD standard presuppose a distinction
between the intrinsic disvalue of punishing the guilty and the intrinsic
value of punishing the innocent, the discussion that follows is framed in
consequentialist—rather than utilitarian—terms.219
Turning to the second preliminary matter, it will be helpful to distinguish
choosing an SOP with the aim of promoting accuracy from choosing an SOP
with the aim of promoting good consequences. An SOP aimed at accuracy
would aim to minimize the number of errors without favoring one kind of
error over another.220 It would do this by not favoring one kind of mistake
over others, except when seeking to compensate for various other sources of
systematic error. For example, if juries tend to place too much trust in
prosecutors, then using an elevated SOP for the prosecution’s case would
increase overall accuracy. By contrast, an SOP aimed at promoting good
consequences might induce a skewing such that the jury makes fewer
mistakes of one kind, while making more mistakes of another kind—and thus
more mistakes overall—if doing so would promote some other good.
Consider again Justice Harlan’s argument for the BARD standard: “[I]t is far
worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.”221 Justice
Harlan makes this remark to defend an SOP that skews in favor of acquittals,
even if the result is that more mistakes are made overall.

in favor of doing so. That is, as a consequentialist, he does not screen out a set of
consequences as not to be taken into account. A consequentialist could adopt such
a screening function; nothing about consequentialism itself precludes a
consequentialist from adopting any particular view about value. But I am aware
of no consequentialist who does adopt the screening function that is the key to the
non-consequentialist, retributive account. See infra Part IV; supra text
accompanying note 200 (discussing Scanlonian contractualism).
219. Among the consequentialist critics of the BARD standard that this Article
discusses, Kaplow stands out as being most utilitarian. He would have the SOP
set solely with reference to the goal of maximizing the value that results from
deterring (broadly construed to include incapacitation) harmful acts—a good—
while also chilling beneficial acts—a bad. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell,
Fairness Versus Welfare: Notes on the Pareto Principle, Preferences, and
Distributive Justice, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 331, 332–33 (2003) (arguing that welfare
is to be understood subjectively, such that “even tastes for fairness are included”).
The idea that there is independent value in doing justice by sanctioning or
punishing those who have done harmful or criminal acts does not enter his picture,
except indirectly, insofar as people may be upset (a bad) if retrospective justice is
not done and pleased (a good) if retrospective justice is done. See id.
220. See Lillquist, supra note 15, at 98–102 (showing that distortions in favor
of one kind of error can occur without raising the number of errors, but showing
that if most defendants are guilty then the number of errors is increased when
accuracy is sacrificed).
221. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970).
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One may be tempted to think that accuracy is a worthy norm for an
SOP. Part of the purpose of a trial is to determine, in an authoritative way,
if a defendant is guilty. And if one thinks of this purpose as an epistemic
endeavor, adopting the epistemic norm of accuracy seems reasonable.222
But a trial is not an exercise in science and is not aimed at knowledge for
the sake of knowledge. Rather, a trial is a practical exercise aimed at
deciding whether to convict and punish a defendant. Accuracy is a
subservient norm for such a practical act, relevant only insofar as the trial
promotes its practical goals. Of course, all else equal, more accuracy is
better. But all else is usually not equal. The costs of one kind of error are
often higher than another. Therefore, one cannot assume that the relevant
practical reasons will call for maximizing accuracy.223

222. This is the organizing idea in TRUTH, ERROR, AND CRIMINAL LAW, supra
note 80. Laudan is fully aware, however, that other goals, such as protecting
innocent defendants, may justify departures from pure epistemic norms. His
interest is in questioning whether the departures are actually justified. Id. at 30.
223. Some authors do seem to make this mistake. See, e.g., Richard L. Lippke,
Punishing the Guilty, Not Punishing the Innocent, 7 J. MORAL PHIL. 462, 464–65
(2010) (taking for granted that the criminal law has two conflicting goals that have
to be balanced: “success at the apprehension and punishment of serious offenders,
and accuracy, understood in terms of their separating the guilty from the innocent
and punishing the former proportionally with the seriousness of their offenses”);
Pardo, supra note 80, at 1083 (taking for granted that accuracy is one of the two
norms relevant to setting SOP rules). Even insofar as accuracy is a norm, one
cannot assume that adjusting the SOP is the best way to promote it. See Lippke,
supra, at 477–80, and Underwood, supra note 49, at 1306–07, for an exploration
of the reasons why one might want to raise the SOP to enhance accuracy. But
putting a thumb on the scale in favor of defendants is a crude tool for achieving
more accuracy. See supra notes 55, 161 and accompanying text. Better solutions
would involve doing things such as ensuring that defendants have access to
experienced and motivated defense attorneys, who are provided with adequate
resources and are not overburdened with an excessive caseload. Some suggest that
the criminal justice system’s failure to live up to goals set in Gideon has shown
this idea to be unattainable. See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, Up from Gideon, 45 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 113, 119 (2013). But this conclusion is overly dire. Four states—
Massachusetts, Montana, Wyoming, and New Hampshire—were able, as of 2007,
to provide enough attorneys to handle their caseload according to guidelines set
by the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals.
See LYNN LANGTON & DONALD FAROLE, JR., STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
PROGRAMS, 2007, at 13 (2010), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf
/spdp07.pdf [http://perma.cc/23BM-XBBH]. It is not clear why other states cannot
do so as well.
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B. Primary Consequentialist Considerations for the SOP in Criminal
Cases
Having dealt with the preliminary matters, this Section turns to the
central task of this Part: considering how consequentialist considerations
would affect the choice of an SOP for criminal convictions. This Section
starts with the derivation of a formula by which to arrive at the right SOP
for criminal convictions. It then considers objections to the use of numbers
for an SOP. Finally, it seeks to provide values for the SOP by filling in
plausible values for the terms in the SOP formula, and it argues that
consequentialist considerations may call for using an SOP for criminal
convictions clearly below the customary understanding of the BARD
standard. The ultimate aim in this Section is not to show that a
consequentialist must accept a fairly low SOP for criminal cases; the aim
is only to show that, given some plausible empirical assumptions, a fairly
low SOP might be called for.
1. Deriving the Equation for the SOP
For a consequentialist, the SOP should reflect the norm of efficiency:
one should not prefer to shift the ratio of convictions to acquittals; the right
balance has been struck.224 To achieve this balance mathematically, one
should set the value of convictions equal to the value of acquittals:
(1) VCon = VAcq
Simplifying so that one generic conviction or acquittal can stand in for
all, the value of a conviction equals the value of convicting the guilty times
the probability (“P”) of guilt, plus the—presumably negative—value of
convicting the innocent times the probability of innocence. In a given case,
the probability that a person is innocent is one minus the probability that
the person is guilty.225 Thus we can represent the value of a conviction as
follows:
224. The equations presented here were first developed by John Kaplan,
Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1065 (1968), and
Alan D. Cullison, Probability Analysis of Judicial Fact-Finding: A Preliminary
Outline of the Subjective Approach, 1 U. TOL. L. REV. 538 (1969). These
equations are further discussed by Lillquist, supra note 15, at 107–08.
225. Kaplow might object that this formulation treats value as though it
depends on what happened in the past—the value depends, at least in part, on
whether a defendant is in fact guilty—rather than what happens in the future. This
argument reflects the broader consequentialist notion of value that he, as a
utilitarian, does not recognize. See supra note 219. But this formulation in no way
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(2) VCon = P * VCG + (1 – P) * VCI
The value of an acquittal likewise equals the—presumably negative—
value of acquitting the guilty times the probability of guilt, plus the value
of innocence times the probability of acquitting the innocent. This formula
can be represented as follows:
(3) VAcq = P * VAG + (1 – P) * VAI
Setting these two values equal to each other to find the P that should be
the SOP yields the following equation:
(4) P * VCG + (1 – P) * VCI = P * VAG + (1 – P) * VAI
Solving for P in (4) yields the following formula:226
(5) SOP = P = 1/(1 + {[VCG – VAG]/[VAI – VCI]})
This is a fairly awkward formula to use, but the following simplifying
assumptions can now be introduced: one can assume that VCG = –VAG, and
that VAI = –VCI.227 These assumptions are not completely arbitrary, but
rather reflect the thought that convicting the guilty and acquitting the
innocent have certain net benefits, and those are lost if the guilty are

excludes the relevance of all other consequentialist values that flow from
convicting the guilty and the innocent.
226. The intermediate steps between (4) and (5) go as follows:
P * [VCG – VAG] = (1 – P) * [VAI – VCI]
P * {[VCG – VAG)]/[VAI – VCI]} = 1 – P
P + P * {[VCG – VAG]/[VAI – VCI]} = 1
P * (1 + {[VCG – VAG]/[VAI – VCI]}) = 1
227. These assumptions explain why Laudan asserts that he can use equation
(6) rather than equation (5). Laudan, supra note 15, at 207 n.18.
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acquitted and the innocent convicted.228 Plugging these assumptions into
(5), we get:229
(6) SOP = 1/[1 + VAG/VCI]
Equation (6) is a reasonably tractable equation. One can see how this
formula produces familiar results by plugging in some familiar values.
Suppose, first, that the disvalue of convicting the innocent is 10 times
greater than that of acquitting the guilty—the idea behind the Blackstone
ratio. This supposition yields this result: SOP = 1/[1 + 1/10] = 1/1.1 = 91%.
Now suppose that the criminal law worked like civil trials in the sense that
the disvalue of convicting the innocent is only marginally greater than the
disvalue of acquitting the guilty. This supposition can be represented as
follows: SOP = 1/[1 + 49/50] = 1/1.98 = 51%.
2. Objections and Replies Regarding the Use of Numbers
Two objections can be raised to using this sort of measure for the SOP.
The first and more fundamental objection is that the SOP should not be
represented by a number.230 Different reasons have been given for this
position. Stein, for example, rejects the idea that one can represent the SOP
with a number because he thinks that a reasonable doubt must be
“substantiated by the evidence.”231 In other words, he thinks that what
distinguishes a reasonable doubt from an unreasonable one is not the
proper degree of confidence, but the source of the doubt. Even a high
degree of doubt not “substantiated by the evidence” would not suffice to
228. The reasoning behind these assumptions is not, strictly speaking,
accurate. An innocent person who is acquitted will likely go on to lead a
productive life, and thus the acquittal produces positive value. The value of
convicting the innocent, however, is more complicated. It has negative intrinsic
value, but it might have positive instrumental value if most people mistakenly
believe that the person convicted is guilty. If we suppose that the intrinsic negative
value swamps the instrumental positive value, then we could get the position taken
in the text. Of course, there is a wide range of reasonable ways to assess the values
in play, and thus one could reasonably find that: VAI ≠ - VCI. However, for the sake
of the exercise carried out in this Section, which seeks to show what
consequentialism plausibly entails, VAI = - VCI, can be accepted as in the range of
plausible positions. Similar things can be said about VCG = -VAG. The sorts of
subtleties papered over in these equations can also be brought back into
consideration at a later stage. See infra Part III.C; infra Appendix.
229. The intermediate steps between (5) and (6) are as follows:
SOP = 1/(1 + {[-VAG – VAG]/[-VCI – VCI]})
SOP = 1/[1 + -2VAG/-2VCI]
230. This subsection satisfies a promissory note from supra notes 12, 146.
231. STEIN, supra note 13, at 173.
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acquit. The problem is that it is not clear what he means by doubt that is
not “substantiated by the evidence.” Jurors should, of course, always refer
to the evidence when deciding whether to convict or acquit. In addition,
they must also refer to their life experiences, their background knowledge,
their common sense, and even their intuition.232 Assuming jurors are
taking the evidence into account in a reasonable way, the only way to
distinguish between reasonable and unreasonable doubt is by determining
whether the doubt is too farfetched. But what counts as too farfetched
depends on the SOP, the right level of which depends, in turn, on what
should be taken to be at stake in the act.233 Nothing in the notion of
“substantiated by the evidence” implies that the SOP cannot be
represented by a number.
Tribe offers a different kind of reason not to use a concrete number.
His reason is that “formulating an ‘acceptable’ risk of error” would
undermine the expressive “demand for certitude” and would, effectively,
violate the MP.234 But most jurors seem content, in practice, to use an SOP
very close to a preponderance of the evidence,235 and most judges seem
content, when articulating the customary understanding, to put a probabilistic
value on the SOP.236 Thus, Tribe likely underestimates the ability of jurors
and society as a whole to accept, without thereby becoming disillusioned, that
the SOP for a criminal conviction can be identified with a numerical
probability lower than certitude.237 In addition, Tribe is confused about the
connection between the MP and a demand for certitude.238 Thus he fails to
give a sound reason not to associate the SOP with a concrete number.
The second objection is that jurors are in no position to make fine
judgments, based on the evidence, about the probability of a defendant’s guilt.
Surely that objection is based on a sound premise; jurors are amateurs who
will serve on a few juries at most during their lives, and they have no scientific
basis for assigning specific probabilities to guilt. Indeed, judges, professionals
who may regularly adjudicate trials, have no scientific basis for assigning

232. A focus on the relevant degree of confidence does not displace the idea
that the judgment of guilt or innocence must take the evidence into account in
some reasonable way. See TRUTH, ERROR, AND CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 80, at
53 (insisting that the SOP cannot be based on “the level of the juror’s degree of
conviction” if that conviction is irrational—i.e., disconnected from the evidence
presented).
233. See supra Part I.B.
234. Tribe, supra note 13, at 1374.
235. See supra Part I.C. (rejecting the expressivist argument for maximalism).
236. See id.
237. The concern with disillusionment is a consequentialist point, taken up in
the Appendix, under consideration of “factor 3.”
238. See supra Part II.A.
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specific probabilities of guilt.239 What Judge Posner has written about juries
in this context applies to judges as well:
In [most] cases the jury’s subjective [probability] estimate would
float free of check and context. It is one thing to tell jurors to set
aside unreasonable doubts, another to tell them to determine
whether the probability that the defendant is guilty is more than
75, or 95, or 99 percent.240
Though the basis for this objection is certainly sound, the conclusion
is exaggerated. Fact finders, be they judges or jurors, can distinguish
between evidence of different strengths. Surely Posner is correct that
jurors have no basis for saying that a defendant’s guilt is 90% likely as
opposed to 95% likely. Nevertheless, that shows only that one cannot ask
jurors to make an estimation of probability that is too fine grained. It does
not show that jurors’ ability to apply probabilistic notions is completely
imprecise. There is no reason to doubt that jurors can distinguish, relatively
reliably, cases in which the evidence would suggest that the defendant’s
guilt is nearly 100% certain (essentially conclusive evidence), roughly 90%
certain (very strong evidence), roughly 70% certain (moderately strong
evidence), roughly 50% certain (equivocal evidence) and so on. If this
assumption is invalid, then all bets are off; we have no business relying on
jurors to serve as fact finders.
In the end, there is a plausible reason not to give jurors an SOP stated
in terms of a numeric probability, even as a rough guide: it might be that
jurors should do a moral weighing of what is at stake to arrive at the SOP
for a criminal conviction, and it might prejudge and undermine their moral
weighing of what is at stake if they are told that the SOP should be roughly
X% certainty.241 But assuming, for the sake of argument, that a
consequentialist balance captures the relevant moral issues, and assuming
one can work out the inputs to the consequentialist formula reasonably
well in advance, then good reason exists to think that courts should give
jurors an SOP in the form of a particular probabilistic value.

239. See TRUTH, ERROR, AND CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 80, at 77–78.
240. United States v. Hall, 854 F.2d 1036, 1044 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J.,
concurring).
241. See infra Part IV.E. This is, however, merely one reason. It may be
morally preferable for legislators or judges to specify a target degree of
confidence, based on the same moral calculus.
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3. Filling in Values for the SOP
One way to try to arrive at a value for the SOP would be to seek to
intuit values for the four terms in equation (5) or the two in equation (6).242
But it makes more sense to try to carefully consider the range of possible
consequences of punishment—of both the guilty and the innocent—then
to assess, empirically, how likely those consequences are, and then to fill
in the values for the two terms in equation (6).243
Seven factors can be distinguished to provide a plausible set of inputs
for equation (6).244 They are:
1. The value of incapacitating criminals as a means of protecting
their potential victims;
2. The value of deterring crime as a means of protecting potential
victims of crime;
3. The value of the moral force of the law being undermined neither
“by a standard of proof that leaves people in [excessive] doubt
whether innocent men are being condemned,”245 nor by a sense
that criminals can act with impunity;
4. The value of people feeling secure that their “government cannot
adjudge [them] guilty of a criminal offense” unless they are
guilty;246
5. The disvalue of punishment’s unintended effects on the lives of
criminals, their families, and communities;247
242. Some authors have conducted empirical studies, surveying how people
value the four terms in equation (5), with the result that people seem committed
to an SOP of between 0.50 and 0.58. See Lillquist, supra note 15, at 112–13. The
value of this work is limited not only by the fact that the values people offer are
most likely empirically uninformed, but also by the fact that subjects often do not
vote consistently with these SOP values. Id. at 113 n.76. These findings indicate,
unsurprisingly, that people’s values are not in a stable, reflective equilibrium.
243. Tribe, supra note 13, at 1385, assumes that the consequentialist model
used to derive equation (6) must refer only to subjective utilities rather than the
objective factors considered below. But that is an unwarranted assumption.
244. These factors can work in unusual ways in certain kinds of cases, as will
be shown in infra Part III.C. In this Section and the Appendix, it is assumed that
they work in consistent ways across the range of violent crimes.
245. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
246. Id. This explanation by Justice Brennan is another way of expressing
Kaplow’s concern with not chilling productive activity.
247. See, e.g., John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan Masur,
Happiness and Punishment, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037, 1063 (2009) (“[P]risoners
often witness the breakups of their marriages and relationships while in prison and
have greater difficulty forming other relationships (including friendships) upon their
release. They experience greater rates of unemployment. . . . [U]nemployment and
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6. The intrinsic disvalue of punishing the guilty, and the intrinsic
disvalue of punishing the innocent; and
7. Any “dynamic” feedback mechanisms between the SOP and the
operation of the criminal justice system that may change the way
these other factors register.
Factors 1 and 2 call for punishing criminals and, therefore, weigh in
favor of a low SOP. Factor 3 is balanced and could cut either way depending
on how people feel about the effects of the criminal law. Factors 4 and 5, in
contrast to the first two factors, call for reining in punishment and, therefore,
weigh in favor of a higher SOP. Factor 6 can cut both ways, though how it
cuts depends on whether one should accept the retributive belief that
punishing the guilty contains intrinsic value, or believes instead that it is
only less bad to punish the guilty than the innocent. And factor 7 aims, like
factors 1 and 2, for a lower SOP. Attempting to balance these factors may
seem a formidable task, but there are good reasons—as argued in the
Appendix—to think that factor 1 and the concern in factor 6 with the
intrinsic disvalue of punishing the innocent dominate,248 and that one can
treat the remaining factors as minor adjustments that, overall, push the
SOP lower, but only slightly. Accordingly, the discussion that follows will
focus on the balance between factors 1 and 6, the balance of which will
then be adjusted slightly lower.
Starting with factor 1: The failure to incapacitate has fairly clear and
significant harmful consequences, at least when the criminals in question
are violent.249 To take a first measure of these consequences, one may use
the following empirical claims, as reported by Laudan:
[T]he average person who is falsely acquitted of a violent crime
will continue committing a couple of them every year for about
nine years, before abandoning a life of crime. Since the average
time served by someone convicted of such a crime is 3.6 years, we
can conclude that every false acquittal enables more than thirtysix crimes (including on average seven violent ones) during the
the dissolution of social ties are two of the most reliable predictors of long-term
unhappiness and anxiety. . . . It is worth noting that these negative effects do not
accrue only to the former prisoner. Individual unemployment and social dislocation
impose significant negative externalities upon the rest of society; the former
prisoner frequently must be supported by state aid, cannot adequately support her
family, and is more likely to commit further crimes.” (footnote omitted)).
248. This argument broadly tracks the argument in Laudan, supra note 15.
249. The remainder of this Part assumes that one can limit the discussion to
the SOP for violent crime. For a broader range, and finer gradations, of crimes,
see infra Part III.C.
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time when, but for the false acquittal, the defendant would have
been incapacitated.250
We can take the seven violent crimes to establish the core of the harm
of acquitting the guilty. The question then is: How can we compare that to the
disvalue of convicting the innocent from factor 6, so that we can get a starting
value for the SOP, using equation (6)? Laudan considers what it would mean
“if we were to regard the harm to an innocent defendant done by a false
conviction to be [on average] as egregious as the seven violent crimes it
enables.”251 Keeping in mind that, according to Laudan, the collection of
seven violent crimes has an 11% chance of including a homicide, and a 44%
chance of including a rape,252 he suggests that preferring one innocent going
to prison for the average period of time to seven violent crimes being
perpetrated on innocent people is not unreasonable.253 Indeed, even if one
incorporates a slight priority for allowing the innocent to suffer harm—caused
by acquitted criminals—over wrongly convicting and punishing, and thus
causing harm to the innocent,254 this tradeoff may seem reasonable.
One reason to object to the idea that one should view these harms as
comparable is that the seven violent crimes are presumably dispersed
among different victims, although the one innocent person suffers all the
harm of punishment, along with the unintended but normally concomitant
side effects of punishment—ranging from broken relationships to
suffering violent crime in prison. Many consequentialists do not worry
about the distribution of harms; they simply add them up. But some
consequentialists think distribution matters, too.255 They might object that
the concentration of harm on the innocent sent to prison makes that effect
even worse. Weighing against that objection, however, is the fact that
some possible types of harm caused by criminals who have not been
imprisoned would be more extreme—and concentrated on one person—
than the harm of being wrongly imprisoned. For example, although an
inmate has a roughly 4% chance of being raped in prison,256 that
250. Laudan, supra note 15, at 202.
251. Id. at 207.
252. Id. at 204–05. Laudan casts his number in terms of the numbers of
homicides and rapes in 63 violent crimes; dividing by nine brings that number
down to seven. Id. at 199–200.
253. Id. at 205.
254. See supra Part II.D.
255. See, e.g., KAGAN, supra note 218, at 48–54 (discussing various sorts of
distributional concerns that might matter to a consequentialist).
256. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics: “In 2011–12, an estimated 4.0%
of state and federal prison inmates . . . reported experiencing one or more incidents of
sexual victimization by another inmate or facility staff in the past 12 months or since
admission to the facility, if less than 12 months.” ALLEN J. BECK ET AL., SEXUAL
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percentage is substantially lower than the 44% chance that a rape will
result from wrongfully acquitting a violent criminal. Some might think that
suffering a rape is more devastating than being imprisoned for 3.6 years
but not suffering extreme violence during that time.257 And surely being
the victim of homicide is worse than being locked up for 3.6 years. Even
if the chance of being wrongfully killed is only 11%, one could reasonably
prefer 3.6 years in prison.258 Thus, the objection in terms of dispersed
harms does not succeed.259
We do, however, need to add the assumption—to be adjusted
immediately below—that for every innocent person convicted, a guilty
person remains free. If true, that implies that the disvalue of convicting the
innocent results from the harm to the innocent person plus the harm one
expects that guilty person to cause. If those are equal, then the disvalue of
convicting the innocent will be twice that of acquitting the guilty.260
Let us now adjust for the fact that in many criminal trials, there is no
question whether the actus reus of a crime can be attributed to a particular
VICTIMIZATION IN PRISONS AND JAILS REPORTED BY INMATES, 2011–12, NATIONAL
INMATE SURVEY, 2011–12, at 6 (2013), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content
/pub/pdf/svpjri1112.pdf [http://perma.cc/4ZNZ-XEX2]. It seems reasonable to
assume that if one has made it through one year without being sexually victimized,
one is likely to continue to remain free from victimization. That is, it seems likely that
the 4% who are victimized changes only slightly from year to year.
257. Of course, those in prison are also likely to be assaulted. By one estimate,
70% of inmates are assaulted by other inmates each year. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
AMERICAN PRISONS 379 (Marilyn D. McShane & Frank P. Williams III eds.,
1996). Serious assaults, in which the person is “injured,” are much more rare. “In
1997, 10 percent of state inmates and 3 percent of federal inmates reported being
injured in a fight since entering prison.” HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NO ESCAPE:
MALE RAPE IN U.S. PRISONS 30 (2001). Presumably, the remaining assaults are
normally qualitatively less traumatic than sexual victimization.
258. The odds of a person being murdered in prison do not count significantly
against this consideration as they are more than a thousand times lower than the
odds of a homicide if a violent felon is wrongly acquitted and set free. The odds
of being a homicide victim are generally lower in prison than out. The murder rate
in state prisons from 2001 to 2010 was about 4 per 100,000. Margaret E. Noonan,
Mortality in Local Jails and State Prisons, 2000-2010 – Statistical Tables, U.S.
BUREAU JUST. STATISTICS STAT. TABLES, Dec. 2012, at 14 tbl.14 (2012). The
national murder rate in 2013 was slightly higher (4.5 per 100,000), which was
lower than it had been in the same period, 2000–2010. Facts About the Death
Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/docu
ments/FactSheet.pdf [http://perma.cc/U5VN-XQ9C] (last updated Oct. 7, 2015).
In both contexts, it is more than a thousand times smaller than an 11% chance of
a homicide that we are assuming would result from the false acquittal of a violent
felon.
259. See infra Part III.C.
260. Plugging into equation (6), the SOP = 1/[1 + VAG/VCI] = 1/[1 + 1/2] =
1/1.5 = 67%.
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defendant; the question is whether the defendant was culpable or instead
lacked the mens rea required for the crime charged or otherwise has a
defense. Consider, for example, a case in which the defendant is charged
with rape, and the question is whether he had the consent of his accuser.
Or consider a case in which a defendant in a murder case invokes selfdefense. In those cases, convicting the innocent would harm him but would
not leave the true criminal at large to commit other crimes,261 while
acquitting the guilty would have the bad effects of leaving a criminal at
large. It is hard to find statistics regarding how often the actus reus is not in
doubt in a trial, but if we assume that it happens in a quarter of cases, and if
we continue to assume that the disvalue of convicting the innocent and
letting the guilty go free are on a par, then we should adjust the harm of
convicting the innocent downward slightly from 2 to 1.75. The SOP then
becomes 1/[1 + 1/1.75] = 1/[1.57] = 64%, even lower than before.
On the other hand, there are a few reasons to think this SOP value is
too low. First, there is a wide range of estimates of crimes avoided per year
of incarceration, and Laudan’s number of seven violent crimes is on the high
end of the range.262 If we lower the number of violent crimes incapacitation
prevents, then we must reduce the negative value of acquitting the guilty.
Second, Laudan does not “consider the replacement phenomenon—the
possibility ‘that some fraction of the crimes that would have been committed
by incarcerated individuals are committed by nonincarcerated offenders.’”263
Taking that into account also shrinks the negative value of acquitting the
guilty. Third, Laudan neglects the fact that those who are incarcerated are not
completely incapacitated; inmates can still victimize others in prison.264
Indeed, an inmate has a 70% chance of being assaulted in prison each year of
his prison term.265 Thus, if an inmate serves a prison sentence of 3.6 years,
that inmate can expect his fellow inmates to assault him or her
approximately 2.5 times. Assuming that being assaulted is not part of the
“punishment” that the state intends to mete out, the innocent person wrongly
convicted suffers not only the unjust punishment, but also a good fraction of
the violent crimes that one hopes to prevent by incarcerating the guilty. This
261. That situation could also arise if the real criminal is independently
incapacitated.
262. Laudan, supra note 15, at 202, relies on ALFRED BLUMSTEIN ET AL.,
CRIMINAL CAREERS AND “CAREER CRIMINALS” 5, 352 (1986). The range of more
recent studies is discussed in David S. Abrams, The Imprisoner’s Dilemma: A
Cost–Benefit Approach to Incarceration, 98 IOWA L. REV. 905, 937–39 (2013).
263. Epps, supra note 15, at 1091 (quoting Emily G. Owens, More Time, Less
Crime? Estimating the Incapacitative Effect of Sentence Enhancements, 52 J.L.
& ECON. 551, 568 (2009)).
264. See supra notes 256–58 (discussing the occurrence of rape, assault, and
murder in prison).
265. See supra note 257.
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fact increases the disvalue of convicting the innocent. Using these three
factors to change the ratio of VAG/VCI by another 50% yields a ratio of 0.57/2
= 0.29 The SOP is then 1/1.29, or 78%.266 Adjusting this number downward
slightly to take into consideration the factors discussed in the Appendix,
yields a rough estimate of 75% for the SOP, which this Article will refer to
as the Laudan standard, after the person who pioneered this sort of
consequentialist critique of the customary understanding of the BARD
standard.267
C. Variable Standards of Proof
The Laudan standard stands as a plausible rebuke to both the
maximalists on the BARD standard and to those who embrace the less
extreme customary understanding of the BARD standard. The calculations
above, however, relied on questionable assumptions about basic values.
Changing those could dramatically affect the resulting SOP. For example,
if the harm of a false conviction was undervalued at the beginning of the
calculation by a factor of two or three,268 then we should double or triple VCI.
Tripling VCI would require adjusting the ratio of VAG/VCI from 0.34—the
level that results in an SOP of 0.75—to 0.11, and the resulting SOP becomes
90%, a number essentially identical to the customary understanding of the
BARD standard.269
266. Another factor that may further shrink the negative value of acquitting
the guilty is that the acquitted in criminal trials are less likely to be career
criminals than the average criminal. This means that the acquitted, including the
falsely acquitted, are less likely to commit further crimes than one would expect
if one simply released 100 convicted criminals and watched to see how many
crimes they committed on average. See Georgi Gardiner, In Defence of
Reasonable Doubt, J. APPLIED PHIL. (forthcoming) (on file with author).
267. Taking into account a more limited range of considerations, Laudan
comes to the figure of 67%. Laudan, supra note 15, at 207. Given the fuzziness
of a juror’s ability to estimate probabilities, these figures may come to more or
less the same thing. See supra Part III.B.2.
268. More, surely, is not plausible. Suppose the harm was undervalued by a
factor of four. Then the tradeoff would be between (a) running an average risk of
spending 3.6 years in prison, along with all the assaults one would suffer there,
and then living with all the negative consequences that follow from having a
conviction, and (b) a 44% chance of someone dying by criminal homicide, and of
two additional rapes, not to mention other lesser assaults, robberies, etc. Without
the homicide risk, one might still choose being victimized by criminals. But when
the odds of being a homicide victim are added to that side of the scales, imagining
how one could prefer that to 3.6 years in prison is difficult.
269. Of course, one could also say that the harms caused by acquitted violent
felons were undervalued. If one takes the risk of homicide seriously, one might
argue that this risk was undervalued by an order of magnitude or more, in which
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Consequentialists, however, cannot reasonably hope that the reformist
implications of their view can be so easily contained. The Laudan standard
was derived for violent crimes as a whole, but that category was broader
than necessary. Of course, the law does not explicitly use a separate SOP for
violent crimes. But whether one is a consequentialist or deontologist, one
has good reason not to cling artificially to the idea that only one SOP must
be used for all of criminal law.270 Juries already seem to exploit the
vagueness of BARD instruction to use a range of standards of proof for
different kinds of criminal cases.271 Many judges, lawyers, and scholars
think that the standard should be higher for the death penalty.272 Moreover,
good reason exists to think that, historically, juries used the high BARD
standard only in capital cases, and that a much lower standard was used
for minor cases.273 Thus, the idea of a separate SOP for violent crimes is
something that has to be seriously considered. And having started down
the road of selecting different SOPs for different kinds of crimes, there is
no reason in principle to leave the distinction as crude as “violent” versus
“non-violent” crimes. Why not distinguish between different sorts of
case the SOP called for by consequentialism would plummet. But the rest of this
Part pursues more robust ways of reaching the same point.
270. See TRUTH, ERROR, AND CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 80, at 55 (“Where
standards of proof are concerned, I am not convinced that one size fits all.”);
Kaplow, supra note 12, at 786 n.86 (claiming that “optimal evidence thresholds
and the evidence threshold . . . will vary greatly by context, even at fairly refined
levels”).
271. See Lillquist, supra note 15, at 164 (noting that because of the vague
standard, “the appropriate level of certainty that jurors will require is left up to the
jurors themselves”); id. at 169 (noting that studies indicate that “subjects believed
that different standards should be used in different cases”); Kaplow, supra note
12, at 810 n.128 (“[T]he text earlier in the present Section suggests that the
apparently one-size-fits-all conventional rules may already be applied by fact
finders in a manner that depends importantly on the circumstances of particular
cases much as would a case-specific welfare-based standard that was explicitly
open-ended.”); Cullison, supra note 224, at 567 (speculating that “courts shun
responsibility for fixing a more precise threshold probability because they feel it
should vary to some extent from case to case”); Kaplan, supra note 224, at 1073
(arguing the same point).
272. See Lillquist, supra note 15, at 148–49. Lillquist traced this thought back
to Judge John Wilder May’s article discussing reasonable doubt. Id. at 104 (citing
John Wilder May, Some Rules of Evidence: Reasonable Doubt in Civil and
Criminal Cases, 10 AM. L. REV. 642, 653–56 (1876)). This Article supports that
view in the end. See infra Part IV.E.
273. See Epps, supra note 15, at 1084 (noting that Bruce Smith argues
defendants often “did not benefit from a presumption of innocence but, rather,
struggled against a statutory presumption of guilt.” (quoting Bruce P. Smith, The
Presumption of Guilt and the English Law of Theft, 1750–1850, 23 LAW & HIST.
REV. 133, 135 (2005))).
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violent crimes?274 Crossing that bridge, however, and considering different
SOPs for different types of violent crimes proves to be crucial for
understanding the plausibility of a consequentialist approach to the SOP
for criminal convictions. For once we start examining the SOP for more
finely distinguished violent crimes, we will see that it will be quite hard
for a consequentialist to deny the extremity of the implications of
consequentialism.
Interestingly, consequentialists have yet to follow the logic of their
position to its ultimate conclusion. But this Part will fill in that gap.275 An
obvious place to start is with the death penalty. People often assume that
the SOP for a conviction that would result in execution should be higher
than for other crimes.276 This assumption may seem obviously correct if
one considers that the VCI is much greater if the innocent person is not
merely incarcerated but killed. It is hard to say just how much worse being
wrongly executed is, but if we assume, for the sake of argument, that this
result is 10 times worse, then the ratio used to derive the Laudan standard
drops to 0.03, and the SOP becomes 97%.
Nonetheless, one has to take into account the harm that would result
if the guilty are acquitted. Although the focus so far has been on
incapacitation, there are reasons to give special weight to deterrence in the
context of the death penalty.277 Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule report
studies claiming to show that the deterrent value of the death penalty is so
strong that each execution deters between 3 and 18 murders.278 Those
274. This idea is alien to American jurisprudence, but not unprecedented. To
use the example of Germany again, the standard on the civil side can vary based
on “the circumstances of the case, the nature of the issue and the kind and amount
of evidence available.” MURRAY & STÜRNER, supra note 189, at 311. Admittedly,
the German system uses professional judges in such cases, which arguably makes
a difference.
275. Even Laudan ducks the math when its application seems to lead to too
radical a conclusion. He writes, for example:
The argument for a revision of the [SOP] downwards is particularly
powerful in the case of serial violent offenders. They are the characters
who are principally responsible for the staggering amount of violence
perpetrated by those who have had repeated, prior brushes with the law.
It could be argued that while BARD should be preserved as the standard
for first-time offenders, we should utilize a standard that makes it less
difficult to convict those with multiple prior convictions.
Laudan, supra note 15, at 208. Notice, he does not bother to examine how low the
SOP might go.
276. See supra note 272.
277. This argument assumes that deterrence in the death penalty context is
much stronger than normal. The Appendix, which informed the Laudan standard,
assumes a much weaker value for deterrence. See infra Appendix.
278. Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 171, at 711–12.
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numbers are probably incorrect,279 but suppose for the sake of argument
that the middle of that range is as accurate, so that an execution deters 10
murders. That assumption has a tremendous impact on the value of VAG.
To determine the extent of that impact, we need to start more or less
from scratch, as the assumptions we used in deriving the Laudan standard
were generic, and we need to use more specific ones instead. Let us start,
then, with the VAG of ten innocent persons killed by lost deterrence value.
That will dominate the disvalue of a court not convicting the killer because
even if a killer goes free, the recidivism rate for homicide—and all death
penalty cases are homicide cases—is about five times lower than for the
average violent crime.280 Therefore, even if a killer is more likely to kill
than the average mistakenly acquitted violent felon, the lower recidivism
rate means that the odds of him killing again are presumably on a par with
the case of a mistakenly acquitted generic violent felon—about 11%.281
That is about 100 times smaller than the deterrent effect. Thus, we can
focus on the deterrent effect alone.
What makes handling this case so difficult is that the deterrent effect
does not depend on the person executed being guilty. As long as people
believe that someone is being executed for a horrible crime, then the
deterrent effect works the same whether the defendant is actually guilty or
innocent. And this deterrent effect will dominate the value of VCI as well.
Indeed, it will flip its valence. If we suppose that the core VCI, before the
deterrent effect is taken into consideration, is the lost life of the innocent
defendant, then the core VCI has a negative value of one lost life. But once
we add in the ten lives saved by the deterrent effect, we get a VCI with a
value of nine saved lives. But this violates an assumption not yet brought
out in deriving equation (6), namely that with the right SOP in place, the
value of convictions and acquittals can be equal and positive.
To see the problem, look back at equation (3):
VAcq = (P)VAG + (1 – P)VAI
279. See COMM. ON DETERRENCE AND THE DEATH PENALTY, NAT’L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, DETERRENCE AND THE DEATH PENALTY 2 (Daniel S. Nagin
& John V. Pepper eds., 2012) (reviewing 30 years of empirical evidence and
concluding that it was insufficient to establish a distinctive deterrent effect).
280. See Charles H. Rose III, Should the Tail Wag the Dog?: The Potential
Effects of Recidivism Data on Character Evidence Rules, 36 N.M. L. REV. 341,
344 (2006) (summarizing recidivism rates across crimes). In all cases where this
Article uses this data, rates are chosen near the high end of the spectrum that Rose
reports. The “five times” figures comes from 30% for average violent crime,
versus 6% for homicide. How these numbers line up with Laudan’s numbers for
failure to incapacitate is unclear. Accordingly, only the ratio—not the absolute
value—is used.
281. See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
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If deterrence is a dominant effect, then the value of an acquittal will
be negative no matter what P is. That is because VAG is negative—it fails
to get the deterrence effect, a problem that compounds its failure to
incapacitate and to deliver just deserts—and VAI is negative as well—as it
too fails to get the deterrence effect, and that dominates the good of not
punishing an innocent. If both VAG and VAI are negative, then there would
never be a reason to acquit.
The only way to make sense of an SOP in such a context is to assume
that if P goes low enough, then other factors, specifically factors 3, 4 and
7—the moral force of the law not being undermined by a standard of proof
so low that it leaves people in excessive doubt about whether innocent
people are being condemned; the value of people feeling secure that the
government cannot adjudge them guilty unless they are actually guilty;
and dynamic feedback effects—start to outweigh the positive value of
deterrence. How low the SOP would have to be for that to happen is an
empirical question, and it is difficult to say. But if the claim that each
execution saves ten innocent lives were actually supportable with solid
empirical data, the state could use that data to counter these worries by
contending that one will be safer if the government uses a low SOP.
Further, if the death penalty were actually that effective at deterring
murder, very few capital murders would occur, thereby greatly reducing
the risk that one would face such a charge. Thus it could easily be the case
that the SOP should go down well below 50%.
One might object that this argument’s empirical claims about the
deterrent value of the death penalty are simply too implausible to take
seriously.282 This objection, however, is weak insofar as it does not address
the counterfactual world in which the deterrent value of the death penalty is
as strong as the argument assumes. It thus fails to grapple with the way in
which a set of circumstances that is empirically plausible enough to be taken
seriously by at least some respected scholars283 implies that
consequentialism could call for using a very low SOP in a distinct subset of
criminal trials. But even if one were tempted by this objection, one would
have to confront the fact that there are other cases, with less dubious
empirical assumptions, that lead to the same extreme conclusion.

282. See, e.g., Raymond Bonner & Ford Fessenden, Absence of Executions: A
Special Report, States With No Death Penalty Share Lower Homicide Rates, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 22, 2000, at A1 (from 1980–2000, the homicide rate in states with
the death penalty was 48% to 101% higher than in states without the death
penalty).
283. See Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 171 (both Sunstein and Vermeule
are undoubtedly respected scholars).
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Consider the following terrorism hypothetical. Suppose that the
government has solid evidence that the defendant, an American male, has
affiliated himself with ISIS, but cannot produce any evidence that he has
committed a terrorist act yet, and has only weak evidence that he has
committed the crime of providing “material support”284 to ISIS. Suppose
further that if the defendant is not convicted of providing material support
to a foreign terrorist organization, then the government will have to release
him. The police could attempt to track his whereabouts, but suppose that
as an American citizen, the government could not legally subject him to
preventive detention.
To construct an SOP for a case like this, a consequentialist would need
more details.285 Therefore, suppose the strong evidence of the defendant’s
ISIS affiliation gives the government 90% confidence that he will try to
engage in a terrorist act in the near future if the government does not
incapacitate him with either incarceration or death. Suppose, further, that
the government reasonably estimates that if the defendant commits a
terrorist act, he is likely to kill a large number people; under some
scenarios he would likely kill just a few, under others he might kill a
hundred or more, and the best estimates suggest that the expected lethality
of a terrorist act that he would commit, should he successfully commit one,
would be 20 innocent deaths. Finally, suppose that the government
believes that the probability of stopping the defendant is only 50% if he
remains free but under surveillance. Thus, the expected harm of acquitting
the defendant, in terms of failure to incapacitate, is nine innocent deaths.286

284. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2012); see also Lillquist, supra note 15, at 162
(entertaining a similar hypothetical).
285. One might think that asking for more details implies that one is leaving
behind the rule-consequentialism that fits the rule-like nature of law and adopting
the sort of act-consequentialism that better fits morality than law. See supra note
214. But this sort of shift is not necessarily problematic in the law. The law needs
to rely on rules that may be over- or under-inclusive only if trying to tailor the law
to individual cases is too difficult from an administrative point of view. If the law
can specify a set of considerations that should be brought to bear on an individual
case, and the agent in charge of handling those considerations is likely to be
sufficiently competent to do so, then there is no reason to insist on a cruder rule.
The case described in the text immediately before and after this footnote should
be understood in that light.
286. This result is achieved by multiplying a 90% likelihood of the defendant
trying to kill 20 people by a 50% likelihood of success. Note that because terrorists
have a kind of commitment to their cause that tends to make them immune to
deterrence via the threat of punishment, the VAG remains at nine innocent deaths.
For a discussion on how deterrence can work against terrorist threats, see
generally Samuel J. Rascoff, Counterterrorism and New Deterrence, 89 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 830 (2014).
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Once again, but this time within an incapacitation framework, we face
a situation in which the value of convicting the defendant may be positive
no matter what the SOP. The baseline VCI if the defendant did not engage
in providing material support to ISIS—which is consistent with his having
affiliated himself with ISIS, as long as he has not yet provided any services
to the group287—is the cost of his imprisonment to him, his family, and
others who depend on him. The maximum sentence for material support is
15 years in prison.288 In this hypothetical case, there is no reason to worry
about convicting the wrong person; the question is only whether this
person committed the crime of providing material support to a terrorist
organization. Thus, the baseline VCI is completely captured by the harm to
the defendant and those who depend on him.
But the positive value of incapacitating him does not depend
significantly on his being guilty—that’s what makes this case interesting
and problematic. This hypothetical supposes that there is a 90% chance
that he will engage in a terrorist act whether he is guilty of material support
or not. And we are supposing that the negative expected value of that act,
if he is not incapacitated, is a 50% chance of 20 deaths. Applying a
standard expected utility calculus to that, the positive value of
incapacitating him is 9 lives. Surely that greatly outweighs whatever value
one would put on the baseline VCI. Again, therefore, this is a case in which
there is value in convicting him whether he is guilty or innocent, and
therefore he should be convicted, no matter what the odds of his
innocence. This means that just about everything said in the death penalty
context transfers to this context: the brake on this sort of abandonment of
an SOP must come from other factors, like factors 3, 4, and 7. How low
the SOP would have to be for those other factors to outweigh the value of
incapacitation is an empirical question, and it is difficult to say what the
value would be. Nevertheless, there are reasons to think that the value
could be quite low. For example, if most people do not worry that they are
at risk of being detained because they do not have certain traits that make
them seem like possible terrorists—most importantly, they are not in any
contact with Islamic extremists or terrorists of any stripe—then worries
that the state might adjudge them guilty even if they are not guilty may
arise for only a few people, while most would feel more secure. From a
287. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 39 (2010) (holding
that the federal law banning the provision of material support to foreign terrorist
organizations does not interfere with the constitutional right to associate with such
groups, or even to become a member of them).
288. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a). The 15-year limit assumes that the crime is
inchoate and that no one dies as a result of having provided material support. If
an individual dies as a result of the activity, the penalty can be as severe as life in
prison. Id.
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strictly consequentialist point of view, then, it might make perfect sense to
use an SOP well below 50%, perhaps the inverse of the BARD standard
as customarily understood, in cases like this.
Notice, then, what this result reveals about consequentialism. What
the state is really concerned with in the terrorism hypothetical is simply
dangerousness. Consequentialism encourages the state to use the criminal
law to do an end-run around any independent restrictions that might exist
on using preventive detention. If the criminal law is used that way,
however, it is serving simply as a fig leaf. It is simply masking, and not
very well, what is going on under the surface.
D. Drawing Moral Lessons About Consequentialism and the SOP
The primary lesson to draw from the fact that consequentialism would
sometimes recommend using a very low SOP for a criminal conviction is
that it does not give the distinction between innocence and guilt its proper
moral significance. Consequentialism can give the distinction some
weight, but, at least as used by theorists such as Laudan, it treats the
existence of guilt as only one consideration among many. In certain cases,
concerns with incapacitation or deterrence would swamp the concern with
whether the defendant is guilty. But this outcome is morally unacceptable.
Guilt should be a precondition for punishment. It cannot serve as a
precondition for punishment, however, if it can be said to have been
established whenever, and simply because, it would be useful to say that.
Consequentialists may want to respond in one of two ways. First, they
might object that the argument in the preceding Section presupposes an
overly crude view of consequentialism. In particular, it presupposes that
consequentialists cannot let value functions turn on contextual conditions
such as whether a low or a high SOP is used to convict. That, they may
say, is clearly a false presupposition. Just as consequentialists can give
different values to the conviction and punishment of an innocent person
and a guilty person, so they can treat the punishment of a person who is
wrongfully convicted using a low SOP as worse than the punishment of a
person who is wrongfully convicted using a high SOP.289 If this skewing
were large enough, it would allow the consequentialist to effectively rule
out using a low SOP.
Admittedly, this response formally saves consequentialism from the
argument in the previous Section. The problem, however, is substantive.
Nothing about the idea of consequentialism itself motivates giving such
289. See Seth Lazar, Risky Killing and the Ethics of War, 126 ETHICS 91, 105
(2015) (staking out a similar principle in the context of “risky killing,” according
to which a wrongful killing is worse the more likely it is to be wrongful).
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weight to whether the SOP used is high or low. Of course,
consequentialism has to get its axiology—its theory of value—from
somewhere. But insofar as the axiology seems to reflect substantive moral
commitments that limit how valuable states of affairs may be brought about,
consequentialism seems to be doing no moral work. In other words, the
more consequentialism contorts itself in unintuitive ways to match
deontological moral commitments, the more it becomes like a Ptolemaic
system of astronomy, adding epicycles to its epicycles to strive to match a
pattern that it fundamentally does not explain.
Indeed, even granting that consequentialism can accommodate the
retributive thought that it is worse to punish the innocent than it is to punish
the guilty requires consequentialism to build some version of retributivism
into its axiology. If there is to be an explanation for why it is so much
worse to wrongly punish someone using a low SOP than a high one, that
too will come from—or so the next Part will argue—a retributive account.
A consequentialism that is not simply contorting itself to match this
retributive account, a consequentialism that uses a more intuitive axiology,
one that sets the SOP by straightforward reference to the consequences at
stake in convicting and acquitting, as worked out in the previous Section,
would not be able to account for the thought that guilt must be a
precondition for punishment. It would, at least in certain cases, let
concerns with incapacitation or deterrence swamp the concern over
whether the defendant is guilty. A straightforward consequentialism like this
should be rejected on substantive grounds. And a contorted consequentialism
should be rejected as having no substance.
A second consequentialist response challenges the conception of
punishment used in this Article. Some consequentialists may see punishment
as distinctive not because punishment presupposes guilt in some robust way,
but because punishment is a distinctive social practice that, as a legal matter,
involves certain legal formalities. That is, some consequentialists may accept
that the prosecution must prove, beyond some SOP, that the defendant has
committed a crime before the defendant can be convicted and punished. But
as long as that connection is met, and the formalities of prosecution and
punishment are followed, some consequentialists may be happy to let the
overall consequences direct their use of an SOP.
Again, the problem with this consequentialist response is not conceptual
or formal, it is substantive and moral. The problem is that punishing without
using guilt as a robust precondition for punishment blurs important moral
lines. Moreover, blurring those lines cuts short moral inquiry in a way that
is inconsistent with showing respect for the rights and dignity of individuals.
A good way to see this problem is to explore a response that
consequentialists might want to offer to the criticism raised in Part III.C.
Consequentialists might insist that the state must take some action in cases
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like the terrorism hypothetical, because choosing merely to surveil the
defendant comes with a 50% chance of him being able to successfully
execute a terrorist act with an expected death rate of 20 innocent persons.
Given that the odds are 90% that he would try to execute such a terrorist
act, he should be incapacitated. Thus, the state should use either preventive
detention or the criminal law, depending on which promises to be the more
effective route to incapacitating him. If the criminal law can be used, then
the metaphor of a fig leaf is, they might say, misleading. Rather, if the
criminal law accommodated the use of a sufficiently low SOP, then the
criminal law should be seen simply as a key that unlocks the legal door to
the use of preventive detention.
This argument, although superficially reasonable, ignores a key
principle of non-consequentialist moral reasoning: each type of action—in
the current discussion, preventive detention versus criminal punishment—
has its own conditions for justification, and justifications have their own
moral integrity. One may not simply blend these justifications together for
a better effect. Preventive detention is permissible only if one or more of a
few conditions are met.290 One of these conditions is that even if the state is
providing all the resources for policing that it is obliged to provide, the
person cannot be effectively policed.291 The danger presented by
consequentialism is that it bypasses this and other related conditions.
Of course, consequentialists would choose to invest in better policing
if that was the most efficient solution to the threat from terrorism. But what
if it is not the most efficient solution? What if it would cost more, as an
aggregate matter, to invest in more policing, but it would better respect the
dignity of autonomous individuals to have better policing and leave even
dangerous individuals, who have not yet committed a crime, free to choose
whether to respect the law or to try to break it and face the consequences?
Before embracing preventive detention, we must determine the strength of
the state’s duty to provide policing resources, and ask whether the state
could, if it met its duty to provide such resources, thereby provide adequate
safety to others. If the answer to the second question is no—if it could not
provide adequate safety even if it met its duty to provide policing
resources—then one can justify preventive detention directly. But if the
answer is yes, then one cannot justify preventive detention within a moral
framework that respects the dignity of autonomous individuals. Using
criminal law as a key to unlock another path to preventive detention may
be cheaper and may produce better consequences overall. But doing so
ignores whether some extra cost is worth bearing for the sake of respecting
the rights and dignity of individuals. And that is why using the criminal
290. See Walen, supra note 24, at 922–27, 930–33.
291. Id. at 924.
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law in place of preventive detention is illicit. It opens a path to justifying
preventive detention that does not arise from considering how preventive
detention can be made consistent with respect for the dignity of
individuals. That is why we must preserve the idea that guilt must be a
precondition for punishment. It forces us to ask all the morally relevant
questions.
This insight regarding where consequentialism goes wrong—that it
does not respect the idea that guilt must be a precondition for punishment—
points the way to a better understanding of the SOP for criminal law. The
better way to approach the question is via the retributive commitment to that
precondition.
IV. A RETRIBUTIVE JUSTIFICATION FOR THE BARD STANDARD
This Part turns from the critical to the constructive. Drawing the lesson
from Part I that the right SOP has to reflect what is properly at stake in
convicting and punishing a defendant who might be guilty or might be
innocent, this Part takes a position on what is at stake. Drawing the lesson
from Part III, it concludes that not all consequences can properly be taken
to be at stake; otherwise, guilt will fail to serve as a precondition for
punishment. It articulates, then, a retributive theory according to which
what is at stake is, on the one hand, the importance of doing justice by
punishing the guilty, and on the other hand, the importance of not
wrongfully punishing the innocent.
This Part first offers an overview of the retributive framework for the
BARD standard. It then explains how this retributive solution is different
from an earlier one. It continues by considering more carefully one side of
the balance: the intrinsic value of deserved punishment. Then it compares
this with the disvalue of punishing the innocent. Finally, it examines the
retributive balance and its connection to the BARD standard as
customarily understood.
A. Overview of the Retributive Framework for the BARD Standard
In a retributive framework, the justifications for punishment include
both the idea that people who have committed serious wrongs deserve
punishment and the idea that others have a right not to be punished. A
retributivist need not suppose that desert is the only reason to punish; the
good that punishment can accomplish through deterrence and the
incapacitation of potential criminals is, on any reasonable view, a reason
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to punish.292 The retributivist point is that these instrumental reasons to
punish are relevant only once it has been determined that the person to be
punished deserves punishment. Desert functions like a gate in the
normative equivalent of a transistor; until it is switched on, the potentially
greater normative force of the instrumental reasons is switched off.
The novel claim in this Article is that this transistor-like function is
true not only for the act of punishing, but also for setting the SOP for
determining that the state may punish someone. The basis of this new
claim is the thought that using a consequentialist balance to set the SOP,
even if modified by a slight priority for negative over positive patientclaims, would allow a low SOP to function as an end-run around the need
to establish guilt as a precondition of punishment. In effect, by relying on
the value of incapacitation and deterrence to lower the SOP, the state
would declare that certain people deserve punishment simply because
society would benefit if the state acted as if their guilt had been
established. A retributivist cannot condone that sort of end-run around
establishing guilt as a necessary precondition for punishment.
The only way to avoid that sort of end-run is to require that the law set
the SOP for conviction independently of the overall consequentialist value
of convictions. This does not mean that the SOP should not be set by
reference to what is at stake in convicting and punishing defendants. The
point is only that certain considerations—the instrumental benefits of
punishment—must be screened off until the prosecution has established
guilt. The intrinsic value of giving those who are guilty of wrongdoing the
punishment they deserve is not likewise screened off. It is the retributive
value of punishing the guilty, and only that value, that should weigh in the
balance against the harm of punishing the innocent, thereby setting the
SOP.
It is important to emphasize two things about this solution. First, it
does not presuppose a particularly robust view of retributive desert. It does
not presuppose, for example, that there is some particular punishment that
fits each particular crime; it is consistent with the view that states have a
lot of leeway in establishing schedules of proportional punishment.293 Nor
does the solution presuppose that inflicting harsh treatment on wrongdoers
is intrinsically desirable—surely the element of retributivism most often
attacked as “barbaric.”294 Rather, this solution presupposes only (a) that
292. See Cahill, supra note 23, at 29–30; Husak, supra note 23, at 995;
MOORE, supra note 23, at 154.
293. See Walen, supra note 25, at 30–31 (arguing that states have a lot of
leeway in establishing schedules of proportional punishment). The model that this
Article develops could be used, not only for the state, but also for other entities
entitled to inflict punishment, such as churches, families, etc.
294. See TADROS, supra note 123, at 124.
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wrongdoing can result in forfeiture of the right not to be punished, up to
some proportional limit, and (b) that when a state establishes a proportional
and instrumentally well-justified schedule of punishment, justice calls for
the state to follow through and inflict appropriate punishments on those who
commit crimes. The only sense in which one must suppose that a guilty
person deserves punishment, then, is that he deserves to be held accountable
in accordance with the established rules that everyone is expected follow.295
This is not to deny that a more robust retributivism is morally sound, as long
as it is not taken to entail the existence of implausibly strong retributive
reasons to punish, regardless of the consequences.296 The point is only that
one does not have to accept a particularly robust form of retributivism to see
that there is some intrinsic value in giving people the punishment they
deserve according to well-established laws.
Second, there is no other solution that gives instrumental value of
punishment a role in setting the SOP for criminal punishment that will work.
One might think that one should continue to count the instrumental value of
punishing the guilty, and that one should only screen off the instrumental
value that sometimes follows from punishing the innocent. This might be
tempting because one might think that consequentialism seemed to
embrace a low SOP in death penalty cases—assuming a high deterrence
value for executions—and the terrorism hypothetical only because the
instrumental value of convicting the innocent gave doing so a net positive
value, at least in terms of deterrence or incapacitation. But this would be a
mistake, which we can see if we take those two cases in turn.
Start with the death penalty. Suppose that the positive value of
convicting the guilty is that it deters murders and would save, on average,
ten innocent lives. This gives us a disvalue for VAG equal to the loss of
those ten lives. Contrast that with the negative value of executing an
innocent person, and put the other considerations to the side as secondary.
This suffices to give us a first-order approximation for the value of VAG/VCI
of 10. Plugging that into equation (6), we get an SOP of 1/11, or less than
10%! The same thing would result for the terrorism hypothetical. Even if
these are only approximately correct, and the SOP would have to be raised
a fair bit because of the other factors, it is still quite plausible that the final
SOP would be well below 50%. Thus, merely screening off the
instrumental value of convicting the innocent will not suffice for giving us
an SOP that respects the principle that guilt must be a precondition for
punishment. To protect the principle that guilt must be a precondition for
295. See Hugo Adam Bedau & Erin Kelly, Punishment, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA
PHIL., http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2010/entries/punishment/ (last updated
Feb. 19, 2010).
296. See infra Part IV.C.

2015]

PROOF BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT

429

punishment, the instrumental value of punishment—whether the
defendant is guilty or innocent—must be screened out.
This retributive position appeals to the core idea shared across
deontology, namely that rights must be respected, and that one cannot fully
account for the rights people have by a straightforward consequentialist
analysis. Certain differences—for example, between negative claims not
to be harmed and positive claims to be helped so that one does not suffer
harm, and between claims not to be harmed as a result of being used as a
means and claims not to be harmed as a side effect—must be respected if
rights are to provide a normative space in which people are all properly
respected as free and equal beings whose lives register as morally
valuable. But they are not the only differences that matter deontologically.
Respect for individuals also requires that the justification of punishment
must presuppose desert. This is not to say simply that it is worse to punish
the innocent than it is simply to lock them up. The point is that paths of
justification are morally significant.297 There may be more than one way
to justify an act such as locking someone up. But at least one such
justification must work, in its own terms, if the act is to be justified. The
terms for justifying punishment include establishing that the person to be
punished is guilty and therefore deserves to be punished. The SOP for
establishing guilt must not undermine its role as a precondition for
considering other values.298
The positive thesis of this Article is that this balance—in which the
instrumental benefits of punishment are screened out as irrelevant to
setting the SOP—tips heavily, but not absolutely, in favor of protecting
the innocent, giving us the BARD standard, as customarily understood. To
complete the argument, it will be necessary to argue for the following three
points: (1) that the intrinsic positive value of providing retributive justice is
297. See supra Part III.D.
298. This point applies quite generally. If a justification for an action involves
a precondition, then only the value reflected in that precondition can be taken into
account in setting the relevant SOP; one must screen out other values.
Take, for example, civil trials involving two parties. Each has an equal
claim not to be wronged—either by being wronged and not made whole, or by
being forced to make another whole when one is not responsible for his need.
Assuming that damages are on a par with the harm suffered, the SOP should be
roughly 50%. But now, the anti-consequentialist significance of that commitment
is clear. All the downstream effects, in terms of chilling productive behavior and
deterring harmful behavior, have to be screened out. On this understanding,
Kaplow’s approach, in supra note 12, to the SOP in civil trials is completely
backwards. Of course, we should seek to deter harmful actions and to avoid
chilling beneficial ones. But civil suits are about individual justice, not social
engineering. Social engineering must be achieved via other means, such as
taxation, fines, policing, etc.

430

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76

slight but non-negligible; (2) that this value is qualitatively lower than the
total disvalue of convicting the innocent; and (3) that the balance between
those different values would result in something that could fairly be captured
by the customary understanding of the BARD standard. Before addressing
these remaining steps in the argument, however, it will be helpful to clarify
why this approach to a retributive justification for the BARD standard is
different from what has gone before.
B. What is New in the New Retributive Solution
A number of authors have considered and rejected a retributive defense
of a high SOP.299 They all target an argument made by Jeffrey Reiman.300
Therefore, this Section will describe Reiman’s position, criticize it, and
explain why this Article’s argument succeeds where his fails.
Reiman’s suggestion is two-fold. First, he assumes that a retributive
argument has to concern itself only with the “direct negative impacts” of
punishing the innocent and of not punishing the guilty.301 In other words,
he thinks a retributive argument screens off not only the consequentialist
benefits of punishing the guilty, but also the consequentialist harms of
punishing the innocent. Second, he mistakenly frames the duty to punish
as a duty that one must owe to someone or to some collection of people.302
If one grants him this mistaken idea, then his claim looks plausible, namely
the claim that however great the harm or wrong to whoever holds the right
that the guilty be punished, that harm or wrong pales in comparison with
the harm or wrong done to a person wrongly convicted.303 In this way he
reaches the conclusion that the value of VAG/VCI is a small fraction, which
would yield an SOP close to 1.0.
299. See Epps, supra note 15, at 1141–42; Reiman & van den Haag, supra note
21, at 242–43; Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of
“Just” Punishment, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 843, 911–12 (2002); Lillquist, supra note
15, at 139–42 (providing a more diffuse discussion of retributivism and its
relevance to the SOP for criminal law). Lillquist considers the idea that the
conflicting duties a retributivist faces—to punish the guilty and not to punish the
innocent—are incommensurable. Id. at 140. He then suggests that retributivists
might think that “the disvalue of erroneous convictions is distinctly higher than the
disutility of erroneous acquittals.” Id. at 141. But he does not explore why. Rather,
he simply says that society makes tradeoffs and then discusses, in a confused way,
negative retributivism, failing to take into account that negative retributivism gives
positive weight to convicting the guilty only in consequentialist terms. Id. at 141–
42.
300. See Reiman & van den Haag, supra note 21, at 230–34.
301. Id. at 232.
302. Reiman considers that it might be owed to the victim, the criminal, or
society. Id. at 233.
303. Id.
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However, Reiman’s critics correctly take him to task for the mistaken
claim that the duty to punish must be owed to someone. As Ernest van den
Haag put it: “The two duties, to punish the guilty and not to punish innocents,
are ends in themselves, independent of the losses or gains of beneficiaries.
The duties are categorical, to be carried out unconditionally.”304 Withholding
judgment, for the moment, on van den Haag’s position on the duty not to
punish the innocent, a retributivist should embrace his claim about the duty
to punish the guilty. On a retributive theory of punishment, the state has a
duty to punish, the duty can be defeated by other considerations (such as
it being too costly), and no one has a right that it punish the guilty.305
If Reiman’s critics were correct in thinking that both retributive duties
were on a par, then their conclusion that retributivism cannot be the ground
of the BARD standard would be correct as well. For then, retributivism
would either have nothing to say about the SOP,306 or perhaps it would
suggest using something like the civil SOP of 51%.307 But his critics all miss
an important asymmetry and in that way mirror Reiman’s mistake. Reiman
mistakenly thinks that both retributive duties—the duty to punish the guilty
and the duty not to punish the innocent—correspond to rights. His critics
mistakenly think that neither retributive duty corresponds to rights. In truth,
the duties differ in this regard. The duty to punish the guilty reflects the value
of doing justice. The duty corresponds to no right and is owed to no one in
particular. But the duty not to punish the innocent is owed to the innocent.
That asymmetry is fairly intuitive and deeply connected to the asymmetry
used in the new retributive account of the SOP for criminal law.
In this new account, the reason the SOP is high is that the disvalue of
not doing justice—by not punishing the guilty, screening off the
instrumental harms that flow from this failure to punish—is substantially
less than the disvalue of punishing the innocent. Most of the latter comes
from the harm done to the innocent person, such as the harm connected to
and giving magnitude to the wrong done to him.308 The difference in value
reflects the difference between concrete harms connected immediately to a
wrong and a mere abstract wrong. If one thinks of both wrongs as mere
abstract wrongs, one will not see this asymmetry, which is the mistake
304. Id. at 242.
305. One might think that victims, if anyone, have a right to ensure that their
wrongdoer is punished. But see infra Part IV.C.
306. See Epps, supra note 15, at 1142 & n.370; Reiman & van den Haag, supra
note 21, at 242–43.
307. See Christopher, supra note 299, at 913 (suggesting that retributivism
should settle on a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard).
308. There is no obvious reason why the SOP cannot take into account other
sources of the disvalue of punishing the innocent. It simply cannot take into
account any instrumental benefits of punishing the innocent.
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Reiman’s critics make. But if one recognizes that one wrong is measured by
a concrete harm, and the other not, then one can see the retributive solution
clearly.
C. The Intrinsic Value of Deserved Punishment
The proposition that there is some intrinsic value in punishing the
guilty—a value that reflects in some way the idea that they deserve to be
punished—can be supported in two ways. First, it is supported by strong
intuitions. Consider this thought experiment: a violent rapist has been
incapacitated by some accident so that he is no longer a threat to anyone;
he has also agreed to cooperate in a sham punishment in which he reports
to a film studio every week to be filmed as though he is in prison, thereby
achieving general deterrence. This sham is very well designed, so that no
one will ever discover it. In reality, however, other than being obliged to
participate in this sham on a regular basis, he lives out his days in comfort,
pursuing his hobbies.309 The instrumental goals of punishment are met in
this case without him having to be punished. But most people think that
punishment is still called for.
Second, holding people accountable for their wrongful acts is also
crucial to treating each other as autonomous agents with dignity.310 This
point seems so clearly correct that it is hard to doubt that we should
condemn the guilty. More problematic is justifying the infliction on them
of harsh treatment proportional to the severity of their crime and their
culpability for it. There are, however, a number of ways of trying to justify
this second, more controversial aspect of retributivism.311 It is not
necessary to rely on any of them here. It suffices to invoke the idea, already
introduced, that the notion of deserved punishment is supported by the idea
that justice calls for giving people the punishment they were told to expect
if they chose to violate the criminal law, assuming that the law is itself
sufficiently well justified and that the punishment is proportional to the
gravity of the crime.312
D. The Relative Weakness of the Intrinsic Value of Punishing the Guilty
Compared to the Harm of Punishing the Innocent
Assuming that some retributive reason to punish exists, the next
question is: How strong is it? There are two sorts of reasons to think that
309.
310.
(1968).
311.
312.

See MOORE, supra note 23, at 98–101.
See Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 THE MONIST 475
See Walen, supra note 25, § 5.
See supra note 295 and accompanying text.
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it is not particularly strong. First, intuitively, this reason to punish cannot
be very strong given the way we readily forsake seeking it. This can be
seen in a number of ways. Consider, for example, the fact that we often do
not object to mercy being shown. Especially when the crime was not
exceedingly heinous, the criminal is repentant, and the victim endorses it,
merciful forgiveness of punishment can be morally praiseworthy.313 But
notice what merciful forgiveness implies about the value of punishment.
For the act of forgiveness to be mercy, the punishment must still be
deserved. But for mercy to be praiseworthy, the intrinsic value of the
deserved punishment must not be that great.
Consider also the fact that prosecutors and the police are rarely in a
position to arrest and prosecute every person suspected of having
committed a serious crime. The problem is not simply that the police and
prosecutors may not always have enough evidence. The problem is often
that they do not have the resources to obtain enough evidence, or to
prosecute every case that they would ideally want to prosecute. They do
not have these resources not simply because they do not exist, but because
almost every society has other priorities, ranging from maintaining roads
to educating children, to allowing taxpayers to keep their money. This
shows that punishing the guilty is not of paramount importance, even
given all the instrumental benefits it may provide. Strip aside those
benefits, and the intrinsic value of punishing the guilty must be relatively
weak indeed.314
Second, there is a theoretical reason to think that the intrinsic value of
punishing the guilty is not particularly strong: it is an abstract interest in
justice. No individual has a particularly compelling personal interest in
punishing the guilty. This may seem an odd thing to say. One might think
that the victim, or the victim’s close family and friends, have an acute
interest in retributive justice being done. But that thought confuses
retributive justice with some combination of vengeance or restorative
justice. Vengeance is personal; retribution is not.315 Admittedly, it is now
common to give victims some say in how punishment is carried out.316 But
this is an accommodation of their special, personal interest in seeing
justice done, and a reflection of the belief that the degree of harm done—
a matter about which a victim has privileged information—is relevant to
the severity of the crime. It does not imply that victims have the right to
313. This thought echoes the near universal consensus that Kant overstated
things when he wrote that “blood guilt” would cling to a people that does not
execute those who deserve to be executed. See infra note 348.
314. See Husak, supra note 23, at 996–1000.
315. See ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 367–68 (1981).
316. See Paul G. Cassell, In Defense of Victim Impact Statements, 6 OHIO ST.
J. CRIM. L. 611, 611 (2009).
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demand that justice be done or that justice is done in their name. And
restorative justice is a tort-like position, that the wrongdoer should address
his victim and try, as far as possible, to make his victim—and the
community—whole,317 not a retributive concern with giving the
wrongdoer the punishment he deserves.
Weighing the abstract good of doing justice against the very concrete
evil in wronging a particular person, it seems clear that, all else equal, the
wrong to the individual should matter more. To make this concrete,
imagine again the case of a rapist.318 Let us suppose, to make the case even
more concrete, that the rapist deserves to spend ten years in prison for his
crime. Now compare the concrete harm—stigma, lost liberty, high risk of
assault, and lost opportunities—of wrongly being sentenced to ten years in
prison as a rapist, and weigh that against the injustice of a rapist escaping
punishment entirely. But to avoid bringing illicit considerations to bear,
assume that the rapist will not commit any more rapes in the future. And
assume that the rape victim has no interest in seeing the rapist suffer. It is
hard to see how one could reasonably care equally about the disvalue of the
guilty rapist not getting the punishment that he deserves and the injustice of
an innocent non-rapist getting punishment that he does not deserve. This is
the truth behind Justice Harlan’s claim that “it is far worse to convict an
innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.”319 Although Harlan thought
of his claim as appealing to consequentialist reasons,320 it is better
understood as reflecting a retributive insight into the comparative weight
of the two possible unwanted outcomes.
E. The Retributive Balance and the BARD Standard
Assuming that the correct balance for setting the SOP tips heavily, but
not absolutely, in favor of protecting the innocent, we must now determine
whether to accept that the resulting balance is the BARD standard as
customarily understood—a roughly 90% probability of guilt.
We can still use equation (6) to answer that question. Recall that
equation (6) represents the SOP as 1/[1 + VAG/VCI]. This was derived from
the assumption that the two values we want to balance are the disvalue of
acquitting the guilty and the disvalue of convicting the innocent, which is
exactly what the retributive model says should be balanced. The difference
317. See Antony Duff, Legal Punishment, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL.,
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/legal-punishment/ (last updated
May 13, 2013).
318. See supra note 309 and accompanying text (introducing Moore’s rapist
example).
319. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
320. See id. at 373–74.
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between the retributive model and the consequentialist model is only that
the retributive model screens off the instrumental value of punishment
when setting both the VAG and the VCI.
Admittedly, the ratio of VAG/VCI reflects an inherently vague moral
weighing, and reasonable people could differ on what sort of numerical
value will result. But the range is not completely unbounded. The SOP
should not be maximally high—not 99% or higher—nor should the SOP
be even close to as low as a preponderance of the evidence. It should fall
somewhere between those two standards. Speaking only for my own
judgment of how to strike that balance, I would put it on the high end. I
find the abstract interest of justice significantly less compelling than the
threat of a concrete wrong to an individual. Thus, I would peg the SOP
around where the BARD standard as customarily understood lies.
This Section will argue two points about this account of the SOP: first,
that this vagueness is a feature, not a bug, and second, that it provides a
fairly constant value across much of criminal law.
On the feature point: If we frame reasonable doubt as the doubt that
one would think sufficient if one weighed the abstract harm of not doing
justice—by not giving criminals the punishment they deserve—against the
concrete harm of convicting the innocent, then we invite jurors to engage
in a moral weighing. Leaving the determination to a well-instructed jury,
then, is arguably appropriate.321 It conforms to a significant feature of the
traditional role of the jury, namely ensuring that punishment is not merely
technically legal, but just. A jury of the defendant’s peers can use jury
nullification322 to provide a community check on the professionalized
bureaucracy, ensuring that elites are not ignoring the community’s sense
of justice.323 The same interest in appealing to the community’s sense of
justice would support giving the jury the task of finding the appropriate
moral balance to set the SOP for a criminal conviction. If that interest is
321. The jury must be well-instructed because good evidence shows that
BARD jury instructions are often poorly designed and leave juries far too prone
to convict. See generally Solan, supra note 90 (discussing whether the BARD
standard is the best way to promote the purported values of the American criminal
justice system). But see Lillquist, supra note 15, at 191–93 (arguing that there is
reason to doubt that jury instructions can make much of a difference).
322. See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Conflicts of Law and Morality—Institutions
of Amelioration, 67 VA. L. REV. 177, 224–30 (1981). Note that the role of juries
in checking the power of the government to prosecute in unjust ways explains
why American juries do not have to explain their verdicts. If they explained their
verdicts, that would invite overturning them on appeal.
323. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION 87–88 (1998) (arguing that when the Constitution was drafted,
the criminal jury was meant to provide populist protection against overreaching
governmental officials).
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judged to be sufficient, then jury instructions on the BARD standard
should emphasize only what is at stake and refrain from providing any
numerical or other guidance on what the SOP should be.
On the other hand, instructing jurors properly is difficult.324 It would
be important to test how juries—or well-constituted mock juries—actually
handle an instruction that asks them to balance the importance of doing
justice by punishing the guilty, without concern for deterrence or
incapacitation, against the disvalue of convicting the innocent. It may turn
out that this instruction does not make much sense to juries. Or, even if it
makes sense, juries may tend to interpret it too close to the Laudan standard,
or too close to a maximalist interpretation of the BARD standard.325 In that
case, it might be best to operationalize the standard by using a “firmly
convinced” standard, or a “be sure and convinced” standard. It may be best
to tell the jury to imagine themselves getting some level of penalty if they
get it wrong, to help them avoid judging guilt too cavalierly. Or it may be
best to insist on the importance of getting convictions if they seem to be too
reluctant to convict. It might even be best to set a target probability for the
relevant degree of confidence.326 These possibilities should be empirically
tested and ultimately legitimated through democratic legislation. The
philosophical point, however, is that the ultimate standard that any jury
instruction should aim to operationalize is whatever threshold probability of
guilt reasonable people would come to, after clear reflection, regarding the
balance between the intrinsic value of giving the guilty the punishment they
deserve and the total disvalue of convicting the innocent.
Turning now to the second issue in this Section: Would this approach
to the SOP provide a constant value across different crimes? One might
think not. It might seem that the present account would call for the SOP
for a conviction to vary across different kinds of crimes and penalties, just
as we found that it should vary if set within a consequentialist
framework.327 This is because, as the severity of a crime goes up, it might
be thought more important to do justice by punishing the wrongdoer, thus
lowering the SOP. But there is reason for a retributivist to think that
another factor would generally counterbalance this first consideration. For
as the severity of the crime increases, the penalty should also increase,
which would also increase the cost of a false conviction. There is no reason
324. See Lillquist, supra note 15, at 185–86 (discussing not only the difficulty
but the danger of unleashing legal argument over how to instruct the jury, a danger
that arises when a particular instruction is attempted).
325. Who is to say that a jury’s interpretation is too close to either pole?
Academics and other commentators have a right to have their say, but ultimately
legislatures and judges have the relevant legal authority to say.
326. See supra Part III.B.2.
327. See supra Part III.C.
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to think that these would not generally rise in a proportionate tandem,
keeping the right SOP generally invariant.328
There are, however, cases in which the penalties do not always rise in
proportionate tandem with the severity of the crime and the SOP would
therefore vary. Consider, first, the penalty for selling cocaine, which under
the federal sentencing guidelines is 4.25 to 5.25 years for selling less than
2 kilograms.329 Assuming that the dealer is not selling to children, that
sentence seems disproportionately large for a victimless crime. That
should drive the value of convicting the guilty down, which, in terms of
equation (6), is the equivalent of driving the disvalue of acquitting the
guilty down.330 If we assume that VAG/VCI goes down, and we assume that
jurors are not ready to engage in straightforward jury nullification, then they
should treat the SOP as an especially high SOP for such a crime.
Now, consider again the death penalty. We noted above that
consequentialists might have reason to adopt a very low SOP for the death
penalty. They would have reason to do so as long as the studies showing
that the death penalty has a strong power to deter murder are more or less
on the mark.331 But for a retributivist, those deterrence effects are screened
off. Instead, what is relevant is that the harm to an innocent victim is
irreversible—meaning that VCI goes up. In addition, the idea that it can be
deserved is dubious, meaning that VAG goes down. Combining the two, the
value of VAG/VCI goes down, meaning that the SOP should go up. Therefore,
as with the selling of cocaine, if the jury is not willing to engage in jury
nullification, it should at least use an unusually high SOP.332
328. Contra Lillquist, supra note 15, at 142 (doubting that negative retributivists
could justify using the same SOP across cases but failing to anticipate the present
retributivist model).
329. The sentencing guidelines rate the crime of possessing with intent to
distribute between 500 grams and 2 kilograms of cocaine as a level 24 offense. U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N, U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2.D1.1(c)(8), at
148 (2014). The sentencing table assigns to that level, with no prior convictions, a
term of between 51 and 63 months in prison. U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Sentencing
Table (Nov. 1, 2014), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/guidelines-manual
/2014/2014sentencing_table.pdf [http://perma.cc/3SFC-CFGX].
330. See supra note 227 and accompany text.
331. See supra notes 277–79 and accompanying text.
332. What if one is accused of a truly horrible crime such as the torture, rape,
and murder of multiple children? Given that there is a limit to how high the
penalty can go, but that the importance of doing justice can continue to go up,
would this not call for lowering the SOP at the high end of horrific crimes? The
clear implication of the present theory is yes. If the death penalty were involved,
it might take the SOP back down to the normal criminal level. If the maximal
penalty were life in prison, then it might go lower. It should nevertheless stay well
above the civil standard. No matter how strong the pull of doing abstract justice
is, the concrete wrong done by punishing the innocent should outweigh it.
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Finally, consider the case of a very minor crime, the kind of regulatory
matter aimed at keeping a certain kind of behavior from becoming too
common for the general welfare, and punished by a very small penalty, such
as a fine or a brief period of community service. In such a case, we may have
a different reason for departing from the customary understanding of the
BARD standard. The penalty may carry so little stigma and impose such a
small burden that we are willing to relax the requirement that desert be
established before it be given.333 That does not mean that the penalty can
be imposed at random. But it suggests that one may approach the use of
such penalties in a more consequentialist fashion. If the desert requirement
can be relaxed in such cases, and the instrumental values of convicting the
guilty can be brought to bear, then the disvalue of acquitting the guilty
may rise relative to more serious crimes. That could lower the SOP to
something more like the Laudan standard, or even the civil standard.
CONCLUSION
The SOP for convicting and punishing a criminal defendant should
reflect what is properly at stake in such an act. What is properly at stake is,
on the one hand, the value of doing justice by giving criminals the
punishment they deserve, and, on the other hand, the disvalue of punishing,
and thereby wronging, an innocent person. If the SOP for criminal
punishment reflected a balance of all the consequences of punishment, one
might reasonably conclude that it should be substantially lower than the
customary understanding of the BARD standard. But we should not permit
the instrumental importance of punishment—whether narrowed down to the
instrumental value of punishing only the guilty, or considered broadly to
include the instrumental value of punishing the guilty and the innocent—to
affect the threshold determination that someone is guilty. Doing so would
negate the retributive commitment to treating guilt as a precondition for
punishment; it would allow the SOP to do an end-run around that
precondition. Only by screening out those instrumental values can we
properly respect the retributive commitment to punishing the guilty, and
only the guilty. The resulting balance, once the instrumental values of
punishment have been screened out, tips substantially in favor of protecting
the innocent. The BARD standard, as customarily understood, properly
captures this tipping.
333. When the imposition on a person is small enough, there is reason to think
that we can relax deontological restrictions that otherwise would apply if doing
so would sufficiently serve the greater good. See Walen, supra note 123, at 428
(emphasizing that the MP “holds that it is impermissible to cause significant harm
to others.” (emphasis added)).
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APPENDIX
In Part III.B, this Article derived the Laudan standard, an SOP of 75%,
by considering only the first and sixth of seven factors relevant to the value
of VAG/VCI: incapacitation and the intrinsic disvalue of punishing the
innocent. That Part then claimed that the other factors, taken together, push
the SOP slightly lower. This Appendix will argue for that claim, starting
with an SOP of 78%, which corresponds to a value for VAG/VCI of 0.29, the
number used in Part III.B before it was adjusted down for the considerations
raised here.334
The next factor to take into account, factor 2, is deterrence.335
Convicting and punishing defendants generally has deterrent value, even if
they are in fact innocent, while acquitting people generally works to lower
the deterrence value. Thus, the value of deterrence generally presses for
more convictions. It does so by raising the disvalue of VAG and diminishing
the disvalue of VCI, which together lowers the value of the SOP. There is,
however, a limit to how low the SOP can go without undermining
deterrence. Insofar as “there is a chance of being punished no matter what
one does, the benefits of following the law are reduced.”336 But as long as
one is more likely to face prosecution and punishment if one is engaged in
crime than if one is truly innocent, then instances of punishment will tend
to deter crime.
One might naively think that the SOP would have to be at least 50% for
it to be the case that one is more likely to face prosecution and punishment
if one has in fact committed the crime in question than if one has not. But in
truth, the SOP could go much lower. To see why, consider this artificial
example. Suppose one in a hundred people is engaging in a certain crime,
X. If police tended to arrest people, prosecutors tended to prosecute
people, and juries tended to convict people randomly, then there would be
no prudential reason, based on fear of punishment, not to commit X. But
suppose the effective SOP for arrest was 10%, and that prosecutors and
juries could rely on 10% likelihood of guilt to reach a conviction—they
aimed to confirm that the arrest standard was properly met. That standard
is far from random; one could rationally hope that by not doing X, one
would not seem even 10% likely to have committed X. This means that
the real question is simply: How much lower should the SOP go to achieve
deterrence?

334. See supra note 266 and accompanying text.
335. This was also taken into account, though only in the limited context of
the death penalty, in supra Part III.C.
336. See Epps, supra note 15, at 1126 n.293.
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There are three reasons to think that the effect of deterrence on the
SOP should not be large. First, the odds of criminal acts resulting in
conviction and punishment are, as a general matter, fairly low.337 This
presumably reflects, in large part, the fact that the odds of being caught are
fairly low. Accordingly, even a fairly sizeable drop in the SOP that the
prosecutor must meet, making it easier to get a conviction, is unlikely to
register with most criminals as a significant change in the probability of
conviction and punishment. Second, criminals are generally not particularly
sophisticated calculators of rational self-interest.338 This is not to say that the
threat of punishment does no good whatsoever. If the threat were completely
removed, it is very likely that many people would commit crimes who
otherwise would not. But a small rise in the conviction rate, caused by a
lowering the SOP in criminal trials, is unlikely to have a pronounced
effect.339 Third, as David Abrams notes, studies looking at the benefits of
a 10% increase in sentences across a range of violent crimes (rape,
robbery, assault, and burglary) show that incapacitation provides “the
largest benefit for each crime.”340 Indeed, the table he provides indicates
that the benefit of incapacitation is roughly twice that of deterrence—most
of which is general, as opposed to specific—across the range of crimes.
Suppose, then, that deterrence increases the value of VAG/VCI by at most
50%. If we start with a VAG/VCI ratio of 0.28 and increase it by 50%, we
get a new value of 0.42. Plugging that into equation (6), the SOP drops
from 78% to 70%.

337. One way to see this is to consider a British study of convicted felons who
self-reported “that they commit offences at around 140 per year in the period at
liberty, before they were imprisoned.” JOHN HALLIDAY ET AL., MAKING
PUNISHMENTS WORK, app. 6, at 130 (2001); see also Paul Robinson & John M.
Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioural Science Investigation, 24
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 173, 184 (2004) (“The overall average of conviction for
criminal offenses committed is 1.3 per cent—with the chance of getting a prison
sentence being 100-to-1 for most offences. Even the most serious offences, other
than homicide, have conviction rates of single digits.”).
338. See e.g., Robinson & Darley, supra note 337, at 179 (“Available evidence
suggests that potential offenders as a group are people who are less inclined to
think at all about the consequences of their conduct or to guide their conduct
accordingly.”). There might be reason to believe that this is particularly true for
violent offenders and less true of white-collar criminals, whose crimes normally
take significant forethought. If that is correct, then deterrence may have more
value for them.
339. As Robinson and Darley write: “criminal law—the substantive rules
governing the distribution of criminal liability and punishment—commonly does
not materially effect [sic] deterrence.” Robinson & Darley, supra note 337, at 173.
340. Abrams, supra note 262, at 962.
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Let us now turn to factor 3, which refers to the importance of the moral
force of the law being undermined neither “by a standard of proof that
leaves people in [excessive] doubt whether innocent men are being
condemned,”341 nor by a sense that criminals can act with impunity. Given
that the SOP used in practice, especially when the “firmly convinced”
explanation is not given, seems to hover between 50% and 70%,342 there is
no reason to worry that this number, 70%, would be problematic in the first
way.343 And given that a lower SOP than the customary understanding of
the BARD standard calls for would make it harder for criminals to act with
impunity, there is reason to think that factor 3 would, if anything, push the
SOP slightly lower. However, given that deterrence and incapacitation are
the primary ways in which the criminal law prevents criminals from acting
with impunity, we can assume that this factor has already been factored in.
Factor 4 was the importance of people feeling secure that their
“government cannot adjudge [them] guilty of a criminal offense” unless
they are guilty. This factor registers the importance of two distinct concerns.
First, it registers the importance of being free from a general fear that one
will be punished for a crime one has not committed. Second, it registers the
importance of not being “chilled” or deterred from doing productive things
for fear that one will be mistakenly taken to have done something criminal.
Both seem to push to raise the SOP, but they are importantly different.
Accordingly, it will be best to consider these two concerns one at a time.
The general worry does not seem to present much of a reason to raise
the SOP above 70%. The reason is that the SOP in use seems to be at that
level or lower, and yet people do not seem to be too worried that the
government can adjudge them guilty if they are in fact innocent.344 If the
341. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
342. See supra notes 93–106 and accompanying text.
343. See Epps, supra note 15, at 1096 (“[W]e have no good reason to be
confident” that something like the Blackstone principle is necessary for people to
accept “that the law is morally legitimate.”).
344. Why people are not particularly worried about being falsely convicted,
given the relatively low SOP in use is curious. Doubtless there are many factors.
One is that they may not realize that the SOP in use is lower than the customary
understanding of BARD. Another may be that the SOP has relatively little to do
with whether people feel harassed by the criminal justice system. As Douglas
Husak has pointed out, overcriminalization is such that “[p]erhaps over 70% of
living adult Americans have committed an imprisonable offense at some point in
their life.” DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW 24 (2008). Yet a much smaller percentage has been sent to prison.
What controls whether someone is prosecuted and convicted is mostly the
discretion of the police and prosecutors. Those who feel harassed will most likely
be those who are viewed suspiciously by those in power, i.e., those who are poor
or African American or Hispanic. See, e.g., Joseph E. Kennedy, Drug Wars in
Black and White, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 153, 155 (2003) (arguing that
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SOP were to drop much lower, then the cost of this generic fear might rise.
But even then, people would have reason to fear only if those who
determine who is brought to trial—the police and prosecutors—failed to
track reasonably well who was engaged in criminal activity. If the police
arrest the innocent only rarely, and if prosecutors do a reasonably good job
of screening out the innocent, then the odds of being punished if one is
innocent will be very low, even if the SOP for conviction at trial were well
below 50%.
Arguably the more important worry is the worry about chilling effects.
Consider two examples: rape and fraud. If the SOP for both were very low,
then one would want to protect oneself from punishment by staying far
away from the line of committing either crime. But consider the costs of
doing so. To avoid being wrongly convicted of rape, men would want to
be very confident that their sexual partners have consented. Beyond that,
they would want to be very confident that their sexual partners would
never decide to accuse them of rape. Though this might at first seem to be
a good thing, from a feminist point of view, it would in fact greatly chill,
or at least distort, sexual relations, even within marriage. This could have
seriously deleterious social consequences. A similar point could be made
with fraud. It would cause people to be very cautious before engaging in
business transactions. But that would put a huge damper on business
activity, which could have seriously deleterious economic and social
consequences. If we assume that these problems are not serious as things
stand, then there may be no pressure to raise the SOP above the Laudan
standard. But there is strong reason to be concerned about lowering the
SOP far below that standard, especially if doing so encourages the police and
prosecutors to adopt a lower SOP for their acts of arresting and prosecuting.
Factor 5 was the disvalue of the effects of punishment that are not
intended as punishment on the lives of criminals, and on their families and
communities. This effect is surely important. The violence that prisoners often
suffer in prison is presumably not intended as part of the punishment;345
presumably it is merely tolerated because the costs of suppressing it are
considered too high and because it is hard to motivate politicians to care
about the plight of the imprisoned. Post-sentencing harm to criminals is
also presumably not normally intended as part of the punishment.346 Both
African Americans are disproportionately impacted by drug laws because of their
“otherness”); William J. Stuntz, Race, Class and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795
(1998) (arguing that the disproportionate impact of drug laws on African
Americans is really a result of class dynamics in the criminal law).
345. See supra notes 256–58 and accompanying text.
346. This is an empirical, not a conceptual claim. It is quite plausible that
certain deprivations that are imposed by law and continue even after a criminal has
served his sentence—such as being barred from voting—should be understood as
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are negative effects that weigh against punishing. Likewise, the harm to
families and communities is also presumably, at least in modern, liberal
democracies, not an intended effect. The fact that we are willing to inflict
these harms for the sake of punishing the guilty implies that we think that
the benefits of punishment outweigh these costs.347 But when these costs
are pointlessly borne, because the person punished is innocent, they surely
weigh more heavily against punishment. Let us suppose that this harm is
half as great as the harm to the innocent person. If we increase VCI by 50%,
that would undo the 50% bump we gave the ratio of VAG/VCI when we took
deterrence into account, bringing us back to an SOP of 78%.
Factor 6 is the intrinsic value of punishing the guilty and not punishing
the innocent. The latter has already been taken into account; the former,
however, has not yet played much of a role. Part III.A noted that the idea
that there is some distinctive value in convicting the guilty is the reason to
use a consequentialist, rather than a utilitarian, framework. The question
is: What kind of value does it have? Those with retributive inclinations
will think it has positive value; others, who accept only the negative
retributive idea that culpability is a necessary condition for intentionally
inflicting punishment, will think it is still bad thing, just a less bad thing
than punishing the innocent. How should we take those possibilities into
account?
Technically, VCG is outside the concern of equation (6), which is
concerned with only the VAG and VCI. But we can assume that the value for
the SOP derived so far represents equation (5), which does give a role to
VCG, and then see how varying that value affects the SOP. As a reminder,
equation (5) holds:
SOP = 1/(1 + {[VCG – VAG]/[VAI – VCI]})
If one thinks it is a bad thing to convict the guilty, then presumably
that is because of the bad effects on the person being punished. As noted
when discussing factor 5, the presumption is that these bad effects are
longer-lasting punitive responses. See Alec Walen, A Punitive Precondition for
Preventive Detention: Lost Status as a Foundation for a Lost Immunity, 48 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 1229, 1264–65 (2011). Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that this is
the case for the majority of post-sentence harms.
347. But see, e.g., Bronsteen et al., supra note 247, at 1064 (arguing that these
extra costs, while “understood,” are “ignored” by politicians writing sentencing
codes). Another harm that wrongful conviction might impose on both the wrongly
convicted person and the community is the risk that innocent people sent to prison
might be converted into criminals. Again, we willingly run the risk that the guilty
will turn into more hardened criminals in prison. The risk is worth adding to the
calculation only when it is pointlessly borne.
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outweighed by the good effects of punishment, so taking them into account
means, at most, that the value of convicting the guilty is slightly lower than
it would be if this were not taken into account. Plugging that into equation
(6) reduces the numerator in the ratio of Vs. That means that if the SOP
had been = 1/(1 + 0.29), then we can reduce the value of 0.29, which raises
the SOP. If, however, one thinks it is a good thing to punish the guilty,
then the change in VCG will be in the opposite direction; it will grow. That
will cause the value in the numerator in the ratio of Vs to grow, which has
the effect of shrinking the SOP.
How large would these effects be? Not large. There is a common view
that retributivists must think that the importance of punishing the guilty is
on a par with that of not punishing the innocent.348 But this is an extreme
view of retributivism, held by few of its modern proponents.349 A
reasonable view would hold that punishing the guilty is only one of many
goods to be achieved, and moreover that it is a good that one would not
sacrifice much to do.350 Accordingly, it seems fair to say that one should
be willing to raise the numerator only a bit, say 20%, even if one accepts
that it is good to punish the guilty. And we can say that the alternative
view, that the suffering of the guilty is bad, should shrink the value of the
numerator to the same extent. That would change the ratio of the number
348. Kant and Hegel seem to have held this view. See IMMANUEL KANT, THE
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 142 (Mary Gregor trans., 1991) (1797) (arguing that a
person sentenced to die must be executed, even if the society in which he lives
were to disband); GEORG HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 120
(Allen W. Wood ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., 1991) (1821) (Punishment “is . . . not
only conditionally right but necessary—namely as a second coercion which
cancels an initial coercion.”). “[P]unishment is merely the negation of the
negation.” Id. at 123. The implication of Hegel’s view is that if the wrongdoer is
not punished, his crime is not negated, and it stands as a wrong. Not punishing,
therefore, effectively wrongs, and thus is on a par with punishing the innocent.
For more modern writers, see for example Reiman & van den Haag, supra note
21, at 242 (“The duties are categorical, to be carried out unconditionally.”);
Russell Christopher, The Prosecutor’s Dilemma: Bargains and Punishments, 72
FORDHAM L. REV. 93, 101 (2003) (“Retributivism imposes an absolute duty to
punish culpable wrongdoers whenever the opportunity arises.”).
349. Moore, the most prominent retributive theorist of the past few decades,
has said that it is a possible view. MOORE, supra note 23, at 157 n.11. (“The
retributivist might adopt a principle of symmetry here—the guilty going
unpunished is exactly the same magnitude of evil as the innocent being punished.
. . . Or the retributivist might share the common view (that the second is a greater
evil than the first). . . .”). But the saner view, as established in supra Part IV.B, is
that there is a categorical difference between the “good” of punishing the guilty
and the right of the innocent not to be punished. See also LARRY ALEXANDER,
KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN & STEPHEN J. MORSE, CRIME AND CULPABILITY: A
THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 7–9 (2009) (defending “moderate retributivism”).
350. See supra Part IV.D.

2015]

PROOF BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT

445

added to 1 in the overall denominator from 0.29 to either 0.35 or 0.23. That
would yield a new SOP of either 74% if one thinks that punishing the
guilty has some intrinsic positive value, or 81% if one thinks it does not
have intrinsic value.
Factor 7 referred to what Daniel Epps calls the “dynamic” effects that
the previous six factors leave out.351 Epps’s concern is that the customary
understanding of BARD might actually hurt innocent defendants, the very
people it was supposed to protect, as well as others. For example, Epps
notes that a high SOP would increase the number of crime victims (a fact
already taken into account), which could induce lawmakers to introduce
draconian sentences to regain the lost deterrence (a fact not yet taken into
account).352 An innocent person convicted would then face a harsher
punishment. Another example: he suggests that acquittals will be less
likely to convey innocence if they can result despite it being fairly likely
that the defendant was guilty.353 Thus the higher the SOP, the more chance
that an innocent person who is acquitted would nonetheless face stigma as
if he were likely to be guilty.
A particularly interesting feature of Epps’s analysis is his questioning
of whether a high SOP protects innocent defendants at all. He distinguishes
three different types of innocent defendants and explains how a high SOP
might make each worse off. First, there are those who would be acquitted
whether the law used an SOP like the customary understanding of BARD,
or a moderate SOP, like the Laudan principle. They suffer more under a
higher SOP regime because they are more likely to be treated as though they
are really guilty.354 Second, there are those who would be convicted using
either SOP. They suffer more under a higher SOP regime because they are
more likely to face harsh punishments.355 Third, there are those who would
seem to benefit from a higher SOP, those who would be convicted under a
lower SOP, but who would not be convicted under a higher one. But even
for this group, the benefit may be less than it seems at first, if it exists at all.
If the higher SOP produces more crime, then the system is likely to respond
with more arrests and prosecutions. As a result, “even if [a higher SOP]
lowers the rate of false convictions, it could still increase the total number
of false convictions.”356 Thus instead of it being less likely that one will
suffer a false conviction, it might become more likely.
How do these effects impact the SOP? Epps discusses these effects
only in the context of criticizing the customary understanding of the
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.

See Epps, supra note 15.
Id. at 1098.
Id. at 1100–01.
Id. at 1110–11.
Id. at 1111–12.
Id. at 1112–13.
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BARD principle, and only contrasting that with an SOP aimed at accuracy.
In truth, however, there is nothing inherently significant about accuracy as
a break on these effects.357 The effects all push for adopting, or at least
pretending to adopt,358 a lower SOP than one would choose without taking
them into account. This is not to suggest that nothing else pushes the other
way. There may also be dynamic effects that call for a higher SOP. For
example, if people believe that too many innocents are convicted, they
may come to distrust law enforcement, thereby undermining the
cooperation necessary to control crime. But the overall and plausible thrust
of Epps’s discussion is to suggest that even the Laudan standard may be
too high.
The overall effect would probably not be large; the effects Epps
discusses are fairly marginal.359 For example, the pursuit of effective
deterrence through harsher punishment may be limited by a general social
sense of proportional punishment, causing prosecutors not to prosecute
and juries not convict if the punishments are too harsh.360 It may also be
limited by awareness that more draconian punishments do less to control
crime than ensuring that punishment is more certain.361 Thus, a high SOP
may not lead to draconian punishments. But to give Epps’s arguments some
credit, it is still worth shaving a few points off the SOP that we were left
with after considering the first six factors.
In the end, if we continue to differentiate the two influences of factor 6,
we get an SOP range of 71 to 78%. And if we average the influence of factor
6, we come up with an SOP of approximately 75%, the Laudan standard.

357. See supra Part III.A (arguing that accuracy has only at most instrumental
value for setting the SOP).
358. As Epps notes, most of these effects do not depend on the criminal law
actually using a high SOP. Most depend primarily on the belief that the criminal
law uses a high SOP. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
359. Epps expresses his own caution, if not skepticism, admitting that “some
of the . . . dynamic costs may be fairly marginal. For example, the additional
stigma acquitted innocent defendants suffer may be real but small in any given
case.” Epps, supra note 15, at 1122.
360. See, e.g., Robinson & Darley, supra note 337, at 185 (“To the extent that
the threat of official punishment stems from a legal rule that people perceive as
unjust—which is by definition the case where deterrence-based rules deviate from
perceived desert—the offender may discount the threat of punishment in the belief
that, no matter what the law on the books says, the lawyers and judges and jurors
in the system would not in fact be so unjust as to actually enforce the rule as
written.”); see also Neal Kumar Katyal, Deterrence’s Difficulty, 95 MICH. L. REV.
2385 (1997).
361. See 1 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING
VIOLENCE: REPORT OF THE NATIONAL RESEARCH PANEL ON THE UNDERSTANDING
AND CONTROL OF VIOLENCE 6 (Albert E. Roth, Jr. & Jeffrey A. Roth eds. 1993).

